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THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
Federal Statutes and Regulation
FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION - RULE lOb-5 - In Pari Delicto
IS A DEFENSE IN SUITS BROUGHT UNDER RULE lOb-5 BY A TIPPEE
AGAINST A TIPPER.
Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank (1977)
Plaintiffs Tarasi and Sampas (tippees) alleged that they were informed
by defendant Mialki (tipper), an officer of defendant Pittsburgh National
Bank, that a merger between two corporations - Meridian Industries and
Paragon Plastics - was going to occur and that executives of defendant
bank were making large investments in the securities of both corporations.'
Purportedly advised by Mialki that it would be beneficial to invest in
Meridian Industries, 2 plaintiffs purchased stock of the corporation without
disclosing this inside information. 3 The merger between the two corpora-
tions did not take place and the value of the plaintiffs' stock declined.,
Plaintiffs brought suit against Mialki and the bank under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Act)5 and rule 10b-5 6 promulgated
1. Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, i154 (3d Cir. 1977). Mialki,
Tarasi's personal banker, originally gave this information to Tarasi and told him not
to repeat it to anyone. Id. However, Tarasi and Mialki later disclosed the information
to Sampas. Id. A third plaintiff, Virginia Harrigan, alleged that she received similar
information from Mialki. Id. at 1155. Tarasi and Mialki met with Harrigan and
indicated to her that Meridian was "good stock" and the bank was behind it. Id. The
record, however, indicates that the proposed merger was not mentioned to Harrigan.
Id.
2. Id. at 1154-55. Mialki indicated that it was too late to invest in Paragon
Plastics to obtain a benefit. Id. at 1154.
3. Id. at 1154-55. Tarasi purchased 1200 shares of common stock on the open
market; Harrigan purchased 100 shares of common stock. Id. Sampas purchased
numerous three-month "call" options. Id. at 1155.
4. Id. at 1156. At the time of the purchases the stock was trading at
approximately eight dollars per share. Id. at 1154. When the merger did not occur, this
value dropped to about one dollar per share. Id. at 1156.
5. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section
10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading or,
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thereunder, alleging that they had purchased stock on the basis of false and
misleading information supplied by Mialki, resulting in losses of $22,000.1
The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment8 on the ground that
the plaintiffs were in pari delicto9 and therefore could not recover. 10 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit" affirmed,
holding that in pari delicto is an appropriate defense in suits brought under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 where the plaintiffs fault is substantially equal
to that of the defendant and policy considerations support the sustaining of
the defense. Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir. 1977).
The preamble of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states that the
Act's provisions are designed to "provide for regulation and control of
[transactions on securities exchanges],. . . and to insure the maintenance of
fair and honest markets .... ,,12 This broad statement of purpose, in
conjunction with the sparse legislative and administrative history,13 has left
much of the development of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, which prohibit
fraudulent or manipulative devices in the purchase or sale of securities, to
the discretion of the courts.14
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Id.
7. 555 F.2d at 1154. Tarasi reimbursed Harrigan for her losses when the stock
declined. Id. at 1156. The effect of this reimbursement upon Harrigan's claim was not
discussed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Id. at 1156 n.7.
8. Id. at 1156. The lower court opinion is unreported.
9. See text accompanying note 44 infra.
10. 555 F.2d at 1156.
11. The case was heard by Judges Adams, Kalodner and Hunter. Judge Adams
wrote the opinion.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (197). See also, H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2
(1934) and S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934) wherein President
Roosevelt's message delivered prior to passage of the Act, which contains a similar
statement of purpose, is reported.
13. See A. JACOBS, The Impact of Rule 10b-5 §5 (1st rev. ed. 1977).
14. Id. § 6.01. In analyzing the policies underlying rule 10b-5, Jacobs stated:
"[case law] refer[s] to no less than eight policies underlying the Rule: (1) maintaining
free securities markets; (2) equalizing access to information; (3) insuring equal
bargaining strength; (4) providing for disclosure; (5) protecting investors; (6) assuring
fairness; (7) building investor confidence; and (8) deterring violations while
compensating victims." Id. Since these policies overlap, a court may cite and rely
upon several of them in reaching a decision regarding the purposes of § 10(b) and rule
10b-5. Id. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
235-37 (2d Cir. 1974) (equalizing access to information, providing for disclosure,
protecting investors, assuring fairness); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
passim (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (fairness, equal access,
deterrence, free markets, disclosure, and protecting the investing public); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 passim (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417
F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (deterring violations while
compensating victims, disclosure, assuring fairness, protecting investors); Speed v.
TransAm Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829, 831 (D. Del. 1951) (insuring equal bargaining
strength, disclosure, assuring fairness, protecting investors, deterring violations while
compensating victims).
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Although neither section 10(b) nor rule lOb-5 specifically provides for a
private cause of action arising out of an alleged 10b-5 violation, 15 since
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,' s the judiciary has implied such a cause of
action.' 7 Suits brought pursuant to this judicially implied cause of action
have occasionally raised the question of whether the plaintiffs own illegal
behavior is a defense in lOb-5 actions, when it is a substantial cause of his
injury.18
The Supreme Court's most thorough analysis of the propriety of the in
pari delicto defense in a suit brought to enforce a regulatory statute occurred
in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.19 In Perma Life,
dealers brought a treble damage suit against their franchisor and others,
alleging that their contracts violated the federal antitrust laws.2° The Court
15. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The argument
has been advanced that, in light of the sections of the Act that specifically provide for
a private cause of action, the absence of such a provision in § 10(b) or rule 10b-5 is
conspicuous. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78 p, 78r (1976). The courts,
however, have consistently rejected this argument, referring generally to the broad
purposes of the Act and the well settled principles of judicial interpretation of
legislation. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
235 (2d Cir. 1974); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946).
16. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
17. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975);
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Fratt v.
Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783
(2d Cir. 1951); Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
The reason for implying a private cause of action was explained in Fratt:
We can think of nothing that would tend more toward discouraging trading off
the established business markets and out of governmental regulation or that
would more certainly tend to deter fraudulent practices in security transactions
and thus make the Act more "reasonably complete and effective" than the right
of defrauded sellers or buyers of securities to seek redress for damages in federal
courts.
203 F.2d at 632. See also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (private cause of action in antitrust suit); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (private cause of action to enforce
Investment Advisors Act of 1940); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d
Cir. 1970) (private cause of action for broker violation of margin requirements section
of Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See generally 78 HARv. L. REv. 1241 (1965).
18. In securities cases, courts have -be-en divided as to the applicability of the
defense. Compare Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (defense not available to tippers against tippees) with James v. Du Breuil, 500
F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974) (in pari delicto precludes seller from recovering against buyer
in suit for alleged violation of securities antifraud provision); Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969) (in pari delicto defense bars recovery by tippee from
tipper). See also Wohl v. Blair Co., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (in pari delicto
defense not stricken on pretrial motion).
19. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). In antitrust cases, the Supreme Court has consistently
denied in pari delicto as a defense. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951),
20. 392 U.S. 134, 135. Plaintiffs alleged defendants had violated § 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), and §§ 2-3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14
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held that "the doctrine of in pari delicto, with its complex scope, contents,
and effects, is not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action. ' 21 The
Court's analysis consisted of two parts. First, the Perma Life Court
considered the policy behind the antitrust treble damage suit and the effects
the defense of in pari delicto might have upon effectuating those policies. 22
Noting "the inappropriateness of invoking broad common law barriers to
relief when a private suit serves important public purposes," 23 the Court
concluded that the private action must remain a vital force "to deter anyone
contemplating business behavior in violation of antitrust laws [and] to
further the overriding public policy in favor of competition. ' 24
In the second part of its analysis, the Court dismissed the franchisor's
argument that in pari delicto was an appropriate defense, concluding that
the contention that the dealers actively supported the entire restrictive
program, participated in its formulation, and encouraged its continuation
was "utterly refuted by the record. 25 However, the Court expressly left open
the question of "whether ... truly complete involvement and participation
in a monopolistic scheme could ever be a basis ... for barring a plaintiffs
cause of action. '26 In separate concurring opinions, four justices contended,
in essence, that a plaintiff should be barred from recovering if his fault was
substantially equal to that of the defendant.27
The federal courts that have attempted to apply Perma Life to in pari
delicto defenses raised in private suits under rule 10b-5 have reached
different results. In Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,28 the Fifth Circuit held that
in pari delicto barred a suit by a tippee against a tipper 29 under section 10(b)
(1976), by requiring dealers to execute contracts, prepared by Midas, which required
dealers to purchase all mufflers from Midas at a fixed price, and prevented them from
selling outside designated territories before dealers could get a franchise. 392 U.S. at
136-37. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held plaintiffs were barred by in
pari delicto because the plaintiffs had sought the contracts, made profits, and had
voluntarily entered into additional franchise agreements, all while fully aware of the
restrictions. Id. at 138, citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,
367 F.2d 692, 699 (7th Cir. 1967).
21. 392 U.S. at 140.
22. Id. at 138-39.
23. Id. at 138.
24. Id. at 139. The Court further commented: "A more fastidious regard for the
relative moral worth of the parties would only result in seriously undermining the
usefulness of the private action as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement." Id.
25. Id. at 140. The Court also noted that although the plaintiffs might be subject
to criticism for taking part in the illegal scheme and partaking in profit, "their
participation was not voluntary in any meaningful sense." Id. at 139. The Court
stated: "Petitioners apparently accepted many of these restraints [contractual clauses
about which petitioners complained] solely because their acquiescence was necessary
to obtain an otherwise attractive business opportunity." Id.
26. Id. at 140.
27. Id. at 146 (White, J., concurring). See id. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring)
(equality of position analysis); id. at 153 (Marshall, J., concurring) (respective fault
approach); id. at 153 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (equally liable standard).
28. 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
29. In Tarasi, the Third Circuit defined a tipper as "a person who has possession
of material inside information and who makes selective disclosure of such
[VOL. 23
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and rule 10b-5.30 The Kuehnert court's discussion of the character of the
plaintiffs participation and the policy considerations involved 31 paralleled
the analysis developed in Perma Life.32 Analyzing plaintiffs involvement,
the court reduced the problem to "an accounting between joint conspira-
tors," stating that "the degree of public interest is not comparable to that
made apparent by the triple damage provision of antitrust legislation. '33
Although the court recognized that the plaintiff was in fact a dupe, it noted
that he acted voluntarily 4 and was therefore equally at fault as the
defendant. 35
Turning to the policy considerations, the Kuehnert court concluded that
the defense should be allowed in light of the need to put deterrent pressure
on the tippee36 and to prevent what would otherwise provide tippees with
"an enforceable warranty that secret information is true."37
information for trading or other personal purposes," and a tippee as "one who
receives such information from a 'tipper."' 555 F.2d at 1154 n.1.
30. 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969). See notes 5 & 6 supra. In Kuehnert, plaintiff
bought stock in Texstar Corporation on the basis of information supplied by Rhame, a
former president of the corporation. Rhame informed the plaintiff that Texstar
Corporation was about to merge with Coronet Petroleum Company and that the value
of Texstar stock would greatly increase as a result. 412 F.2d at 702. The plaintiff did
not disclose this information when he purchased the stock. When he later found out
that the information was false and that Rhame had duped him in an attempt to gain
control of Texstar Corporation, the plaintiff brought suit against Rhame and the
corporation. Id. The corporation raised as a separate defense that Rhame's actions
were his own personal affair and were not authorized by it, but this issue was not
reached by the district court. Id. at 701.
31. Id. at 703.
32. See notes 20-27 and accompanying text supra.
33. 412 F.2d at 703. To support this position, the Fifth Circuit pointed to the
availability of the "unclean hands" defense - the equitable counterpart of in pari
delicto - in actions involving the Securities Exchange Commission's proxy
requirements. Id. Further, the court noted that true co-conspirators may be deprived of
recovery even under the Sherman Act. Id. See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text
supra; note 53 infra.
34. 412 F.2d at 702.
35. Id. at 704. The court remarked that technically the plaintiff knew nothing,
concealed nothing, and hence did not defraud his vendors. Id. Yet, the Fifth Circuit
held: "The statutory phrase 'any manipulative or deceptive device' . .. seems broad
enough to encompass conduct irrespective of its outcome .... The absence of actual
harm to his vendors, as far as the plaintiff was concerned, was a pure fortuity." Id.
(citations omitted).
36. Id. at 705. The court stated:
[I]n view of the substantial deterrent pressures already felt by the corporate
insider, .. .we think it important that tippees, who present the same threat to
the investing public as do insiders themselves, should be offered appropriate
discouragement. We conclude that the better choice is to leave upon persons
believing themselves tippees the restraint arising from the fear of irretrievable
loss should they act upon a tip which proves to have been untrue. Hence the loss
must lie where it falls.
Id. (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 705. The court recognized that "if a tippee has no remedy against an
insider's private falsehoods, little deterrent against such conduct will exist .... "Id.
Nonetheless, the court maintained that allowing the tippee to sue would give him a
"free rein," stating: "[Ilf what [the tippee] is told is false, he can recover against his
1977-19781
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Confronted with the same issue as in Kuehnert, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held, in Nathanson v.
Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,38 that in pari delicto was not a defense to a suit
by tippees against a tipper.39 In its analysis, the court noted that plaintiffs'
conduct constituted a fraudulent practice since they took advantage of
unknowledgeable stockholders.40 However, the court's consideration of the
impact the in pari delicto defense would have on the investment market led
it to conclude that the tipper should be held responsible for his actions.4'
Specifically, the Nathanson court determined that the private suit under rule
10b-5 is necessary to enforce the policies of the rule and the Act itself "as a
means not only of redressing a private wrong, but also of protecting the
public interest. '42
informer. If it is true, he will ... be liable to his vendors or vendees, but here he may
well be protected by the difficulties of discovery." Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Godbold took issue with the majority's policy
analysis. Id. at 705 (Godbold, J., dissenting). Judge Godbold believed that the in pari
delicto defense would stifle the private suit in 10b-5 cases, noting that such a suit is a
"major weapon - and may be the most important weapon - in attainment of the
policies exemplified by the Act and the rule." Id. at 706 (Godbold, J., dissenting). In
general, Judge Godbold thought tippers should be held liable since they are the source
and the first step in the chain of dissemination of information harmful to the
securities market. Id.
38. 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
39. Id. at 53. In Nathanson, plaintiffs bought stock in TST Industries, Inc. (TST)
on the basis of inside information, supplied by an employee of the defendant
brokerage firm, which indicated that upon a merger with Elgin National Watch Co.
(Elgin), the TST stock would be exchanged for Elgin stock, which was worth about
twice as much as TST stock, on a one-for-one basis. Id. at 51. The exchange never
occurred and plaintiffs brought suit against the firm under § 10(b) and rule lob-5. Id.
40. Id. at 55.
41. Id. at 57. The court stated:
If the prophylactic purpose of the law is to restrict the use of all material inside
information until it is made available to the investing public, then the most
effective means of carrying out this policy is to nip in the bud the source of the
information, the tipper, by discouraging him from "making the initial disclosure
which is the first step in this chain of dissemination."
Id., quoting Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d at 706 (Godbold, J., dissenting). See
note 37 supra.
42. 325 F. Supp. at 54 (footnote omitted). The court observed that the Act was
designed "to prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in
securities transactions generally. . . ." Id. at 53, quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968). In addition, the court
noted that rule 10b-5 "is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities
market place that all investors ... have relatively equal access to material
information . . . ." Id.
Recognizing the "surface appeal" of the argument that tippee suits would
supply tippees with an indemnity against loss, the Nathanson court maintained that
the tippee is subject to prosecution by those he defrauded and discounted the
difficulties of locating tippees for such purposes. Id. at 55 n.26. See note 37 and
accompanying text supra. Furthermore, while the court did not ignore plaintiffs'
participation in an illegal act, it observed that tippees and tippers were in inherently
unequal positions. 325 F. Supp. at 57. The court observed:
The true insider ... is at the fountainhead of the confidential information,
whereas the tippee . . . may be only one of many who innocently or otherwise
[VOL. 23
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Against this conflicting background, the Third Circuit confronted the
question "whether the defense of in pari delicto stands as a bar to a lawsuit
brought by 'tippees' against a 'tipper' pursuant to section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder. ' 13 After defining in pari delicto as that
doctrine which bars a party "from recovering damages if his losses are
substantially caused by 'activities the law forbade him to engage in,'"44 the
court examined Perma Life,4 5 Kuehnert,46 and Nathanson 47 and announced
that the test for the applicability of the defense would be whether the
plaintiffs fault was "substantially equal" to that of the defendant.48
In applying the analytical framework of Perma Life, the Third Circuit
first discussed whether the plaintiffs' conduct justified the application of in
pari delicto.49 The court noted that the plaintiffs, by failing to disclose the
inside information before purchasing securities in Meridian Industries,
clearly violated the securities laws.50 Furthermore, the court emphasized
that these illegal acts were committed by the plaintiffs voluntarily 5' and
"may fairly be said to be a sine qua non of their losses." 52 The Third Circuit
therefore concluded "that the prohibited conduct of the plaintiffs is of
receives a tip, and whose potential for harm is minimal as compared to that of
the original source of the information. While it is true that each is in a position to
take advantage of the public investor, the greater threat to the investor is posed
by the original insider . .. ."
Id. This factor, coupled with the strong policy arguments against barring private suits
to enforce regulatory statutes, precluded the tipper from benefiting from the in pari
delicto defense. Id. at 56-58. The court stated:
[I]t appears that the fundamental purpose of the securities acts in the prevention
of fraud, manipulation or deception in connection with securities transactions
and in compelling adherence by insiders to their duty to disclose material inside
information before action upon it, would better be achieved by disallowing rather
than allowing the defense.
Id. at 56-57.
43. 555 F.2d at 1154 (footnotes omitted). Also before the court was plaintiffs'
argument that summary judgment should not have been granted by the district court
because there were material facts at issue. Id. at 1156. The court rejected this
argument, concluding that there was no dispute as to the factual matters bearing on
the defense of in pari delicto. Id. The court stated that "if the defense ... is applicable
in securities fraud cases, . . . the defendants would still be entitled to a verdict as a
matter of law even if plaintiffs prevailed as to every disputed factual issue." Id.
44. Id., (emphasis in original) quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. at 154.
45. 555 F.2d at 1157-59. See notes 20-27 and accompanying text supra.
46. 555 F.2d at 1159-60. See notes 28-37 and accompanying text supra.
47. 555 F.2d at 1160-61. See notes 38-42 and accompanying text supra.
48. 555 F.2d at 1161.
49. Id.
50. Id. See notes 5 & 6 supra.
51. 555 F.2d at 1161. The court distinguished Perma Life by noting that in
antitrust transactions there is usually some form of an agreement between the parties,
whereas in securities transactions there is no such relationship which predicates the
allegations of fraud. Id. The court concluded, however, that the case before them
"contain[ed] an important element, absent in Perma Life, that, we believe, makes it an
instance of joint participation in wrong-doing - specifically, voluntary illegal
conduct on the part of the plaintiffs." Id. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
52. Id. at 1162.
1977-19781
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sufficient magnitude and has a sufficient causal relation with their losses to
bring into play the concept of in pari delicto . . . 3
Reaching the question of the impact of the in pari delicto defense upon
the enforcement of the regulatory system,5 4 the court noted that the concern
of enforcement "cuts both ways"5 5 since both parties violated rule 10b-5 and
disallowing or applying the defense would have a deterrent impact on one of
the parties. 56 Nonetheless, the court concluded that "the enforcement
pressure that non-recognition of in pari delicto would engender through
incremental deterrence of 'tippers' [was] outweighed by the prophylactic
impact on the use of inside information that allowance of the defense will
lead to." 57 The court noted three major factors to support this conclusion: 1)
if the in pari delicto defense were not allowed, only tippers believing their
information to be false would be deterred;5 8 2) the in pari delicto defense
would "eliminate the warranty of the accuracy of the tip";59 and 3) other
deterrents against tippers are available. 60
53. Id. The Tarasi court, in its analysis, seemed to adopt the test of the concurringjustices in Perma Life, noting that the Court itself had "diluted" its holding by
reserving "the point 'whether truly complete involvement and participation in a
monopolistic scheme' could form the basis of a defense." Id. at 1158, quoting 392 U.S.
at 140. See note 27 and accompanying text supra. The Tarasi court noted that, the five
justices who did concur "explicitly concluded that they would hold, in some
circumstances, that illegal conduct on the part of a plaintiff would prevent him from
recovering." 555 F.2d at 1158. See The Supreme Court 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63,
260-61 (1968). But see 60 CALIF. L. REv. 572, 575 (1972), where it was stated that
Justice Black, writing for the Perma Life Court, "made no attempt ... to balance the
competing interests of eliminating anticompetitive schemes and investigating the
moral worth of the plaintiffs. In his view, such balancing inhibits the effectiveness of
the private action, which is the basis of antitrust enforcement." Id.
54. 555 F.2d at 1162.
55. Id. at 1163.
56. Id.
57. Id. See 69 DUKE L.J. 832 (1969) and 50 B.U.L. Rav. 87 (1970), which agree with
the analysis of the Kuehnert court and the conclusion that "to bar recovery by a
defrauded tippee seems the more effective method to protect that policy." 69 DUKE L.J.
832, 840 (1969).
In addition to its discussion of the impact of the in pari delicto defense on
securities law, the Tarasi court also took into consideration the two factors that
provide the basis for in pari delicto: augmenting the integrity of the court, and
preventing unjust enrichment. 555 F.2d at 1165. Furthermore, the court noted that
since the private cause of action under rule 10b-5 is judicially implied, it is
appropriate that "limited, judicially fashioned" defenses be engrafted as well. Id.
58. Id. at 1163. The court noted: "[Plarticularly in light of the [rule] that a
showing of scienter is a prerequisite to private recoveries under rule 10b-5, it is
questionable whether such tippers would be forestalled from spreading inside
information by the threat of 'tippee' suits." Id. (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 1163-64. The court referred to the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Kuehnert
and noted that "the danger of eliminating in pari delicto is that such a stance would
give 'tippees' almost no incentive to forebear from using inside information." Id. at
1163.
60. Id. at 1164. The court relied on Kuehnert in stating that "substantial
deterrents to 'tippers' are provided by the possibility of SEC and criminal actions and
private suits by non-'tippee' purchasers and sellers who have been adversely affected
by the dissemination of inside information." Id.
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The Tarasi court based its holding that the defense of in pari delicto was
allowed upon two observations. Initially, the court asserted that allowing
the defense would "best serve the policies that undergird the securities
law. '61 It is submitted that this assertion does not accord proper importance
to the function tippee suits serve in revealing the tipper.62 By barring tippee
suits, it may now be possible for tippers to dispense information in
anonymity, with no great risk of prosecution by the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC), since the SEC is largely dependent on private actions in
uncovering violations.63
The Tarasi court also observed that tippee violations would be deterred
if in pari delicto were applied.6 4 Implicit in this observation is the
assumption that tippees will be hesitant to act on inside information absent
protection from loss should the information be faulty. It is submitted,
however, that prior to acting upon inside information, a tippee does not
often consider the possibility of suing his source if the information is
wrong.65
The impact of the Tarasi decision on litigation under rule 10b-5 is
unclear. Although the Tarasi court's ultimate conclusion accorded with the
decision in Kuehnert,66 in examining the fault of the parties, the Third
Circuit created an uncertain standard to be employed in determining
whether the defense of in pari delicto is applicable. At the outset of its
analysis, the Tarasi court stated the test to be whether the plaintiffs' fault
was "substantially equal" 67 to that of the defendant. The court later
determined, however, that the plaintiffs' illegal activities were "of sufficient
magnitude and [had] a sufficient causal relation with their losses to bring
into play the concept of in pari delicto .... ,"68 As a result of these different
and ambiguous standards, it is submitted that courts will have difficulty in
applying Tarasi consistently, and may reach different decisions depending
on the standard they employ.
61. Id. at 1163.
62. Even the Kuehnert court, which denied suit by allowing in pari delicto,
recognized that if "tippee suits were barred, there would be little deterrent against the
tipper." 412 F.2d at 705.
63. Comment, Rule lOb-5: The In Pari Delicto And Unclean Hands Defense. 58
CALIF. L. REv. 1149 (1970). Conceding that heavy trading is fairly easy to detect, one
commentator maintained that "less spectacular cases may be nearly impossible to
uncover without extremely costly and undesirable federal invasions of privacy ....
The SEC cannot be expected to dissipate its energies chasing down a multitude of
disconnected two party transactions . . . ." Id. at 1159.
64. 555 F.2d at 1163. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text supra.
65. See Comment, supra note 63. As this commentator stated:
It is questionable ... whether barring the tippee's action against the insider
will effectively provide the deterrence the courts assumed that it would .... In
most instances, tippees will have taken the tip from someone they trust, and
therefore will not doubt the person's word. The tippee just wants to make money
and does not think of possible adverse consequences.
Id. at 1159.
66. See notes 28-37 and accompanying text supra.
67. 555 F.2d at 1161.
68. Id. at 1162.
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In Tarasi, the Third Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in limiting the
parties who can bring suits to enforce rule 10b-5.69 In other areas in which
private suits are used to enforce a regulatory scheme, common law barriers,
including the in pari delicto defense, have been rejected because they hinder
implementation of legislative and administrative policies.70 Until the
Supreme Court provides guidance, it is unclear whether the trend
established by Kuehnert and Tarasi in 10b-5 litigation will be continued.
Kathleen M. Donahue
FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION - FRAUDULENT ACTIVITY MUST
OCCUR "IN CONNECTION WITH" PURCHASE OR SALE OF SECURITIES TO
VIOLATE SECTION 10(b).
Ketchum v. Green (1977)
Babb, Inc. (Babb), a close corporation engaged in the insurance
brokerage business,1 suffered from internal corporate dissension which
resulted in the dismissal of its chairman of the board and its president.2 The
69. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
70. See note 19 and accompanying text supra. See also 60 CALIF. L. REV. 572
(1972) in which the author comments on the rationale behind the majority opinion in
Perma Life stating that the approach taken by Justice Black revealed the "basic
perspective that the judiciary should use all reasonable means to eliminate
anticompetitive business conduct." Id. at 575. This viewpoint was recognized by the
Nathanson court and the dissenting judge in Kuehnert who stated that allowing the
in pari delicto defense "as a judicially imposed restraint on 10b-5 litigation will
hinder the effective weapon of the private suit." 412 F.2d at 706 (Godbold, J.,
dissenting). See 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 44 TUL. L. REV. 618 (1970). Here the
Kuehnert court was criticized in the following manner:
It is submitted that, in a 'tipper-tippee' relationship as in [Kuehnert], the
doctrine of ... in pari delicto [has] no place as [a] defense to violations of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 .... [T]he importance of the private action under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 is only now at its first stage of serious development.
Id. at 624-25. This commentator also felt that judicially imposed restraints such as in
pari delicto will only obstruct the remedial purposes of those regulations. Id. at 625.
1. Babb, Inc., is incorporated in Pennsylvania and conducts its brokerage
business in Pittsburgh, Cleveland and Philadelphia. Ketchum v. Green, 415 F. Supp.
1367, 1368 (W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940
(1977).
2. See note 4 infra.
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ousted officers, Chandler Ketchum and Harold Bigler, brought suit against
other officers and directors of Babb3 to enjoin their dismissal.4
Although the defendants constituted a majority of the board of
directors,5 they collectively held only about forty-eight percent of the
outstanding stock.6 Ketchum and Bigler, on the other hand, owned forty-four
percent of the shares and, with the proxies they had obtained from minority
shareholders, held the controlling block of stock.7
Several months before Babb's annual shareholders' meeting scheduled
for April 1976, the defendants determined to oust Ketchum and Bigler from
their posts." However, the defendants had to be reelected to their position of
dominance on the board of directors in order to legitimately exercise the
function of appointing company executives.9 To ensure their reelection, the
defendants found it prudent not to reveal their intentions to plaintiffs who,
as controlling shareholders, had the ultimate power to determine the board's
composition. 10 Thus, at the annual meeting when a nominating committee
submitted to the shareholders a slate of the incumbent board members,
which included the defendants and the unsuspecting plaintiffs," the slate
was approved by a unanimous vote.' 2 The newly reelected board imme-
diately met to choose officers.1 3 In accordance with the expectations of all
parties, the nominating committee then submitted the names of Ketchum
and Bigler for the offices of chairman of the board and president. 4 The
defendants, now reentrenched as the majority on the board, rejected the
proposed slate and instead elected their own nominees. 15 Ketchum and
Bigler were then terminated as employees by action of the board.16
3. 415 F. Supp. at 1368. At the time of the ouster there were eleven members of
the board of directors. Id. at 1369 n.1. The seven directors who voted to oust the
plaintiffs were Waugh, Livingston, Steele, Green, McCutchen, Roof and Hiltz. Id.
These seven were named as defendants. Id. Directors Whitridge and Hainsfurther
voted in favor of the plaintiffs and were not made parties to the suit. Id. The
corporation itself was also made a defendant. Id. at 1370.
4. Id. at 1370. Both Ketchum and Bigler had assumed active management of
Babb in 1967, along with certain of the defendants, and the corporation had initially
prospered under their stewardship. Id. at 1368. However, Babb had not shown a profit
for at least the preceding three years. Id. Several of the defendants became
dissatisfied and complained that plaintiffs had wastefully diverted corporate
resources into losing ventures and had repeatedly disregarded the board of directors
in the formulation of corporate policy. Id. at 1368-69.
5. Id. at 1369 n.1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1369. See note 4 supra.
9. 415 F. Supp. at 1369 n.1.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1369.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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Under the terms of a stock-retirement agreement, all Babb shareholders
were required to be employees. 17 Thus, having lost their employment status,
plaintiffs could no longer hold Babb stock, and the board authorized its
purchase and tendered payment.'8 Ketchum and Bigler refused to surrender
their shares.19 Instead, they sought to enjoin their dismissal as officers and
shareholders of Babb and to secure damages, 20 claiming that their dismissal
had been fraudulently obtained in violation of section 10(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act (1934 Act)21 and of rule 10b-5. 22 The United States
17. Id. The shareholders' agreement, dated November 18, 1968, required a
shareholder or his representative to surrender his stock upon death, retirement, or
disability at a price determined by a formula relating to corporate income. Id. at
1369-70 nn.2 & 3. The agreement, which was drafted at the instruction and with the
participation of the plaintiffs, had been consistently enforced. Id. at 1369. If the
employee was terminated for any reason other than death, retirement, or disability,
one-third of the formula price was paid. Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1023 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977). Plaintiffs claimed that during this period the
stock was worth $15.00 per share. 557 F.2d at 1023 n.1. At the time of the lawsuit the
repurchase price for death, retirement, or disability was $7.90 per share and the price
for other forms of termination was $2.63 per share. Id.
18. 415 F. Supp. at 1369-70.
19. Id. at 1370.
20. 557 F.2d at 1024.
21. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976). Section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act provides, inter alia:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976), and the 1934 Act were
passed by Congress in an attempt to restore order in the market after the financial
crash of 1929 through federal regulation of securities. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1934). "The 1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors against
manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities
exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges."
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976), citing S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934). The Securities and Exchange Commission was provided
with "an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers" to carry out the 1934 Act. Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
22. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5 (1977). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942 to enforce
section 10(b). See note 21 supra. The rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5 (1977). For purposes of this note, references to section 10(b) are
meant to encompass rule 10b-5, the administrative derivative of the statute.
Ketchum and Bigler claimed that the defendants were able to maintain their
majority position on the board of directors despite their minority position as
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District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed the action
for failure to state a claim under these provisions.2
3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 24 affirmed,
holding that any fraudulent activity by the defendants did not occur "in
connection with" the surrender of plaintiffs' stock to the company and that
consequently there was no basis for recovery under section 10(b). Ketchum v.
Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977).
Although a clear-cut test for determining the elements of a section 10(b)
cause of action has not yet been enunciated, there are common areas of
inquiry that courts repeatedly examine in determining whether a violation
has occurred.25 A nonexhaustive list includes questions regarding the
existence of a fraud or a manipulative or deceptive device, 26 the requirement
stockholders by failing to disclose their intention to oust the plaintiffs in the
officership election. 415 F. Supp. at 1370. The plaintiffs maintained that defendants'
misrepresentations tainted the subsequent actions that culminated in the activation
of the stock retirement agreement. Id. at 1370-71. Their argument proceeded as
follows: The defendants could not gain control of Babb unless the plaintiffs could be
divested of the stock; Ketchum and Bigler could not be forced to surrender their stock
unless they were discharged as employees and this could not be achieved unless the
defendants had control of the board; the defendants could not gain control of the
board unless they were reelected as directors; the reelection depended on the
concealment of their intention to oust Ketchum and Bigler; therefore, the misrepresen-
tation was undertaken with the objective of fostering the surrender of the stock. Id. at
1370-71.
23. 415 F. Supp. at 1373. The district court held that "the 'in connection with'
language of Rule 10b-5 requires a showing of causation between the alleged fraud
and a plaintiff's sale (or purchase) of a security," id. at 1371, and that plaintiffs had
failed to show the "requisite causation." Id. at 1372. See notes 64-68 and
accompanying text infra. In addition, the court observed that "plaintiffs' complaint
goes to the propriety of their ouster and discharge, and not to the sale or purchase of
their Babb stock." Id. at 1373. See note 56 infra.
24. The case was argued before Judge Markey, Chief Judge, Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (sitting by designation), and Judges Aldisert and Adams. Judge
Adams wrote the opinion.
25. See A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5, § 36 (Sec. L. Serv. rev. ed. 1977);
Note, Securities Regulation - Rule 10b-5 - The Supreme Court's Holding in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), May
Force a Renewed Search for a Limiting Doctrine for Rule 10b-5 Liability, 50 Txx. L.
REv. 1273 (1972).
Although rule 10b-5 does not expressly provide for a private right of action,
private remedies have been established through judicial decision. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 730 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,13 n.9 (1971); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
26. The types of practices considered fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive have
been expanding. Initially, courts narrowly construed the kinds of "manipulative or
deceptive device[s] or contrivance[s]" which were made unlawful by section 10(b)
despite the broad language of the rule. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977); note 22 supra.
A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), held that section 10(b)
prohibited all fraudulent schemes, "whether the artifices employed involve[d] a
garden type variety of fraud, or present[ed] a unique form of deception." Id. at 397.
Coverage was expanded in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
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of a purchase or sale of securities in order to establish standing, 27 and
whether the alleged fraud was "in connection with" the purchase or sale of
securities.2 In addition, courts have explored questions of materiality, 29 of
reliance upon the fraud, 3° and of the need to show scienter or intent to
defraud.31
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), and its companion cases, Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d
Cir. 1968), and Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970). Those cases
enunciated a concept of "new fraud" which is not deception but rather involves the
exercise of undue influence over the actions of a corporation. 405 F.2d at 218-19, See
also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (failure of buyers to
disclose position as market makers to sellers); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (failure to disclose material
inside information equally to outsiders); A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d
Cir. 1967) (purchasing securities with no intention to pay unless their value rises).
27. The case of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), developed the rule that a plaintiff must have been either a
purchaser or a seller of the securities involved. 193 F.2d at 463-64. Similarly, in a
derivative action, the corporation on whose behalf the shareholder acted must also
have either purchased or sold securities. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792,
807 (5th Cir. 1970); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 824 (5th Cir. 1970). This purchaser-
seller rule has been generally followed in the other circuits. Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1974); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139,
156-58 (3d Cir. 1973); Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 433-35 (10th Cir. 1973).
However, courts have developed various exceptions. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (in suit for equitable relief it is not
necessary to establish all elements required in suit for money damages); Fensterm-
acher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 333, 336 n.4 (3d Cir. 1974) (claimant suing
for equitable relief not required to be a buyer or seller); Eason v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 661 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974)
(nontrading plaintiff who shows defendant's fraud to be the direct cause of damage
may have standing); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 960 (1974) (no requirement that plaintiff be a purchaser or seller in injunction
actions); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (plaintiff who
is damaged because he is fraudulently induced not to sell or buy and subsequently
sells or buys after learning of the fraud may have standing).
The United States Supreme Court adopted the Birnbaum rule in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), in which Justice Rehnquist stated:
"The virtue of the Birnbaum rule ... is that it limits the class of plaintiffs to those
who have at least dealt in the security to which the prospectus, representation or
omission relates." Id. at 747. For a discussion of Blue Chip and its effect on exceptions
to the Birnbaum rule, see Jacobs, Standing to Sue Under 10b-5 After Blue Chip
Stamps, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 387 (1976).
28. See notes 32-51 and accompanying text infra.
29. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811, rehearing
denied, 382 U.S. 933 (1965).
30. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the Supreme
Court held that "positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is
necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable
investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision." Id. at
153-54. See also Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975); Harnett v. Ryan
Homes, Inc., 496 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1974); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); Heit v. Wetzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
31. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Supreme Court
concluded in Hochfelder that section 10(b) "was addressed to practices that involve
some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct
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The area that had received the least attention in past years, the "in
connection with" element, has recently been the subject of increased judicial
treatment.32 Presently the United States Supreme Court's only direct
analysis of that factor is found in the 1971 case of Superintendent of
Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. 33 The facts in that
case disclosed that Manhattan Casualty Company's stock had been
purchased by a defendant who then engineered the sale of U.S. Treasury
Bonds held by the company, applying the proceeds to cover his check drawn
for the purchase price.3 4 In that way, the company's own assets had been
misappropriated and used by the defendant in his scheme to buy control of
the company.35 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York dismissed the complaint 36 and the Second Circuit affirmed37 on
the ground that section 10(b) was "limited to preserving the integrity of the
securities markets." 38 The United States Supreme Court reversed.39 In the
opinion, written by Justice Douglas, the Court held that "Manhattan
suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of
securities as an investor."40 The Court stated that "[s]ection 10(b) must be
read flexibly, not technically and restrictively." 41 However, Justice Douglas
noted that Congress had not intended section 10(b) to govern transactions
which were merely a matter of "internal corporate mismanagement," 42 thus
suggesting a limit to this broad "touching" test. Yet there is also language
alone." Id. at 201. The extent of applicability of the scienter requirement is presently
unresolved. See, e.g., Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
See also 22 ViLL. L. REV. 1238 (1977).
32. See A. JACOBS, supra note 25, at § 38.01; Note, SEC Rule 10b-5 - "In
Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Any Security" Restriction: Need for
Analytical Precision, 5 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 28 (1969).
33. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
34. Id. The Supreme Court detailed the steps involved in the scheme:
To complete the fraudulent scheme, Irving Trust issued a second $5,000,000
check to Manhattan which Sweeney, Manhattan's new president, tendered to
Belgian-American Bank & Trust Co. which issued a $5,000,000 certificate of
deposit over to New England Note Corp., a company alleged to be controlled by
Bourne. Bourne endorsed the certificate over to Belgian-American Banking Corp.
as collateral for a $5,000,000 loan from Belgian-American Banking to New
England. Its proceeds were paid to Irving Trust to cover the latter's second
$5,000,000 check.
Id. at 8 (footnotes omitted).
35. Id. at 7-9.
36. 300 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
37. 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970).
38. Id. at 361. The Second Circuit stated that "Rule 10b-5 was not intended to.
provide a remedy for schemes amounting to no more than 'fraudulent mismanage-
ment of corporate affairs.'" Id. at 360, quoting Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193
F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The court found that the rule's
purpose was to protect the securities market and the investing public, that the alleged
fraud affected neither the market nor the public, and that therefore the rule could not
be extended to cover the scheme. 430 F.2d at 360-61.
39. 404 U.S. 6, 14.
40. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 12.
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in the Bankers Life opinion which suggests that the Court will apply section
10(b) to areas formerly reserved for state corporation law.4 3 The Court was
unclear in defining the scope of the "internal corporate mismanagement"
exception to the "touching" test;44 additional language suggests that a
breach of fiduciary duty would not fit within the exception and might be a
violation of the 1934 Act.45
43. 404 U.S. at 12. "Since there was a 'sale' of a security and since fraud was used
'in connection with' it, there is redress under § 10(b), whatever might be available as a
remedy under state law." Id.
44. Id. It is not clear exactly what Justice Douglas intended to fall within his
"internal corporate mismanagement" exception. Id. The Second Circuit had held that
the Bankers Life scheme was nothing more than fraudulent mismanagement of
corporate affairs and thus not within the purview of section 10(b). 430 F.2d at 360-61.
See note 38 supra. The Supreme Court's reversal determined that the Bankers Life
facts did not fall within the internal corporate mismanagement exception. 404 U.S. at
12. Thus, in spite of the discussion of mismanagement and fiduciary duty, the
Bankers Life outcome appears to have been generated by the "touching" test.
The corporate mismanagement exception was applied by the Sixth Circuit in
Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977)
(only claims stated by minority shareholders objecting to merger with tender offeror
were violations of fiduciary duty and of state statutes prohibiting transactions unfair
and oppressive to shareholders).
Two cases that noted the corporate mismanagement exception but did not
dismiss the 10b-5 claim on that ground were In re Penn Central Securities Litigation,
494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974) (reorganization of a railroad through formation of a
holding company involved only an incidental exchange of shares) and Popkin v.
Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972) (minority stockholder sought to enjoin a merger
claiming that the exchange ratios were unfair to the minority). For discussions of the
application of rule 10b-5 to corporate management cases, see Jacobs, The Role of
Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 27 (1973); Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5
Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1007 (1973).
45. 404 U.S. at 12. The Court noted that the corporate entity should not be
disregarded even though the creditors of the defrauded corporation may be the
ultimate victims because "[t]he controlling stockholder owes the corporation a
fiduciary obligation - one 'designed for the protection of the entire community of
interests in the corporation - creditors as well as stockholders."' Id., quoting Pepper
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939).
The United States Supreme Court further explored this area of fiduciary duty
and corporate management in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
There, the Court concluded that Congress, by enacting section 10(b), had meant to
regulate only those activities that involved manipulation or deception. Id. at 473-74.
The plaintiffs in Santa Fe were minority shareholders eliminated in a short-form
merger who claimed that the majority had breached its fiduciary duty to deal fairly
with the minority. Id. at 467, 473. The Court held that although the majority might
have injured plaintiffs by breaching a corporate fiduciary duty, id. at 477, the
transaction "was neither deceptive nor manipulative and therefore did not violate
either § 10(b) of the Act or Rule lOb-5." Id. at 474.
In Santa Fe the Supreme Court acknowledged that some cases had held
breaches of fiduciary duty violative of rule 10b-5 but stated that they were
"inapposite" cases since they included some element of deception. Id. at 474-75 n.15.
Included among these cases were: Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972) (bank employees misstated material facts in order to acquire stock at less
than fair value); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)
(the directors were deceived when they believed that the proceeds of the bond sale
would go to the company); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (stockholder claimed damage in connection
with a merger as a result of market manipulation and misrepresentation);
(VOL. 23
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The Third Circuit first considered the "in connection with" requirement
as it existed after Bankers Life in Landy v. FDIC.46 The Landy court
interpreted Justice Douglas' opinion as saying that internal corporate.
mismanagement could be regulated under section 10(b) as long as the
"touching" test was satisfied.4 7 Subsequently, in Tully v. Mott Super-
markets, Inc.,48 the Third Circuit interpreted the "touching" language to
mean that there must be a direct causal connection or nexus between the
alleged fraud and the purchase or sale of the security.' 9 Even though in
Tully there had been a fraud contemporaneous with the purchase ot stock
which deprived plaintiffs of the control for which they had bargained, ° the
Third Circuit found that the requisite causal connection was lacking for a
section 10(b) claim since the fraud did not lie "in the actual sale of stock" to
plaintiffs.51
In Ketchum, the Third Circuit focused its analysis upon an examination
of the "in connection with" requirement of section 10(b) and did not consider
whether a fraud had occurred or whether the requirement of a purchase or
sale of securities had been met.52 The court pursued four analytical avenues
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
906 (1969) (majority stockholder and the board of directors deceived the minority);
Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) (resolution by the board of directors
contained material misrepresentations in authorizing the sale of stock to the directors
at a price below fair market value).
46. 486 F.2d 139, 155 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
47. 486 F.2d at 155. The Landy court noted that the only limitation placed by
Bankers Life on its flexible interpretation of section 10(b) was that Congress had not
intended the provision to regulate transactions that were no more than internal
corporate mismanagement. Id. "The crux of the case ... that took it out of the realm
of corporate mismanagement was that Manhattan suffered an injury, 'as a result of
deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor."' Id., quoting 404
U.S. at 12-13.
48. 540 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1976).
49. Id. Several other courts have adopted the causal connection interpretation of
"touching." See, e.g., Rochelle v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523 (9th Cir.
1976); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Guttman v. Brinkman, 410 F.
Supp. 46 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 68 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
50. 540 F.2d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 1976). In Tully, plaintiff Class A shaeholders
offered to purchase certain treasury shares which the corporation was off eng. Id.
Some of these shares were then sold to plaintiffs by the corporation, but the
corporation refused to sell them additional shares contrary to an alleged prior
agreement. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that this refusal was due to a secret, fraudulent
scheme to deprive plaintiffs of the voting control which they otherwise had. Id.
51. Id. at 194.
52. 557 F.2d at 1025-26, 1030. See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
Because the court disposed of the case on the "in connection with" issue, it did not
need to decide the other factors and assumed that defendants had engaged in a
deceptive practice within the meaning of the 1934 Act. Id. at 1026. However, the lower
court had stated that it "would have serious problems with a finding of actionable
fraud on these facts." 415 F. Supp. at 1371 n.6.
Despite plaintiffs' refusal to reddem their shares, the Third Circuit noted that
the purchase/sale requirement had been met. 557 F.2d at 1030 n.25. The court's
rationale rested upon the express terms of the 1934 Act which defines purchase and
sale to encompass "contracts" of purchase or sale, and thus includes the stock-
retirement agreement here. 557 F.2d at 1030 n.25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(aX13), (14) (1976).
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in reaching its conclusion that any fraudulent activity engaged in by the
defendants did not occur "in connection with" the forced surrender of
plaintiffs' stock to the company.5 3 First, the court determined that the
"internal corporate mismanagement" exception noted in Bankers Life5 4
exempted defendants from liability since the controversy arose out of an
internal corporate conflict and since "the essence of plaintiffs' claim
concern[ed] their dismissal as officers of Babb, Inc.155 and not a fraudulent
securities transaction.5 6
A second reason given by the court for finding that plaintiffs did not
fulfill the "connection" requirement of section 10(b) was the lack of
proximity between the fraud and the sale of the securities.57 The court noted
that in Bankers Life "there was a fairly tight linkage"58 between the
misrepresentation and the securities transaction. Here, however, the court
contrasted that linkage with the several steps between the defendants'
nondisclosure of their intention to oust plaintiffs and the forced surrender of
stock in accord with the stock retirement program.5 9 The court buttressed its
argument by comparing the defendants' purposes in the two instances.60 It
reasoned that while the Bankers Life bond transaction was "clearly
undertaken for the purpose of making possible the practices alleged to be
deceptive, 'S1 the Ketchum defendants' misrepresentations "were undertaken
with the objective of inducing the expulsion of the plaintiffs as officers and
employees - not to foster the surrender of their stock."6 2 The court
concluded that "the deceptive practices . . . and the ultimate sale of
plaintiffs' stock are not tied sufficiently tightly so as to surmount the
53. 557 F.2d at 1025-30. The lower court had dismissed the action because it
concluded that plaintiffs had not shown that the alleged fraud had caused the sale of
securities. 415 F. Supp. at 1371. That court said that the causation requirement had
not been met since the sale of the stock "occurred solely as a matter of contractual
obligation . . .and not as the result of the allegedly tainted stockholders' vote for
directors." Id. The district court also stated that causation could be evaluated through
tests of materiality and reliance. Id. It viewed the stockholders retirement agreements
as contractual obligations which eliminated any choice for the plaintiffs. Id. Thus, the
district court concluded, plaintiffs could not have relied on the alleged fraud since
their forced sale was decreed by the contracts. Id.
54. 404 U.S. at 12. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
55. 557 F.2d at 1027.
56. Id. Although the court conceded that the "touching" test may have been met,
it determined that "the 'touch' test of Bankers Life would not draw this lawsuit within
the coverage of § 10(b)," id., if the suit involved "an instance of internal corporate
mismanagement." Id. The court noted that while the complaint stressed the
importance of the relinquishment of plaintiffs' shares under the stock-retirement
agreement, the record was generally silent on that point. Id. The forced sale of
securities was not mentioned until the concluding paragraphs of the stipulation. Id.
57. Id. at 1028.
58. Id. The linkage in Bankers Life may not have been as tight as the court
suggests since there were a number of separate steps involved. See note 34 and
accompanying text supra.
59. 557 F.2d at 1028.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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'connection' requirement of § 10(b), even as broadly formulated in Bankers
Life."63
The court derived the third reason for dismissal from the earlier Third
Circuit decision in Tully.64 As Judge Adams noted, the court there had
required "a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the purchase or
sale of stock. '65 The Ketchum court viewed the stock retirement agreement
before it, rather than the defendants' conduct, as the direct cause of the
forced sale of stock.66 Thus, the court concluded that the retirement
agreement operated as "an independent and intervening cause of such
transactions - a force [serving to] disrupt the connection between the
challenged conduct on the part of the defendants and the relinquishment of
plaintiffs' shares. '67 Since the causal connection requirement of Tully was
not met under this construction, the "in connection with" requirement of
section 10(b) was not satisfied and therefore that claim could not be
sustained.68
The court based its fourth reason for dismissal upon a policy
argument. 69 In the court's view, section 10(b) was not "designed to preempt
. . . a large number of state corporation provisions."70 Allowing this case to
proceed, the court reasoned, could possibly "foster the federalization of
corporate law,"' 71 despite what the court believed was the intention of
Congress not to interfere with the states' regulation of corporate affairs.7 2
Accordingly, the court referred the-plaintiffs to Pennsylvania corporation
laws for relief. 73
Although the Third Circuit mustered four reasons for affirming the
dismissal of the Ketchum complaint, 74 it is submitted that the policy
argument against extending the scope of the 1934 Act provides the true
rationale for the decision, and that further examination of the first three
reasons discloses problems which may limit their application in future
cases.
Because the proper application of the internal corporate mismanage-
ment exception to Justice Douglas' "touching" test is not clear,75 Judge
Adams could easily have found that the facts before him warranted the
protection of section 10(b). Arguably, the alleged fraud touched the securities
transaction. 76 It would follow, under the Landy interpretation of Bankers
63. Id.
64. 540 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1976). See notes 48-51 and accompanying text supra.
65. 557 F.2d at 1028, quoting 540 F.2d at 194.
66. 557 F.2d at 1029.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1028-29.
69. Id. at 1029-30.
70. Id. at 1029.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1030.
74. 557 F.2d at 1026-30. See notes 53-73 and accompanying text supra.
75. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
76. Indeed, the Ketchum court admitted that the facts may have satisfied the
"touching" test. 557 F.2d at 1027. See note 22 supra.
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Life,"7 that the existence of internal corporate mismanagement did not
mandate dismissal of the complaint since the "touching" test was satisfied.
It is further submitted that the court's mechanical application of the
proximity test 7s does not adequately distinguish the facts in this case from
those of Bankers Life since there were arguably as many intermediate steps
between the fraud and the securities transaction in Bankers Life as in
Ketchum. 79 However, the Third Circuit's inquiry into the purpose of the
alleged fraud8° weakens an interpretation that the court totally relied upon a
mechanistic approach in its analysis of proximity. It is unclear, however,
why the court bases a discussion of proximity upon an examination of
purpose, since the purpose of defendants' behavior was not a factor in the
Supreme Court's finding of proximity in Bankers Life."' Regardless of the
origin of this test, it is submitted that the Ketchum court's conclusion did
not give sufficient weight to plaintiffs' dual roles as shareholders and as
officers.8 2 The court's finding that the defendants' objective was the
expulsion of plaintiffs as officers8 3 did not consider that a necessary
coordinate of that objective was the forced sale of plaintiffs' stock. 4 The
court should have given weight to the fact that the defendants' position
could not be secure until plaintiffs were deprived of their shares.8 5 It is
submitted, therefore, that the close relationship between the defendants'
misrepresentations and the forced sale of plaintiffs' stock satisfies the
proximity requirement under both an intermediate steps analysis and a
purpose analysis.
The use of the Tully causation standard by the Third Circuit 6 is also of
questionable validity since Tully's rigid equation of connection and
77. See text accompanying note 47 supra. In Bankers Life, the Supreme Court
was faced with a factual situation that the district court had labelled a case of
internal corporate mismanagement. 404 U.S. at 12. In spite of the mismanagement,
the Court held that the plaintiff's claim was within the scope of section 10(b) since
there was a fraud "touching" the securities transaction. Id.
78. 557 F.2d at 1028. See notes 57-63 and accompanying text supra.
79. See note 34 supra. The steps after the sale of the bonds in Bankers Life were
as follows: 1) Irving Trust issued a check to Manhattan; 2) the check was tendered to
Belgian-American Bank & Trust which issued a certificate of deposit to New England
Note; 3) Bourne, who controlled New England, endorsed the certificate to Belgian-
American Banking as collateral for a loan to New England; and 4) the proceeds of the
loan were paid to Irving Trust to cover its check to Manhattan. 404 U.S. at 8.
Compare the steps involved in Ketchum leading up to the securities
transaction: 1) the defendants misrepresented their intentions about the upcoming
election of officers; 2) the incumbent board of directors was reelected; 3) the
defendants then voted to replace plaintiffs as officers; and 4) since plaintiffs were no
longer employees, the defendants tendered payment for plaintiffs' shares in
accordance with the stock-retirement agreement. 557 F.2d at 1023-24.
80. 557 F.2d at 1028. See notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
81. See 404 U.S. at 12.
82. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
83. 557 F.2d at 1028.
84. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
86. 557 F.2d at 1028-29. See notes 64-68 and accompanying text supra.
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causation appears to be at odds with the flexible "touching" language of
Bankers Life.8 7 Nonetheless, assuming the Tully standard to be correct, the
requisite causal connection can be shown on the Ketchum facts.88 Indeed,
the chain of causation appears even stronger in Ketchum than it was in
Bankers Life because the defendants' alleged misrepresentations in
Ketchum were a prerequisite to the forced sale of plaintiffs' securities
8 9
rather than simply a consequence of the sale as in Bankers LifeY0 Contrary
to the Third Circuit's characterization of the stock retirement agreement as
"an independent and intervening cause," 91 it is reasonable to view the
agreement as a necessary and dependent step in the chain between the
misrepresentation and the defendants' goal of controlling Babb.92 Thus, the
Third Circuit may have insisted on too strict a causation standard when it
affirmed the dismissal of the Ketchum complaint.93
The court's policy argument against expanding the scope of section
10(b) 91 appears to be the most solid basis for its decision. By referring the
plaintiffs to Pennsylvania corporation laws for relief,95 the court acknowl-
edged that corporations are primarily creatures of the states and not of the
federal government. The Ketchum court's effort to restrict the coverage of
section 10(b) through strict construction of the "connection" requirement is
consistent with the stance of the present Supreme Court in limiting
expansion of relief available under the 1934 Act.
96
87. 404 U.S. at 12-13. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
88. The causal connection between defendants' misrepresentations and the
securities transaction can be shown in the following way: Defendants concealed their
intentions in order to be reelected to the board of directors; reelection to the board was
necessary in order to discharge Ketchum and Bigler as employees; their discharge
was necessary in order to trigger the stock retirement agreement and to force the
surrender of stock; the surrender of plaintiffs' stock was necessary in order to give
defendants undisputed control of Babb. 415 F. Supp at 1370-71.
89. See note 22 supra.
90. 404 U.S. at 8-9. As the Bankers Life opinion indicates, the sale of the bonds in
Bankers Life was not caused by defendants' fraud. Id. at 8. Rather, the fraud occurred
in the conversion of the proceeds of the bond sale so that Manhattan received no
compensation for the depletion of its assets. Id. at 10. Arguably, therefore, the
Bankers Life fraud did not "cause" the securities transaction but was merely
"connected" with it.
91. 557 F.2d at 1029.
92. See notes 17 & 22 supra.
93. 557 F.2d at 1028-29. The Ketchum court's analysis may be valid in light of
Tully's causal connection requirement, but arguably Tully was wrong in its
interpretation of the discussion of connection in Bankers Life.
94. 557 F.2d at 1029-30.
95. Id. at 1030.
96. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), where
the Court restricted coverage by adopting the Birnbaum purchaser-seller rule. See note
27 supra. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), further narrowed the scope
of section 10(b) by imposing a requirement that scienter, and not simply negligence,
be alleged by plaintiffs in private damage actions. See note 31 supra. The United
States Supreme Court reinforced its opposition to interference with state corporate
laws in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-80 (1977) (minority
shareholders eliminated in a short-form merger do not have a cause of action under
rule 10b-5 since that is an area of corporate conduct traditionally left to state
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The Ketchum opinion demonstrates some of the pitfalls involved in
applying the flexible Bankers Life standard to the "connection" requirement
of section 10(b).9 7 In addition, the outcome of the proximity and causation
discussions depended upon the method by which the court structured the
relationship between the alleged misrepresentations and the securities
transaction. It would be equally tenable to interpret the triggering of the
stock retirement agreement and the resultant forced sale as the objective of
the internal corporate management struggle rather than a mere byproduct.
The court's insistence upon a rigid causation standard may lead to
situations where plaintiffs are forced to juggle events in order to construct
the necessary causal relationship.
The contrast between the flexible "touching" language of Bankers Life
and the strict causation standard of Tully and Ketchum is not easily
resolved. Despite the Third Circuit's strained reasoning, however, the
outcome in the Ketchum case cannot be faulted. In light of the federal
courts' present reluctance to become involved in state corporate matters, the
application of federal securities law to the Ketchum situation is inapprop-
riate.
J. Randolph Lawlace
ANTITRUST LAW - TYING ARRANGEMENTS - CLASS ACTION - WHERE
AN ACTION ALLEGING AN ILLEGAL TYING ARRANGEMENT Is BROUGHT
AGAINST A LESSOR BY ITS LESSEES, PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO
PROVE ACTUAL COERCION ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS IF PRACTICAL
EFFECT OF LEASE AGREEMENTS IS TO CONDITION SALE OF ONE PRODUCT
UPON PURCHASE OF ANOTHER, THEREBY PERMITTING A CLASS ACTION.
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1977)
Bogosian and Parisi, two independent service station operators,'
separately initiated lawsuits2 against their respective lessors, Gulf Oil
regulation), and in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 40-41, rehearing
denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977) (no cause of action for a tender offer should be implied
under section 14(e) of the 1934 Act since that is an area appropriately relegated to
state law).
97. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
1. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124, 127 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Paul J.
Bogosian began operating a Gulf station in Watertown, Massachusetts as a lessee of
Gulf Oil Company in 1957 and was still in business at the time the action commenced.
Id. Louis J. Parisi operated an Exxon station in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania as a
lessee of Exxon Corporation from July 1968 to June 1971. Id.
2. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The two
independent actions were not formally consolidated for trial but were treated together
for purposes of discovery and pretrial motions. Id. at 1047 n.1.
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Corporation and Exxon Corporation, alleging that their lease agreements
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act (Section 1).3 The plaintiffs, who also
joined fifteen other major oil companies as party defendants, 4 specifically
alleged that the defendants had pursued a "course of interdependent
consciously parallel action" involving the illegal tying of the purchase of the
lessor's gasoline to the lease of the service station site.5 Bogosian and Parisi
sought certification under subsections (b)(1), (2), or (3) of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 236 to maintain a class action on behalf of all present and
3. Id. at 1047. Section 1 provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
4. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 439 (3d Cir. 1977). The other
defendants were Amerada Hess Corp., Hess Oil and Petroleum Division, American Oil
Co., Atlantic Richfield Co., Chevron Oil Co., Cities Service Oil Co., Getty Oil Co.,
Humble Oil & Refining Co., Mobil Oil Co., Phillips Petroleum Co., Shell Oil Co.,
Standard Oil Co. of California, Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, Sun Oil Co., Texaco, Inc.,
and Union Oil Co. of California, Union 76 Division. Id.
5. 393 F. Supp. at 1054. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had required
all dealers who leased service stations from defendants to: "(a) license the use of the
lessor's trademark; (b) sell only the lessor's gasoline; and (c) not sell gasoline
purchased from any other source under the licensed trademark." Id.
6. 62 F.R.D. at 130, Rule 23 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
1977-1978]
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former lessee-dealers of the defendants, 7 a class estimated by plaintiffs to
include 100,000 members8 and involving over 400 different contractual
forms. 9 Certification was denied by the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania'0 on the ground that common questions of
law and fact did not predominate over those affecting individual members,"
since "proof of exertion of economic coercive force as to each individual
dealer" would be required in order to find an illegal tie-in.' 2
With respect to the plaintiffs' individual actions, the district court
granted motions for summary judgment made by the nonlessor defend-
ants, 3 and directed the entry of judgment for all moving defendants except
Gulf in the Bogosian action and Exxon in the Parisi action. 14 The district
court ruled that plaintiffs' allegation of "interdependent consciously parallel
action" was not a sufficient statement of concerted action necessary to state
a claim under section 1.15
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b).
7. 62 F.R.D. at 127.
8. Id. at 130 n.8. Plaintiffs estimated that the class "could possibly be less than
100,000." Id. The defendants estimated that the class would range between 250,000
and 2,000,000 members. Id.
9. Id. at 137.
10. Id. at 140. Judge VanArtadalen heard the case. Id. at 127.
11. Id. at 132-34. The district court concluded that to prove plaintiffs' contention
that "the practical economic effect of the contracts" produced the tying arrangement
would require a determination "in each and every lease that there was such economic
coercion in fact as to constitute an illegal tie-in agreement." Id. at 136-37.
The district court also found that certification under subsections (1) and (2) of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) was inappropriate. Id. at 132-33. See note 6
supra.
12. 62 F.R.D. at 136-37. The district court also determined that a class action was
not the superior method of adjudicating this controversy. Id. at 139-40. The district
court decided that a class action was not superior to other possible methods for
several reasons, including "possible serious conflicts of interests between present and
former lessees," the ability of the class members to prosecute individual actions, and
the enormous difficulties presented in managing such a class. Id. at 139-40. Judge
VanArtsdalen mentioned three particular problems in management of the class: "(a)
notice to class members; (b) processing individual damage claims and possible
counterclaims and defenses; and (c) determining the nationwide liability as to all
defendants in favor of the entire class." Id. at 140.
13. 393 F. Supp. at 1056. The motions for summary judgment filed by Atlantic
Richfield were denied because they were made after plaintiffs filed their notices of
appeal. 561 F.2d at 440. Cities Service did not move for summary judgment. Id.
14. 393 F. Supp. at 1053.
15. Id. The court found that a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act required an
allegation of concerted action or a contract, combination or conspiracy. Id. at 1050.
Judge VanArtsdalen concluded that "the plaintiffs have deliberately chosen to place
all of their 'concerted action' claims under the rubric of 'interdependent consciously
parallel action' and this phrase fails to satisfy the Sherman Act § 1." Id.
The court also considered the question of whether Parisi had stated an
individual claim against his lessor, Exxon. Id. at 1053. Exxon argued that Parisi had
failed to make a tie-in claim since he had not shown that he had been compelled to
purchase the unwanted tied product as required by Capital Temporaries, Inc. of
Hartford v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974). 393 F.2d at 1055. The district
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On appeal,16 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 17
vacated the judgments and the order refusing class certification and
remanded the cases for reconsideration, holding that there were common
questions of law or fact suitable for class treatment since plaintiffs were not
required to prove actual coercion on an individual basis and since the
question of defendants' sufficient economic power to appreciably restrain
competition could be demonstrated without individual examination of every
service station lease. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978).
A tying arrangement has been defined by the United States Supreme
Court as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at
least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other
supplier."'8 Tying arrangements restrain competition by requiring buyers to
purchase unwanted items and by foreclosing possible competitors from the
market for the tied product. 19 Because of these anticompetitive effects, tying
arrangements have been declared per se illegal under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.20 The Supreme Court has articulated three requirements for
the establishment of an unlawful tying arrangement under the per se rule.21
court rejected that argument and stated that the Olsten compulsion requirement was
"merely evidence of the economic power of the tying product." Id. In addition, the
court stated that if Parisi chose to rely on the rule of reason to show a Sherman Act
violation rather than on the per se rule, Olsten and the question of compulsion would
not be relevant. Id. Therefore, the court concluded, Parisi had stated a claim against
Exxon and summary judgment for Exxon against Parisi was not appropriate. Id.
16. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 440 (E.D.Pa. 1977). Plaintiffs
appealed, contending that the entry of judgment for defendants was an abuse of
discretion and that the refusal to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3) was erroneous. Id.
17. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Aldisert and Gibbons.
Chief Judge Seitz wrote the majority opinion. Judge Aldisert filed a dissenting
opinion.
18. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
19. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99
(1969) (Fortner I); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); Times-
Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
20. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99
(1969) (Fortner I); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). For the text
of § 1 of the Sherman Act, see note 3 supra.
In Northern Pacific, the Supreme Court described the basis of the principle of
per se unreasonableness: "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."
356 U.S. at 5. The Court noted that this approach avoided "the necessity for an
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of
the industry involved." Id. The Fortner Court stated that "[t]ying arrangements of
[the traditional] kind are illegal in and of themselves, and no specific showing of
unreasonable competitive effect is required." 394 U.S. at 498.
21. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99
(1969) (Fortner I); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
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First, the existence of a tie between a tying product and a tied product must
be established. 22 Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the seller has
sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably
restrain competition in the market for the tied product.23 Third, the tying
22. Fortner Enterprises Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 507 (1969)(Fortner I); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953). In
Times-Picayune, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he common core of the adjudicated
unlawful tying arrangements is the forced purchase of a second distinct commodity
with the desired purchase of a dominant 'tying' product, resulting in economic harm
to competition in the 'tied' product." Id. The United States had charged a publishing
company which owned a morning and an evening newspaper with violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act since the publishing company required advertisers to purchase
combined insertions in both newspapers. Id. at 596-97. The Supreme Court found that
the per se doctrine was not applicable to the case since only one product (advertising
space) and one market (local newspaper readership) were involved. Id. at 613-14.
Thus, there was no dominant tying product. Id. at 614.
The Supreme Court has also noted that "[tihere is, at the outset of every tie-in
case, . . the problem of determining whether two separate products are in fact
involved." Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 507
(1969) (Fortner I). The plaintiff in Fortner alleged that U.S. Steel and its subsidiary,
U.S. Steel Homes Credit Corp., had agreed to a tying arrangement where the purchase
at artificially high prices of prefabricated houses manufactured by U.S. Steel was a
condition for obtaining credit from Credit Corp. at advantageous terms. Id. at 497.
The Court determined that two products were involved since "the credit [was]
provided by one corporation on condition that a product be purchased from another
corporation, and . . . the borrower contractfed] to obtain a large sum of money over
and above that needed to pay the seller for the physical products purchased." Id. at
507. See Ross, The Single Product Issue in Antitrust Tying: A Functional Approach,
23 EMORY L.J. 963 (1974).
23. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499,
502-03 (1969) (Fortner I); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958).
Various tests have been used over the years to determine if sufficient
economic power over the tying product has been shown. See McCarthy, Trademark
Franchising and Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-ins, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1085, 1096-97
(1970); Note, Tying Arrangements and the Individual Coercion Doctrine, 30 VAND. L.
REv. 755, 758-59 (1977). Early cases required that the seller of the tying product wield
"monopolistic leverage" or have a dominating position in the market. Times-Picayune
Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953). See United Shoe Mach. Corp. v.
United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922). This standard was lowered in Northern Pacific, in
which the Supreme Court required only "sufficient economic power with respect to the
tying product to appreciably restrain" competition in the market for the tied product.
356 U.S. at 6. In Loew's, the Court stated that
[m]arket dominance - some power to control price and to exclude competition -
is by no means the only test of whether the seller has the requisite economic
power. Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic power
may be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or from
uniqueness in its attributes.
371 U.S. at 45 (footnote omitted). Various tying products have been considered
sufficiently unique or desirable to provide evidence of economic power to satisfy the
per se test. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958) (land);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (patents); United States v.
Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (copyrights); United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (copyrights); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (trademark); Warriner Hermetics, Inc.
v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 463 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1086 (1972) (trademark).
More recently, the Supreme Court has broadened the test further by defining
the basic question as "whether the seller has the power to raise prices, or impose other
26
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arrangement must be shown to affect a not insubstantial amount of
commerce.
24
Several lower courts have added a fourth element to the test of an illegal
tie by requiring the buyer to demonstrate that he was coerced into accepting
the arrangement.25 These courts reason that even though the seller may
possess sufficient economic power to restrain competition, that power is not
illegal unless the buyer was coerced into the purchase of an unwanted
product.26 The coercion requirement has a particularly marked impact on
burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable number of buyers
within the market." Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495, 504 (1969) (Fortner I). The Court clarified this "appreciable number" language by
recognizing that there may be reasons other than economic power that explain a
seller's success in convincing an appreciable number of buyers to accept a
burdensome term. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 429 U.S. 610(1977) (Fortner II). The Fortner H Court declared that a seller must have "some
advantage not shared by his competitors in the market for the tying product" before
his product will be labeled unique for purposes of the tying analysis. Id. at 618.
24. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969)(Fortner I); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962); International Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). The Fortner I Court stated that in
determining whether a not insubstantial amount of commerce is involved "normally
the controlling consideration is simply whether a total amount of business,
substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de minimis, is
foreclosed to competitors by the tie . . . ." 394 U.S. at 501. The Court rejected the
defendant corporation's contention that $200,000 worth of annual purchases involved
in the alleged tying arrangement was insubstantial. Id. at 501-02. In Loew's,
payments of $60,800 were found to satisfy the substantiality test. Id. at 499.
25. See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307,
1327 (5th Cir. 1976); Capitol Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 661-63(2d Cir. 1974); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount
Theatres, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131, 1137 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972);
Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 331, 336 (N.D. 111. 1974);
Thompson v. T.F.I., 64 F.R.D. 140, 146-47 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Abercrombie v. Lum's, Inc.,
345 F, Supp. 387, 391-92 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
In Olsten, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
addressed the question of coercion. 506 F.2d at 658. The licensee of an employment
service business alleged that he was required to operate a blue collar employment
service under the "Handy Andy" trademark in order to obtain an exclusive license for
the white collar Olsten franchise. Id. at 661. The Second Circuit reviewed cases
discussing tying arrangements and concluded that
the plaintiff must establish that he was the unwilling purchaser of the tied
product. If he was not coerced by the economic dominance of the seller, he at
least must show that he was compelled to accept the tied product by virtue of the
uniqueness or desirability of the tying product ....
Id. at 663. The court rejected the argument that the use of a trademark provided the
requisite economic power, finding that the plaintiff had not shown that he was
coerced into accepting the blue collar business and that "the tying alleged here [was]
ersatz at best." Id. at 667.
26. See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307(5th Cir. 1976). The Fifth Circuit stated that in order to show an illegal tie "it is not
enough to show that the seller has sufficient economic power and that two products
were purchased together. In addition, it must be shown that the purchaser was
coerced into purchasing an unwanted product." Id. at 1327. See American Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131, 1137 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972).
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class action antitrust suits. 27 If every potential class member were required
to prove individual coercion by the seller, the action would no longer be
suitable for class treatment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 28
since common questions of law or fact would be outweighed by individual
questions on the coercion issue.
29
The Third Circuit considered the problem of coercion in a class action
context in Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc.30 In Ungar, a group of
franchisees brought suit against their franchisor alleging that it was
Dunkin' Donuts' policy to grant licenses to use its trademark only on
condition that the franchisees also purchase other items.31 The district court
concluded that common questions of law and fact predominated over
individual questions and granted class certification under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 32 The Third Circuit reversed,3 3 holding that proof of
individual coercion was necessary to show a prima facie case of illegal tying
since there was no express contractual tie-in.34 While listing the Supreme
Court's three requirements for proving a per se illegal tie-in,3 5 the Ungar
court stated further that in the absence of an agreement, the plaintiff must
show that his purchase of both the tying product and the tied product was
not voluntary.36 The Third Circuit commented that in establishing the
existence of the elements of a tie-in "[p]roof of economic power must ...
focus on the seller; but proof of a tie-in must focus on the buyer, because a
27. See Note, supra note 23, at 763-67.
28. For the text of rule 23(b)(3), 8ee note 6 supra.
29. See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1224-26
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Abercrombie v. Lum's Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387,
391-93 (S.D. Fla. 1972). Cf., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537
F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976) (directed verdict on tying claim was proper since plaintiffs
failed to establish that their decision to purchase tied product was coerced by
franchisor).
30. 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976), noted in the Third
Circuit Review, 22 VnL. L. REv. 822 (1977).
31. 531 F.2d at 1212, 1215. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Dunkin' Donuts
pursued a policy of granting a license to use its trademark only on condition that the
franchisee accept real estate, equipment, signs, and supplies from Dunkin' Donuts. Id.
at 1215. The franchise agreements allowed franchisees to purchase the items from
approved vendors, but the plaintiffs argued that these vendors paid Dunkin' Donuts
in return for being approved and then passed along the cost of the payments to the
franchisees, thus eliminating any possible economic savings. Id. at 1216. The
plaintiffs "emphasized that the focus of their case was not individual instances of
illegal conduct, but a pervasive company policy, 'firm and resolutely enforced,'" to tie
the license to the other items. Id.
32. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd,
531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
33. 531 F.2d 1211, 1226-27 (3d Cir. 1976).
34. Id. at 1226.
35. Id. at 1223-24.
36. Id. at 1224. The Third Circuit contended that the United States Supreme Court
had set forth a coercion requirement in tying cases and that this coercive element was
lacking in the district court's analysis. Id. at 1219. The court noted that under the
district court's rule a tie-in could be established if a plaintiff showed that a seller-
franchisor with dominant economic power over a buyer-franchisee had exercised
salesmanship and sold two products. Id. at 1224.
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voluntary purchase of the products is simply not a tie-in. '37 The court
concluded that since each franchisee must prove that he was individually
coerced into accepting the tie-in, common questions of law and fact did not
predominate and the class should not have been certified. 38
Facing a similar situation in Bogosian, the court disposed of several
procedural issues39 before focusing upon the district court's refusal to certify
a class under rule 23(b)(3).40 The court determined that it "must decide
whether the 23(a) prerequisites [had] been met, whether the district court
correctly identified the issues involved and which [were] common, and
whether it properly identified the comparative fairness and efficiency
criteria."" The Bogosian court acknowledged that if a district court properly
applied the relevant criteria for class certification, the Third Circuit would
"'ordinarily defer to its exercise of discretion.' ",42
37. Id. at 1224.
38. Id. at 1226.
39. 561 F.2d at 440-42. The court first considered the appealability of the
judgments and found that the district court was empowered to enter final judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and had not abused its discretion in so
doing. Id. at 440-42. The court then considered the district court's ruling that
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. Id. at 444-47. Writing for the majority, Chief
Judge Seitz concluded that the complaint, read as a whole, did allege a combination
and that this, joined with a statement of the specific activities alleged to be unlawful,
did state a claim. Id. at 445. Therefore, the court concluded, "the ruling that the
specific allegation of interdependent consciously parallel action made here fails to
state a claim should be vacated so that the issue can be decided, if necessary, after the
relevant facts are fully developed." Id. at 447. Finally, the Third Circuit agreed with
the district court that plaintiffs did not lack standing. Id.
40. Id. at 448.
41. Id. The court adhered to the analysis previously articulated in Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
Id. The Katz court held that a class action could be maintained under rule 23(b)(3)
only if the district court also found 1) that the questions of law or fact predominate
over any questions which affect only individual class members, and 2) that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the issue. 496 F.2d at 756. The Katz court stated that if it determined that the district
court had properly identified the individual and common issues it would defer to the
lower court's determination as to predominance "since that requirement relates to the
conservation of litigation effort, and the *trial court's judgment probably will be as
good as ours." Id.
42. 561 F.2d at 448, quoting Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 757 (3d
Cir. 1974). In Katz, the Third Circuit listed three components of a decision on the
superiority of a class action: 1) consideration of alternative methods of adjudication of
the issues; 2) comparison of the fairness of each method to all of the parties involved;
and 3) comparison of the efficiency of adjudication of each method. 496 F.2d at 757.
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The court first determined that the prerequisites of rule 23(a) had been
met.4 3 Next, the court addressed the identification of common questions44
and rejected the defendants' argument that Ungar required proof of coercion
in all tying cases and stated that only the three elements listed by the
Supreme Court were necessary to establish a per se violation.4 5 The purpose
of the rule against tying, the court reasoned, is to allow the buyer to make a
free choice based upon the merits of the tied product;4 6 to achieve that free
choice the seller must not be allowed to condition sale of one product upon
purchase of another.4 7 Thus, the court maintained that "[tihe issue [was]
whether the seller acted in a certain way, not what the buyer's state of mind
would have been absent the seller's action."48 Based upon this finding, the
court concluded that a plaintiff need not prove coercion once he has shown
that the seller conditioned the sale of one product upon purchase of
another.4 9 The reason coercion was required in Ungar, according to the
court, was that the necessary conditioning "was not reflected in the
agreement or in the operation of its terms."0
43. 561 F.2d at 448. For the text of rule 23(a), see note 6 supra. The court found
that the prerequisite of numerosity was met since estimates of the number of class
members varied between 100,000 and 2,000,000. 561 F.2d at 448. The court referred to
the next section of its opinion for a discussion of the common issues involved. Id. The
typicality requirement was satisfied since the claims of the representatives were found
to be identical with those of the rest of the class. Id. at 449. Finally, the Third Circuit
nqted two aspects of the prerequisite of adequacy of representation in rule 23(a)(4). Id.
The first concern was found to be satisfied by the competency of counsel to the class.
Id. The court mentioned the district court's additional concern that there might be a
divergence of interests between former and present lessees, but concluded that rule
23(d) provided adequate means, including certification of subclasses, for dealing with
this situation and that consequently there was no basis for denying class certification
on the grounds of inadequacy of representation. Id.
44. 561 F.2d at 449.
45. Id. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
46. 561 F.2d at 449-50.
47. Id. at 450.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The court noted that in some cases the existence of a tie-in had been
proven on the basis of business conduct where the dominant party persuaded the
economically dependent party to buy certain products together with the products the
dependent party originally sought. Id. See, e.g., Advance Business Systems & Supply,
Inc. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 64 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970);
Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960). The Bogosian court
identified Ungar as one of those cases since in Ungar the franchisee claimed that the
franchisor had "created an economic arrangement in which the perceived threat of
termination buttresses the franchisor's salesmanship." Id. See notes 30-38 and
accompanying text supra.
The court pointed to several cases in which coercion was discussed as an
element of a tying claim because the tie-in was sought to be shown "on the basis of a
request or suggestion coupled with pressure, intimidation, in short - coercion." 561
F.2d at 451 (footnote omitted), citing Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response,
Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1326-31 (5th Cir. 1976), Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 F.2d 395
(6th Cir. 1975), Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 445 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1972), and American
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The Bogosian court next evaluated the plaintiffs' claim that it was
illegal to require a lessee to purchase gasoline only from the lessor as a
condition to the leasing of a gas station site.51 The court noted that,
although no single contractual clause imposed that condition, plaintiffs
pointed to "a constellation of lease provisions" that accomplished the same
result.52 Since this claim was based on the terms of the agreement, the court
reasoned that, unlike Ungar, no proof of coercion was required.53 The Third
Circuit recognized that evaluating the claim would be a difficult process
since examination of the various lease agreements used by defendants
would be necessary, but concluded that "the factual and legal questions pre-
sented in this phase will be precisely the same in a class action as they
would be in an individual suit. 5 4
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 446 F.2d
1121 (2d Cir. 1971).
The court also noted that the claim that actual coercion was necessary to
show a tie-in had been rejected in several cases because the seller had expressly
conditioned sale of one product upon another. 561 F.2d at 451, citing Hill v. A-T-O,
Inc., 535 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1976), Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 407
F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1976), and Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 1976-1 Trade Cas.
60,887 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
51. 561 F.2d at 451-52.
52. Id. at 452. For example, the plaintiffs cited clauses which provided that the
lease would expire in six or twelve months, that no alterations could be made to the
leasehold without the lessor's approval, that the lessee must license the use of the
lessor's trademark, that the lessee could not sell gas other than the lessor's from
pumps bearing the lessor's trademark, that the lessee would pay rent as a percentage
of gas volume sales subject to a minimum rent, and that if the lessee failed to
purchase a stated quantity of gasoline the lease would terminate. Id.
53. Id. The court mentioned that the defendant oil companies agreed that the only
way a lessee could sell other brands of gasoline under the terms of the leases would be
to install his own pumps and tanks. Id. The court noted that whether this was a
realistic option for a short-term lessee was a common question of fact to be developed
by expert testimony. Id. The majority stated that for the plaintiffs to show that the
purchase of gasoline was tied to the lease, they would have to show "that the lease
agreements in use by all defendants [had] similar clauses which [had] the practical
economic effect of precluding sale of other than the lessor's gasoline." Id.
54. Id. at 453. The court also found that common questions existed in plaintiffs'
trademark claim, in the element of sufficient economic power over the tying product to
appreciably restrain competition in the tied product, and in proof of fact of damages.
Id. at 453-56. The court noted that there were two aspects to proving fact of damage
in antitrust cases. Id. at 454. The first is the element of "standing," where the courts
have limited the private action to plaintiffs whose injury is not too indirect a
consequence of the antitrust violation. Id. See, e.g., Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Material
Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506-09 (3d Cir. 1976); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971). The second element is
a showing that a causal relationship existed between the violation and the loss to
plaintiff. 561 F.2d at 454. The Bogosian court concluded that if an antitrust violation
has affected a class of persons who do have standing, "there is no reason in doctrine
why proof of the impact cannot be made on a common basis so long as the common
proof adequately demonstrates some damage to each individual." Id. Thus, the court
stated that proving the fact of damage would depend on the facts of each case. Id.
The court suggested that the district court might conclude that it should
bifurcate the trial by having one jury consider violation and another jury consider
fact of damage and damages. Id. at 455.
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Finally, the court considered the comparative fairness and efficiency of
a class action5 5 and rejected the district court's reasons for concluding that a
class action was not appropriate.5 6 Having determined that the district court
erred in identifying issues common to the class and in evaluating the
comparative fairness and efficiency of a class action, the court vacated the
order refusing class certification.5 7 Chief Judge Seitz then remanded the
cases for reconsideration of the class certification and for further proceed-
ings consistent with the court's opinion.5 8
In his dissent, Judge Aldisert argued that the district court's holding
should have been affirmed.5 9 In particular, Judge Aldisert disagreed with
the majority's treatment of class certification. 60 He noted that Bogosian did
not present an ordinary class action since the proposed class was "truly
titanic,"'61 and "the size and diversity of the asserted class raise[d] serious
questions about the propriety of class action treatment. ' '62 Judge Aldisert
took exception to the majority's determination that common questions were
presented and that individualized proof of coercion was not necessary,6 3
reasoning that the evaluation of the practical economic effects of the
"constellation of lease provisions" would present diverse questions not
appropriate to class treatment.6 4 The dissent contended that while there
55. 561 F.2d at 456.
56. Id. The Third Circuit did not feel compelled to address or even present the
district court's reasons. Id. Instead, the court stated simply that "our disagreement
with each [reason] is both complete and fundamental." Id. The majority expressly
commented upon the district court's conclusion that compliance with the notice
provision of rule 23(b)(3) presented significant problems of manageability. Id. The
court agreed with the plaintiffs that individual notice could be sent to the present
lessees along with regular correspondence dispatched by the defendants and directed
the plaintiffs to send individual notices to the former lessees as well. Id.
57. Id. at 456-57.
58. Id. at 457.
59. Id. at 457-62 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert would have affirmed the
district court's finding that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. Id. at 460 (Aldisert,
J., dissenting). He attacked the majority's holding that the relevant facts should be
developed before the district court decided whether plaintiffs had stated a claim when
they alleged interdependent consciously parallel action. Id. at 457 (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting). In Judge Aldisert's view, a bare allegation of interdependent consciously
parallel action did not state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 458 (Aldisert,
J., dissenting), citing Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,
346 U.S. 537 (1954). Therefore, Judge Aldisert would have affirmed the entry of
summary judgment. 561 F.2d at 460 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
60. 561 F.2d at 460-62 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 460 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
62. Id. See notes 7 & 8 and accompanying text supra. Judge Aldisert decided that
it would not be economically impractical to prosecute individual actions since the
class members were "businessmen ... with significant and definite financial
interests in the litigation." 561 F.2d at 460 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
63. 561 F.2d at 461 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
64. Id. Judge Aldisert was of the opinion that "[e]ven if there were only one
defendant oil company and only one form contract, the practical economic effect
would vary from dealer to dealer, city to city, and region to region." Id.
The dissent argued that the question of market power in the tying product
also presented diverse questions, id., and rejected the majority's assertion that market
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were certain common questions, the fundamental question was "whether the
district court abused its discretion in concluding that common questions
would not predominate."6 5 Concluding that the district court's finding that a
class action was not superior to individual actions was well within the lower
court's wide range of discretion,66 Judge Aldisert would therefore have
affirmed the denial of class certification.6 7
It is submitted that the majority's discussion of class certification in
Bogosian and particularly its treatment of coercion as an element of tying
are not entirely consistent with the Third Circuit's previous holding in
Ungar.68 Subsequent to these decisions, ambiguity remains regarding what
proof is necessary to show the existence of a tie-in. In Ungar the Third
Circuit stated that, in the absence of reliance by the franchisee on express
contractual tie-ins, the existence of a tie-in could be shown only by proof that
the buyer had been coerced into buying the tied product.6 9 The Bogosian
court, however, insisted that the buyer's state of mind played no role in
determining the existence of a tie-in which could be proven only by showing
that the seller had conditioned the sale of one product upon purchase of
another.70 Although the Bogosian court viewed coercion as a means of
showing a tie-in where no express agreement existed,71 the court appeared to
curtail the role of coercion by shifting the focus from the buyer to the seller,
since a plaintiff would have to provide proof of the seller's conditioning
rather than the coercive effect of the conditioning upon the buyer. Coercion
could then be a factor in demonstrating the existence of sufficient economic
power to restrain competition. 72
It is also suggested that the Bogosian court's attempt to distinguish
Ungar on the grounds that the alleged tie-in in Bogosian was based upon an
express agreement while the Ungar tie was not does not adequately explain
power could be demonstrated by showing that defendants controlled most existing
stations and that zoning restrictions and high capital costs made new development
difficult. Id. In Judge Aldisert's view, zoning and capital costs could not be
established by common proof since they would vary from place to place. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 462 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. See notes 30-38 and accompanying text supra. The Ungar decision provoked
comments by several observers who argued that the individual coercion doctrine was
inconsistent with the basic principles of the law of tying and with the general
purposes of antitrust law. See Note, supra note 23; 9 CONN. L. REV. 164 (1976); 55 Tsx.
L. REV. 343 (1977); 22 ViLL. L. REV. 822 (1977).
69. 531 F.2d at 1226. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
70. 561 F.2d at 450. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
71. 561 F.2d at 450.
72. See note 23 supra. For example, a plaintiff could show that he was coerced
into buying the tied product as evidence that the seller had the economic power to
impose a burdensome term. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,
394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Fortner I); Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,
429 U.S. 610 (1977) (Fortner II).
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the different treatment given the two cases. 73 It is difficult to perceive why
individual issues predominate in Ungar where there were 600 potential class
members7 4 but do not predominate in Bogosian where the court was faced
with 15 defendant companies, over 400 different contractual forms and a
minimum of 100,000 potential class members. 75 In addition, the Bogosian
court's suggestion that the plaintiffs prove the existence of a tie-in by
showing "the practical economic effect" of the leases on the lessees' ability
to sell gasoline 76 raises serious questions about the predominance of
common questions. As Judge Aldisert noted in his dissent, the practical
economic effect of one lease from one oil company may vary according to the
location of the station and the volume of business. 77 This varying effect
would appear to require a myriad of individual questions which are
arguably not suitable for treatment on a class basis.
Other questions are raised by the majority's treatment of the question of
the superiority of a class action over individual actions. 78 First, it can be
argued that the Third Circuit should have deferred to the district court on
this determination since it had "properly applied the relevant criteria to the
facts of the case."'79 Furthermore, the Bogosian court did not address the
"possible serious conflicts of interests between present and former lessees"
identified by the district court80 nor did it consider the disadvantages of
class treatment foreseen by the district court."' Finally, although the district
court had specifically noted the difficulties involved in processing individual
damage claims, counterclaims and defenses, and in determining nationwide
liability of all defendants in favor of the class of plaintiffs,82 the only
manageability factor mentioned by the Third Circuit was notice to class
members.83 It is submitted that these factors indicate that the Third Circuit
should have deferred to the district court's decision that a class action was
not superior to individual actions, despite any errors made by the lower
court in identifying issues common to the class.
73. 561 F.2d at 450-51. See text accompanying note 34 supra. The Ungar
plaintiffs argued that it was a pervasive company policy to enforce the tie. 531 F.2d at
1216. Presumably, the franchisor employed the leverage given it by virtue of the
franchise agreements to enforce that policy, even if the agreements did not themselves
specifically impose a tie. Id. The Ungar plaintiffs could arguably have set forth a
constellation of lease provisions that would have satisfied the Bogosian court that the
tie-in claim was based on the terms of the agreement. See 561 F.2d at 452; note 52
supra.
74. 531 F.2d at 1215.
75. See notes 4-9 and accompanying text supra.
76. 561 F.2d at 452.
77. Id. at 461 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
78. See notes 55-58 and accompanying text supra.
79. 561 F.2d at 460 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). See notes 41 & 42 and accompanying
text supra.
80. See 62 F.R.D. at 139.
81. Id. at 139-40. See note 12 supra.
82. See 62 F.R.D. at 140.
83. 561 F.2d at 456.
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One consequence of the discussion of coercion in Bogosian may be the
encouragement of the use of class actions in attacking alleged antitrust
violations. The court's statement that proof of individual coercion is required
only where the alleged tie-in is not based on an express agreement appears
to reaffirm the Third Circuit's adherence to the Supreme Court's three-step
analysis of per se violations.8 4 The deemphasis of coercion may make it
easier for plaintiffs to show the existence of a tie-in.
It is submitted that the Third Circuit's refusal to defer to the lower
court's discretionary determination that a class action was not superior to
individual actions will create enormous problems for the lower court.8 5 The
management of this action which involves both a "truly titanic"8 6 class and
an extremely complex task of determining "the practical economic effect" of
the lease agreements87 may cause this litigation to linger for decades with
no benefit to the class and with no respite for the defendants. Furthermore,
the implication of a final resolution of this claim in favor of the plaintiffs
would extend beyond the radical alteration of the nationwide system of
gasoline distribution to the root of the franchising system.
J. Randolph Lawlace
CIVIL RIGHTS - SECTION 1981 - A MUNICIPALITY CAN BE HELD
VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1981 FOR THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR OF ITS POLICE OFFICERS.
Mahone v. Waddle (1977)
Plaintiffs, two black citizens, brought suit for damages against two
police officers individually and their employer, the City of Pittsburgh (City).'
The plaintiffs claimed that they were stopped without probable cause for a
supposed traffic violation, 2 and further alleged that, because they were
black, plaintiffs were mistreated by the two police officers throughout the
subsequent arrest, incarceration, and hearing.3 The suit against the City
84. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 12 supra.
86. 561 F.2d at 460 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 452.
1. Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1020 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub
nom. City of Pittsburgh v. Mahone, 46 U.S.L.W. 3420 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1977) (No.
77-731). The district court opinion is not reported.
2. 564 F.2d at 1020. Plaintiffs claimed they were charged with driving too fast
for conditions and following too closely. Id.
3. Id. The alleged mistreatment of plaintiffs included their subjection to "racial
epithets, verbal harassment, and physical abuse by hands, fists, and nightsticks"
during the arrest and transportation to the police station. Id. In addition, defendants
allegedly played a part in plaintiff's subsequent conviction by giving false testimony
in the proceeding before a city magistrate. Id.
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asserted three grounds for relief.4 Plaintiffs contended that the City was
vicariously liable for the misconduct of its officers under the fourteenth
amendment 5 and under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (1866
Act).6 They also maintained that the City was directly liable "for its alleged
negligence or wanton recklessness in failing to train and supervise the two
individual defendants and in permitting them to act as police officers
notwithstanding the City's prior knowledge of their propensity to harass
and mistreat black citizens. '7
The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylva-
nia granted the City's motion to dismiss all claims against it,8 finding that
the City was entitled to immunity from prosecution for damages under the
fourteenth amendment as well as from claims for damages under section
1981. 9 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit",
affirmed the dismissal of the fourteenth amendment claim but reversed the
dismissal of the other claims, holding that section 1981 could be asserted by
a private individual to bring a civil claim for compensatory and punitive
damages against a municipality. Mahone v. Waddle, 654 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir.),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. City of Pittsburgh v. Mahone, 46 U.S.L.W.
3420 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1977) (No. 77-731).
4. Id. at 1021. The individual defendants were sued for alleged violations under
the fourteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1970). Id.
5. Id. at 1021. The fourteenth amendment states, in part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
6. 564 F.2d at 1021. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat.
27; reenacted in Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144).
7. 564 F.2d at 1021. Jurisdiction for the federal claims was based upon 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1343(3) (1970), with pendent jurisduction over the state law claims. Id. For the
text of § 1331, see note 36 infra. For the text of § 1343(3), see note 72 infra.
8. 564 F.2d at 1021. The district court dismissed the federal claims against the
City, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim
for which relief could be granted. Id. In the absence of jurisdiction based upon federal
law, the court was unwilling to exercise derivative, pendent jurisdiction over the state
law claims and consequently dismissed them also. Id.
9. Id. The district court's rationale was that the municipal immunity available
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) extended to claims brought under the fourteenth
amendment and to those based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Id. In addition, the court
found that the facts were insufficient to grant relief under § 1981. Id.
10. The case was first heard by Judges Rosenn, Kalodner, and Garth, and later
by Judges Gibbons, Rosenn, and Garth. Judge Rosenn wrote the majority opinion,
and Judge Garth wrote a lengthy dissent.
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A modem repercussion of the passage of the Civil Rights Acts11 during
Reconstruction has been federal law sUits12 by individual citizens attempt-
ing to hold municipalities liable for damages caused by their employees'
conduct. 13 These suits generally have been unsuccessful, 14 because the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (1871 Act)15 demonstrated
Congress' concern that it lacked "constitutional power to impose liability on
political subdivisions of the States."'1 6 The municipal immunity concept was
11. In the decade following the Civil War, Congress enacted five statutes which
are collectively known as the Civil Rights Acts. See Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14
Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1988 (1970)); Act of May 31, 1870, ch.
114, 16 Stat. 140 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1970)); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch.
99, 16 Stat. 433 (repealed 1894); Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970)); Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat.
336, 337 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 3061, 8061 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1976); 42
U.S.C. § 1985 (1970)). Although not reflected in the United States Code, parts of the
1866 Act and the 1870 Act have been traced by the Supreme Court to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,
242 (1976). See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 206 & n.17 (1970).
12. That suits against government employees and municipalities may be brought
in state courts has been recognized traditionally. See, e.g., 564 F.2d at 1041 (Garth, J.,
dissenting).
13. See Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law: "Under
Color of" Law and the Civil Rights Act, 1961 DUKE L.J. 452, 455.
Cases discussing individual and municipal liability for violations of citizens'
constitutional and civil rights indicate that any level governmental employee may be
held liable under § 1983 for direct wrongdoing, with certain narrowly drawn
exceptions. See, e.g., Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa.
1977). In Santiago, Chief Judge Lord described various forms of individual immunity
that might bar § 1983 claims. State judges, for example, are immune from damage
suits under that statute "for actions done in the performance of their judicial function."
435 F. Supp. at 146, citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Judge Lord noted,
however, that judges are not immune from suits for equitable relief. 435 F: Supp. at
146, citing Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 86-87 (7th Cir. 1975). He also remarked that
judicial immunity does not extend to nonjudicial functions of judicial officers. 435 F.
Supp. at 146, citing Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970).
Similarly, Judge Lord stated that absolute immunity may be afforded
government officials for functions that relate to the judicial process, but that merely a
good faith defense exists for all other supervisory and nonsupervisory government
employees. 435 F. Supp. at 147, citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)
(absolute immunity for actions related to judicial functions); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975) (good faith defense for school board officials acting in an adjudicatory
capacity).
14. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 21 & 23 infra. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), holding state officers and employees
individually liable for violations of plaintiffs' federally protected rights under § 1983,
that section had been applied restrictively by lower federal courts even in suits that
did not join municipalities as defendants. See Note, The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40, 213-14 (1961). See generally Note, supra note 13.
15. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, §1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at R.S. § 1979 (1874),
current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970)).
16. Moor v. County of Almeda, 411 U.S. 693, 708 (1973) (footnote omitted). See
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 788 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Kerr); id. at 791
(remarks of Rep. Willard); id. at 793 (remarks of Rep. Poland); id. at 795 (remarks of
Rep. Blair); id. at 798 (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
The 1871 Act was proposed and enacted as a result of the rising violence and
destruction in the South after the Civil War, and the apparent reluctance or inability
of state governments to control the situation by effective enforcement of state law. See
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judicially established in Monroe v. Pape,17 in which the Supreme Court held
that a municipality is not a "person," subject to liability under section 1983
of the 1871 Act. 18 The Monroe Court emphasized the reluctance of Congress
to impose civil liability upon the "mere instrumentalit[ies] for the
administration of state law." 19
Lower federal courts responded to Monroe and subsequent Supreme
Court decisions that further limited the scope of section 198320 in two general
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 175-80 (1960). The solution attempted by the 42d Congress in the 1871 Act, was to
create federal jurisdiction over official state infringement of federally guaranteed
rights, since "Congress had neither the means nor the authority to exert any direct
control, on a day-to-day basis, over the actions of state officials ... " 409 U.S. at 427.
The 42d Congress debated a proposal that expressly created municipal
liability. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871). The proposal, known as
the Sherman Amendment, would have required "the inhabitants of the county, city, or
parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed ... to pay full
compensation to the person or persons damnified by such offenses .... " Id.
Although the Senate adopted the Sherman Amendment, the House rejected it. Id. at
704-05, 725.
The supporters of the Sherman Amendment argued that imposition of
liability upon municipalities for their employees' wrongdoings would provide "a
safeguard [against civil rights violations] which no police arrangement [could] make,
one more effective than any other . . . ." Id. at 794 (remarks of Rep. Kelley). For a
discussion of the scope of the Sherman Amendment and the significance of its
rejection, see Kates & Kouba, supra note 13, at 133-36, 147-48.
The events, social and political climate, legislation, and judicial actions of the
Reconstruction era have been discussed by a number of historians. See, e.g., 6 C.
FAIRI AN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88 (1971); H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); A. NEVINS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICA,
1865-1878 (1927); B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL
RIGHTS (pt. 1) (1970); K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1965); J.
TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (rev. ed. 1965); Bickel, The Original Understanding
and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Frank & Munro, The
Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131
(1950); Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1954);
Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323
(1953).
17. 365 U.S. 167 (1960).
18. Id. at 191. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
19. 365 U.S. at 190, quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1871). The
Monroe- Court expressly declined to comment upon certain policy considerations
raised by the facts of the case such as the ineffectiveness of private remedies against
police officers and the projected beneficial results of municipal liability. 365 U.S. at
190. Moreover, the Court did not reach the constitutional issue "whether Congress has
the power to make municipalities liable for the acts of its officers that violate the civil
rights of individuals." Id. at 191. See Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities
for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 939-40 (1976).
20. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973); Moor v. County of
Almeda, 411 U.S. 693, 710 (1973). The Moor Court held that a county is not a "person"
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manners: 1) by concentrating upon the definitional nature of the cases, in
order to determine when a particular defendant is a "person; ' 21 and 2) by
reading the cases and history of section 1983 as evidencing a congressional
mandate for municipal immunity in civil rights cases. 22 Under either, or a
combined approach, the impact of Monroe and the Court's subsequent
restrictions on section 1983 availability has been the effective destruction of
for § 1983 purposes. 411 U.S. at 710. The Bruno Court applied § 1983 exclusion of cities
and counties to requests for equitable relief as well as to damage claims. 412 U.S. at
513. Prior to the Court's limitation of § 1983 in Bruno, many lower federal courts had
interpreted Monroe and Moor as presenting no barrier against equitable relief under
the statute. See, e.g., Harkless v. Sweeney Ind. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 320 (5th Cir.
1970), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); see also Note, Civil Rights Jurisdiction Under
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) Not Available When Equitable Monetary Relief Sought Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 Would Stem Directly from Municipal Funds, 47 Miss. L.J. 799, 802 &
n.20 (1976).
21. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd., 430 U.S. 651
(1977) (school board is not a "person"); Wright v. Arkansas Activities Assoc., 501 F.2d
25 (8th Cir. 1974) (voluntary athletic association is not a "person"); Cheramie v.
Tucker, 493 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974) (state highway
department and other arms of state government are not "persons"); Blanton v. State
Univ., 489 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1973) (state university is not a "person"); Lehman v. City
of Pittsburgh, 474 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1973) (municipal civil service commission is not a
"person"); Henschel v. Worchester Police Dept., 445 F.2d 624 (1st Cir. 1971) (per
curiam) (city police department is not a "person"); Madden v. New Jersey State Parole
Bd., 438 F.2d 1189 (3d Cir. 1971) (parole board is not a "person"); Gittlemacker v.
County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970)
(city hospital is not a "person"); Christian v. Anderson, 381 F. Supp. 168 (D. Okla.
1974) (state of Oklahoma is not a "person"); Edwards v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 371
F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 510 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1974) (public utilities commission
is not a "person"); Sams v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 352 F. Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (state parole board is not a "person"). Cf. Bosley v. City of Euclid, 496 F.2d 193,
195 (6th Cir. 1974) (municipality is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970)).
In Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 520 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.), aff'd en banc on
other grounds, 528 F.2d 499 (1976), the Fifth Circuit held a pension fund board of
trustees to be a "nonperson." 520 F.2d at 998. In his dissent, Judge Godbold
enunciated the following test for determining when an entity should be included in
the § 1983 "person" category: "[Wihether the public body is so connected -
administratively, functionally, fiscally, and in other ways - to a state, city, or county
... that it is in effect an arm ... of the state, city, or county." Id. at 1005 (Godbold,
J., dissenting).
22. See, e.g., Redding v. Medica, 402 F. Supp. 1260, 1261 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Hines v.
D'Artois, 383 F. Supp. 184, 189-90 (W.D. La. 1974); Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp.
203, 215 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 917
(1972); Note, supra note 19, at 939.
In Hines, the court disposed of plaintiffs' vicarious liability claims against the
municipal corporation for the actions of police officers, maintaining that "[t]o hold
otherwise would punish the entire community, the innocent with the guilty, and run
counter to the congressional intent in adopting the Civil Rights Acts, reflected by the
history of their evolution as described in Monroe ... and City of Kenosha ... " 383
F. Supp. at 190.
In a slightly different approach, the Bennett court noted that the purpose of
§ 1983 was to create a remedy for aggrieved individuals by allowing them to bring
damage actions against the wrongdoing municipal employees, but that municipal
liability was rejected by the 42d Congress as antagonistic to its own policies. 323 F.
Supp. at 215. Thus, according to the Bennett court, to allow a damage claim against a
city under § 1981 would also "[deprive] section 1983 of its essential significance." Id.
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potential federal remedies against local governmental entities for their
direct and indirect violations of section 1983.23
An alternate theory for reaching municipal coffers for harm inflicted by
city employees has been to bring claims directly under the fourteenth
amendment,24 alleging direct and, more commonly, vicarious liability of the
municipal corporation. 25 This approach gained popularity after the Supreme
Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,26 in which the injured plaintiff was allowed to bring a
damage claim directly under the fourth amendment against federal officers
for their unconstitutional conduct.2 7 While Bivens arguably was a narrow
decision confined to its facts,28 it has been asserted that the Bivens doctrine
should be given broad application, 29 as implied in two subsequent Supreme
Court cases.30 In District of Columbia v. Carter,31 Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, noted that a Bivens-based remedy might be available to
redress unconstitutional harm inflicted upon the plaintiff by a police
officer, 32 even though section 1983 was held not to apply in the District of
Columbia.33 In City of Kenosha v. Bruno,34 the Court held that municipal
23. See, e.g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969); Diamond v. Pitchess,
411 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1969); Brown v. Town of Caliente, Nevada, 392 F.2d 546 (9th Cir.
1968); Fischer v. City of New York, 312 F.2d 890 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828
(1963); Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12,18 (S.D. Me. 1970); Davis v. Hartman, 306
F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
Baxter v. Parker, 281 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Fla. 1968). But see Note, Developing
Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1222 (1971)
(growing number of federal courts limiting municipal immunity).
24. This method of reaching municipal coffers often utilizes § 1331 of the federal
judicial code, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), as the jurisdictional counterpart to the
fourteenth amendment. Section 1331 cases necessarily require a showing that more
than $10,000 is at stake. See cases cited in note 25 infra. For the text of§ 1331, see note
36 infra.
25. See, e.g., Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975); Brault v. Town of
Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 527 F.2d 736, 739 (2d Cir. 1975) (en banc);
Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 718-19 n.7 (7th Cir. 1975); Braden
v. University of Pittsburgh, 477 F.2d 1, 7 n.10 (3d Cir. 1973) (dictum); Owen v. City of
Independence, 421 F. Supp. 1110, 1119 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Mejia v. School City of Gary,
415 F. Supp. 370, 373-74 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 156
(N.D. Ill. 1975); Patterson v. City of Chester, 389 F. Supp. 1093, 1095-96 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Perzanowski v. Salvio, 369 F. Supp. 223, 229 (D. Conn. 1974); Dupree v. City of
Chattanooga, 362 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); but see, e.g., Perry v. Linke,
394 F. Supp. 323, 326 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 217 (D.
Md.), aff'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 917 (1972).
26. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
27. Id. at 397.
28. See 564 F.2d at 1058-59 (Garth, J., dissenting).
29. See, e.g., Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647, 651 (N.D. Cal. 1974);
Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U. L.
REV. 770, 771-73 (1975).
30. See Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause of
Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 531,
542 (1977).
31. 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
32. Id. at 432-33.
33. Id. at 432.
34. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
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immunity existed in equity claims, thus foreclosing the use of section 1983
against the City for that purpose. 35 Although the majority did not
specifically refer to Bivens as providing the substantive basis for a suit
against the municipality, the Bruno Court suggested that, if the injured
parties could satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, jurisdiction
over the municipality might be conferred under section 1331 of the federal
judicial code.36 Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, in their joint
concurrence, expressly noted that a Bivens remedy was available. 37
The Supreme Court has not decided if a Bivens-type remedy could be
extended to other constitutional provisions to bring damage actions against
a municipality for its direct and indirect violations. 38 Lower federal courts
have split on the issue.39
Another theory for damage actions against a municipality for direct and
vicarious violations of civil rights is to rely upon section 1981 of the 1866 Act
as the basis for such relief.40
The 1866 Act was passed to enforce the newly enacted thirteenth
amendment.41 Accordingly, section 1981 has become an important vehicle
35. Id. at 513. See note 20 supra.
36. 412 U.S. at 513-14. Section 1331(a) provides in pertinent part: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States ... " 28 U.S.C.§ 1331 (1970).
37. Id. aI 516 (Marshall & Brennan, J.J., concurring).
38. See Bodensteiner, Federal Court Jurisdiction of Suits Against "Non-Persons"
for Deprivation of Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. L. REV. 215, 221-22 (1974); Note,
supra note 19, at 926-29.
39. For a thorough discussion of lower federal courts' disposition of fourteenth
amendment damage claims against municipalities, see Lehmann, supra note 30, at
544-97. Several lower federal courts have premised their decisions of Bivens' claims
upon numerous procedural and substantive issues. Id. However, the most frequent
considerations are whether implication of a direct constitutional remedy is necessary
or appropriate in view of the availability of § 1983 and whether legislative history of
that statute established municipal immunity against fourteenth amendment claims.
See Note, supra note 19, at 922-24, 927, 945-52; Comment, Implying a Damage
Remedy Against Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment: Congres-
sional Action as an Obstacle to Extension of the Bivens Doctrine, 36 MD. L. REV. 123,
125 (1976).
Implication of a Bivens-type remedy is not necessary, of course, in suits
against individual state government officials, because § 1983 specifically provides for
federal relief in such situations. See Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158, 165
(C.D. Cal. 1977).
40. For the text of § 1981, see note 6 supra.
41. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 16 at 99. The thirteenth amendment states:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
Section 2 of the thirteenth amendment purportedly allowed Congress to pass
legislation necessary to give life to the amendment. See, e.g., Casper, Clio, Bemused
and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 89, 101. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the
survivor of two Reconstruction statutes discussed during the session-long debate of
the 39th Congress between the certification of the thirteenth, amendment, December
1977-19781
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for establishing federal causes of action in modern civil rights litigation. 42
Although a majority of claims brought under section 1981 have focused
upon its "contract" guarantee,4 3 the sweeping scope of the 1866 Act has
18, 1865, and the delivery of the fourteenth amendment, June 13, 1866. See Bickel,
supra note 16 at 7-29. Much of the debate over the 1866 Act focused upon defining
"civil rights," and the formula eventually adopted is represented by the enumerated
rights in § 1 of the 1866 Act: "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for security of
person and property . . . ." Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. See Bickel,
supra note 16, at 20-24.
The sponsor of the 1866 Act, Senator Trumbull, "described its objectives in
terms that belie any attempt to read it narrowly." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 431 (1968). Senator Trumbull introduced the Act as "the most important
measure that ha[d] been under [the Senate's] consideration since the adoption of the
constitutional amendment abolishing slavery [thirteenth amendment]" and as a
device "to give effect to that declaration and secure to all persons within the United
States practical freedom." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (remarks of
Sen. Trumbull). The sweeping effect of the bill was recognized by the members of the
39th Congress, and "was disputed by none." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 433 (1968), citing CONG. GLOBE, supra, at 504 (remarks of Sen. Cowan), id. at 504
(remarks of Sen. Howard), and id. at 601 (remarks of Sen. Hendricks).
The broad scope of the 1866 Act has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court
repeatedly. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425 (1973). It has
been argued, however, that closer reading of the legislative debates - with the
contemporary politics in mind - does not warrant the "universal" application
employed by the Court. See Casper, supra, at 104-22.
42. See, e.g., McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 263 (1976); Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454
(1975); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Penn v.
Schlessinger, 490 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1973); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438
F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
The companion statute to § 1981 - 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) - is also an
important tool in civil rights litigation. Section 1982 reads as follows: "All citizens of
the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
The historical note accompanying § 1981 traces the statute to the Act of May
31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (Enforcement Act of 1870), which, as enacted,
enforced aspects of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 16, at 443-45. The historical note fails to reflect, however, that the 1866 Civil
Rights Act was the source of § 16 and § 17 of the 1870 Act and was specifically
reenacted in § 18. See Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16 & 17, 18, & 16 Stat. 144. The
Supreme Court acknowledged this in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-70 n.8
(1975), and found "no basis for inferring that Congress did not understand the draft
legislation which eventually became 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to be drawn from both § 16 of the
1870 Act and § 1 of the 1866 Act." Id. at 169 n.8. See also Sethy v. Almeda County
Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1160 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976); Note, Section 1981 and Private
Discrimination: An Historical Justification for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1024, 1036-39 (1972).
Even before the detailed discussion of the history of the 1866 Act in the
Runyon footnote, the Court had recognized the common origin and "historical
interrelationship" of § 1981 and § 1982. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454, 471 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring in part); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973). See also Campbell v. Gadsen County
Dist. School Bd., 534 F.2d 650, 654 n.9 (5th Cir. 1976).
43. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1976);
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert.
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prompted the Supreme Court to comment that the current codifications
encompass every form of race discrimination. 4 Thus, the Court has held
that section 1981 provides for the redress of private discrimination, in
addition to civil rights violations under color of state law, 45 and that the
statute protects aliens 46 and whites as well as blacks.
47
denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 352 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. Mich.
1972); Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md.), affl'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 917 (1972).
44. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1967). In Jones, after a
detailed discussion of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the
majority, stated:
In light of the concerns that led Congress to adopt it and the contents of the
debates that preceded its passage, it is clear that the Act was designed to do just
what its terms suggest: to prohibit all racial discrimination, whether or not under
color of law, with respect to the rights enumerated therein ....
Id. (emphasis added). See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237
(1969), citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-37 (1967).
45. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968). Applying § 1981 and § 1982 to acts of private discrimination became
possible only after the Supreme Court began to enforce the statutes literally in Jones.
See Larson, The Development of Section 1981 As a Remedy for Racial Discrimination
in Private Employment, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 56, 57 & n.6 (1972). Before that
time, the "original state action doctrine," read into the thirteenth amendment in the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883), was also read into § 1981 and § 1982, since
they were designed to enforce the constitutional provision. See Goldstein, Death and
Transfiguration of the State Action Doctrine - Moose Lodge v. Irvis to Runyon v.
McCrary, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1, 2-3 (1977).
In Jones, which involved discriminatory refusals to sell real estate, the Court
rejected dicta to the contrary in earlier cases and held that § 1982 applied to private
individuals as well as to state officials. 392 U.S. at 437-44. The Court's decision was
based upon a literal interpretation of the statute and upon a detailed analysis of
legislative history. Id. at 422-37. Citing Jones as precedent, the Court subsequently
held that § 1981 protected against racially discriminatory exclusion from private
schools in Runyon. 427 U.S. at 173. In addition, the Jones rationale has provided the
basis for several circuit court decisions that held that § 1981 can be used to redress
racial discrimination in nonpublic employment. See, e.g., Brady v. Bristol-Meyers,
Inc., 459 F.2d 621, 622-23 (8th Cir. 1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438
F.2d 757, 758-60 (3d Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097,
1099-1100 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works
of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 481-85 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
See generally Brooks, Use of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 to Redress
Employment Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 258 (1977); Casper, supra note 41;
Larson, supra.
In Jones, the Court granted the requested injunctive relief. 392 U.S. at 413. To
the extent that the availability of legal remedies was left open, the question was
settled in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969), in which damages were
awarded under § 1982. Id. at 239. The Supreme Court subsequently recognized the
appropriateness of monetary relief in § 1981 cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975). Accord, Young v. International Tel. & Tel.
Co., 438 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1971); Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913, 918
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
46. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971); Guerra v.
Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974); Roberto v. Hartford Ins. Co.,
177 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950); Chavez-Salido v. Cabell,
427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
47. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286-96 (1977);
Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894, 898-99
(E.D. Mo. 1969).
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The Supreme Court has not decided if a municipal corporation could be
held liable for damages under section 1981.48 Two United States circuit
courts of appeal49 and several district courts,50 however, have decided that
question affirmatively. In contrast, a number of district courts have not
allowed damage actions against municipalities under section 1981.1
In Mahone, the Third Circuit assumed, without actually finding, that
the individual defendants' conduct violated section 1983,52 and that, while
the City would be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior in other
contexts, the doctrine's application here was precluded by section 1983 and
Monroe.5 3 The court also explored the possibility that the fourteenth
amendment gave rise to a cause of action against the City,54 but, after
outlining the opposing viewpoints on the subject,55 the majority declined to
join the debate,56 reasoning that its decision with respect to the avail-
ability of section 1981 made a determination of the constitutional issue
unnecessary.57
48. See Moor v. County of Almeda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961).
49. United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 425 (7th Cir. 1977); Sethy v.
Almeda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1976).
50. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158, 162-65 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Skyers v.
Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 431 F. Supp. 79,84 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Gomez v. Pima County,
426 F. Supp. 816, 817-18 (D. Ariz. 1976); Rafferty v. Prince George's County, 423 F.
Supp. 1045, 1058-61 (D. Md. 1976); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of
Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 908 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Robinson v. Conlisk, 385 F. Supp.
529, 530 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913, 916 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
U.S. ex rel. Washington v. Chester County Police Dept., 300 F. Supp. 1279, 1280-81(1969) (motion to dismiss), 294 F. Supp. 1157, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (motion to proceed
in forma pauperis). Cf. Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Serv., 528 F.2d 508
(5th Cir. 1976) (remanded to determine, inter alia, whether state and county corporate
defendants can be sued under § 1981); Booth v. Prince George's County, 66 F.R.D. 466,
470 & n.3 (D. Md. 1975) (postponement of consideration of § 1981 until claim for
damages arises).
51. Redding v. Medica, 402 F. Supp. 1260, 1261 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Black Bros. v.
City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 147, 148 (E.D. Va. 1974); Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F.
Supp. 203, 215 (D. Md.), aff'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 917
(1972).
52. 564 F.2d at 1021.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1022.
55. Id. at 1022-24. The City contended that the fourteenth amendment did not
provide an independent cause of action. Id. at 1022-23. Moreover, it claimed that§ 1983 manifested "a congressional policy against municipal liability" and that
finding a direct cause of action under the amendment would circumvent the
congressional policy. Id.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that a claim for which relief could be
granted could be implicitly found in the fourteenth amendment, as had been done by
the Court in Bivens. 564 F.2d at 1023. See notes 24-37 and accompanying text supra.
56. 564 F.2d at 1024.
57. Id. at 1024-25. The majority noted that in Bivens the Court implied a cause of
action directly under the fourth amendment because no "effective and substantial
federal statutory remedy for plaintiffs" existed. Id. In contrast, the Third Circuit did
find an effective federal statutory remedy under § 1981. Id. at 1027-30. Thus, the court
emphasized that it "express[ed] no opinion . . .on the issue whether a fourteenth
amendment remedy may or should be implied in other cases where the plaintiffs have
no effective federal statutory remedy." Id. at 1025.
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In discussing the section 1981 claim, the court found a noticeable lack of
judicial interpretation of the "equal benefits-like punishment" language of
section 1981 relied upon by plaintiffs.58 The court therefore conducted an
independent examination of section 1981 and concluded that "[d]espite the
sparsity of precedent, a natural and common sense reading of the statute
compels the conclusion that section 1981 has broad applicability beyond the
mere right to contract." 59 According to the Mahone court, the injury alleged
by the plaintiffs fell "within the broad language of both the equal benefits
and like punishment clauses of section 1981." 6 The court noted that the
1866 Act was intended as "a complete statutory analog to the thirteenth
amendment,"1 and was designed to "eradicate all discrimination against
blacks and to secure for them full freedom and equality in civil rights."6 2
The court refuted the City's contention that a broad reading of the
"equal benefits-like punishment" language, combined with the recent
Supreme Court determinations that some private discrimination may be
actionable under section 1981,63 would result in a federal court action under
that statute "whenever a white man strikes a black in a barroom brawl. ' 64
Rather, the court interpreted the "equal benefits-like punishment" language
as implicitly involved in "relations between the individual and the state, not
between two individuals," because "[t]he state, not the individual, is the sole
source of law, and it is only the state acting through its agents, not the
private individual, which is capable of denying blacks the full and equal
benefit of law."'65
The court next turned to the question whether the district court had
jurisdiction to hold the City liable under section 1981.66 The majority refused
to extend section 1983 municipal immunity to section 1981.67 The court noted
that, whereas the word "person" in section 1983, defined in Monroe as
58. Id. at 1027. The court cited only three cases that construed the "equal benefits-
like punishment" language of § 1981. Id., citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879); Rafferty v. Prince George's County, 423 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Md. 1976); and
Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Mo.
1969). See note 6 supra.
59. 564 F.2d at 1028. The court's conclusion was based entirely upon the language
of § 1981. After paraphrasing the enumerated rights in § 1981, the court stated that
"[t]he statute can be read in no other way. To read the language of the statute as
applying only to the right to contract ignores the clear and vital words of the majority
of its provisions." Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
63. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
64. 564 F.2d at 1029 (footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 1029. By contrast, the reverse argument - that the right to contract
inherently involves relations between two private individuals - is the basis for
finding private discriminatory acts subject to § 1981, under the contract language. Id.
at 1029-30. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See also Note,
Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement
Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1974).
66. 504 F.2d at 1030.
67. Id.
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excluding municipalities, 68 describes those who may be found liable for
improper conduct, the word "persons" in section 1981 applies to those
protected by the statute.6 9 The court found no evidence of congressional
intent to create such municipal immunity.70 The majority further concluded
that sections 1981 and 1983 derived from different legislative enactments
and were created to enforce different constitutional provisions, and that
section 1981 was not in any way expressly or implicitly modified or repealed
by the subsequent congressional adoption of section 1983. 11
Finding that no bar to suit against municipalities existed in section
1981, the majority held that section 1343(3) of the federal judicial code
provided the necessary jurisdictional component.72 The majority asserted
68. See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
69. 564 F.2d at 1030. For the text of § 1981 and § 1983, see notes 6 & 18 supra.
70. 564 F.2d at 1030.
71. Id. at 1030-31. In its historical analysis, the majority noted that § 1981,
although originally enacted as part of the Act of 1866, was reenacted in the Act of
May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 144. Id. at 1030. Thus, the court concluded that
"[d]ue to its unusual history, section 1981 can fairly be said to rest not only on the
fourteenth amendment but also on the foundation provided by the thirteenth
amendment. Id., citing, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Section 1983, according to the Mahone court, was enacted to enforce the
fourteenth amendment, and the Supreme Court has made clear that "[d]ifferent
problems of statutory meaning are presented by two enactments deriving from
different constitutional sources." 564 F.2d at 1030, quoting, District of Columbia v.
Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1972). Similarly, the Mahone court acknowledged that the
1871 'congressional debates demonstrated an "intent to temper the protection of civil
rights against encroachment by the states with countervailing concerns of federal-
ism," whereas the 1866 Act "manifest[ed] Congress' purpose to enact sweeping
legislation ... to abolish all the remaining badges and vestiges of the slavery
system." 564 F.2d at 1030 (footnote omitted).
Furthermore, the Mahone majority rejected the argument that § 1983, enacted
five years after § 1981, constituted an implied repeal of the earlier statute. Id. at 1031.
Specifically, the court viewed the proposed but rejected municipal liability provision
in the 1871 Act as creating "collective responsibility for a single individual's private
act of violence against blacks which occurred within the city's borders," and therefore
did not affect a municipal corporation's liability for wrongdoings of its employees
performed under color of state law. Id. (emphasis in original). This distinction of the
proposed amendment to the 1871 Act has been made by other courts. See, e.g., Sanbria
v. Village of Monticello, 424 F. Supp. 402, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
The Third Circuit cited Sethy v. Almeda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157(9th Cir. 1976) (en banc), as supporting its view that municipal immunity under § 1983
and Monroe was not properly extended to § 1981. 564 F.2d at 1030.
72. 564 F.2d at 1034. Section 1343(3) provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any privilege or immunity secured by
the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens ....
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
The majority discussed § 1343(3) in response to the dissent's assertion that the
section was not available in actions brought under § 1981. 564 F.2d at 1050-51 (Garth,
J., dissenting).
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that section 1343(3) derived from the same source as section 1981 and was,
therefore, its historical jurisdictional counterpart. 73
Judge Garth, dissenting in part and concurring in part, submitted that
the 1866 Act did not "enable aggrieved persons to initiate suit in federal
court."74 He maintained that the jurisdictional basis for a private federal
cause of action was not provided until the enactment of the 1871 Act 75 and
concluded that all 1866 Act claims, including section 1981 actions, are
affected by the jurisdictional limitations of the 1871 Act and section 1983.76
Since municipalities are not liable under section 1983, Judge Garth
concluded that municipal immunity must be extended to suits brought
pursuant to section 1981.
77
73. 564 F.2d at 1033. The court cited footnotes in two Supreme Court cases to
show the common derivation of § 1981 and § 1343(3). Id., citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
476, 508 n.10 (1939) and Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543-44 n.7
(1972). See note 76 infra.
74. Id. at 1041 (Garth, J., dissenting), citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1271 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bingham). Judge Garth noted that a proposed
amendment to the 1866 Act would have provided for private damage actions. Id. at
1039 (Garth, J., dissenting). The proposal, made in the form of recommended
instructions to the House Judiciary Committee, was defeated. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1271 (1866). Judge Garth stated that "if the Act had already provided
for a private cause of action in the federal court," the proposal would not have been
necessary. 564 F.2d at 1040 (Garth, J., dissenting).
75. 564 F.2d at 1040 (Garth, J., dissenting). Whether or not civil rights jurisdiction
in the federal courts had first been created by the 1866 Act was at the heart of the
dispute between the majority and dissent in Mahone. The disputed language of the
Act is as follows:
And be it further enacted, That the district courts of the United States,
within their respective districts, shall have, exclusive of the several States,
cognizance of all crimes and offenses committed against the provisions of this
act, and also, concurrently with the circuit courts of the United States, of all
causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in
the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any of
the rights secured to them by the first section of this act ....
Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (emphasis added by the court). The dissent
interpreted the above statutory language as only providing federal jurisdiction in
removal cases. Id. at 1044-47 (Garth, J., dissenting).
76. 564 F.2d at 1043 (Garth, J., dissenting). In addition to the substantive bar of§ 1981 claims against municipalities, Judge Garth argued that a procedural barrier
also existed, since § 1343(3) was enacted in the 1871 Act as the jurisdictional
counterpart to § 1983. Id. at 1050-51 (Garth, J., dissenting). He distinguished the
Lynch footnote relied on by the majority (see note 73 supra) by asserting that the
Court meant only that the 1866 Act had served as the model for the 1871 Act, not that
the 1866 Act included the substance of § 1343(3). Id. at 1049 (Garth', J., dissenting).
Thus, he reasoned that § 1343(3) provided jurisdiction for § 1983 claims only. Id.,
discussing City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
Finally, Judge Garth discussed the availability of federal jurisdiction under
§ 1331 or under § 1343(4) as an alternative to § 1343(3). 564 F.2d at 1051-52 (Garth, J.,
dissenting). Noting that the former two statutes were enacted without specific
congressional consideration of the municipal immunity-liability question, Judge
Garth reasoned that the decision of the 42d Congress when enacting the 1871 Act
"has remained without change and accordingly it still binds us." Id. at 1052 (Garth,
J., dissenting). For a discussion of the 42d Congress' rejection of municipal liability
under the 1871 Act, see note 16 supra.
77. 564 F.2d at 1043 (Garth, J., dissenting).
1977-1978]
47
Editors: Federal Statutes and Regulation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Whereas the majority found it unnecessary to decide if a cause of action
for damages could be asserted against a municipal corporation under the
fourteenth amendment,78 the dissent addressed that issue and decided
against the plaintiffs.7 9 Judge Garth's analysis began with the apparent
presumption in Bivens that "it is appropriate for federal courts to recognize
damage claims asserted directly under provisions of the Constitution
guaranteeing individual rights."0 Noting that the Bivens Court carefully
pointed out that no "special factors counselling hesitation" existed, Judge
Garth distinguished the instant case by enunciating four such "special
factors."'81 First, the fourteenth amendment included its own enforcement
mechanism in section five, which provides that "Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. '8 2
Second, section 1983 represented Congress' method of enforcing the
fourteenth amendment.8 3 Third, Congress has not overruled Monroe, via
legislative action, to allow municipal liability, even though such action has
been proposed.8 4 Fourth, whereas the plaintiff in Bivens would have
78. 564 F.2d at 1024.
79. Id. at 1052. (Garth, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1058-59 (Garth, J., dissenting), citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1972).
Before reaching Bivens, Judge Garth distinguished Supreme Court cases
allowing injunctive relief directly under the fourteenth amendment and other
constitutional provisions, as flowing from the uncontroverted equitable power of the
federal courts. 564 F.2d at 1056-57 (Garth, J., dissenting), citing Griffin v. County
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232-34 (1964). In addition, Judge Garth refuted plaintiffs'
assertions that the Third Circuit had previously decided that fourteenth amendment
damage actions were maintainable against municipalities; the dissent characterized
the disputed cases as merely deciding that jurisdiction in such claims might be
conferred by § 1331. 564 F.2d at 1057-58 (Garth, J., dissenting), discussing Rotolo v.
Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976); McCullough v. Redevelopment
Auth., 522 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1975); Skeehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State
College, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983
(1973), on remand, 538 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1976).
81. 564 F.2d at 1059 (Garth, J., dissenting), quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1972).
82. 564 F.2d at 1059 (Garth, J., dissenting), quoting, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
83. 564 F.2d at 1059 (Garth, J., dissenting). Judge Garth elaborated: "For the
federal courts to create a cause of action directly under the Fourteenth Amendment for
the sole purpose of overruling Congress's decision to exempt municipalities from suit
is hardly the deference to congressional choice which section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment demands." Id.
84. Id. at 1059-60 (Garth, J., dissenting). The circumvention of Monroe could
have been achieved if any of the various proposed legislation had been enacted. See,
e.g., H.R. 11827, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 10876, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967);
H.R. 5427, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 6334, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R.
6030, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 3932, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. 1215, 88th
Cong., lst Sess. (1963); S. 2983, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H.R. 10120, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962); H.R. 10951, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). See also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, LAw ENFORCEMENT - A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH 179
(1965); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1961 COMMISSION REPORT ON CIVIL RIGHTS -
JUSTICE 113 (1961).
A bill, currently before Congress, would allow damage actions to be brought
against municipalities for the unconstitutional conduct of their employees. See Civil
Rights Improvement Act, S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S. 201-05 (daily
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encountered formidable difficulties in suing federal agents individually in
state court, and would have been thwarted by the sovereign immunity
barrier, if suing the agents' employer - the United States - those obstacles
were absent in the instant case.8 5 For these reasons, Judge Garth concurred
with the majority's dismissal of the fourteenth amendment claim "on the
ground that no fourteenth amendment cause of action for damages is
available against a city.
'86
Although the authorities disagree on the facts surrounding the political
and legislative activity in the post-Civil War era,87 it is clear that the major
goal of the Reconstruction Congresses was the protection of civil rights
against race-based discrimination.8 8 Since the incorporation of freed slaves
into society was threatened by a variety of barriers and was to have a
profound social impact,8 9 the contemporary legislation and constitutional
reform reflected both reiteration of general policy and responses to specific
difficulties in implementing the new policy. 90 The Mahone court correctly
recognized that section 1981 exemplified the former type of legislative
ed. Jan. 10, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Mathias). The proposed legislation expressly
amends § 1983 by defining "person" as "any individual, State, municipality, or any
agency or unit of government of such State or municipality," although certain,
arguably broad, exceptions to municipal liability are also created by the Civil Rights
Improvement Act. See Id. at S. 204.
In contrast to congressional inaction with respect to municipal immunity,
Judge Garth noted the quick response of Congress to overrule a Supreme Court
decision holding that attorney's fees could not be awarded under original civil rights
legislation, by enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976, P.L.
94-559, § 2 (Oct. 19, 1976). 564 F.2d at 1060 (Garth, J., dissenting). See Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 264 (1975).
85. 564 F.2d at 1060-61 (Garth, J., dissenting). Specifically, Judge Garth
explained that § 1981 and § 1983 provided access to federal courts for plaintiff to sue
the police officers as individuals. Id. Moreover, claims against both the individual and
municipal defendants could be brought in state courts, since immunity of local
governmental units had been abolished in Pennsylvania. Id. at 1061 citing Ayala v.
Board of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
86. 564 F.2d at 1060. (Garth, J., dissenting).
87. See, e.g., Graham, The Early Antislavery Background of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 479, 481-83.
88. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170- 71 (1976); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-62 (1975); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 422 (1968); C. FAIRMAN, supra note 16, at 1127; J. McPHEARSON, THE STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY 330-35 (1964); K. STAMPP, supra note 16, at 7-76, 131-33; J. TENBROEK,
supra note 16, at 177-81.
89. See, e.g., Gressman, supra note 16, at 1323-24. The post-Civil War legislation
and constitutional amendment was expected to cause a "profound shift" in the
relationship between the federal government and the states, reversing the nature of
the national entity from "the prime threat to civil liberties" to their principal
protector. Id. at 1342.
90. The thirteenth amendment exemplified congressional formulation of general,
antislavery policy. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883); tenBroek,
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States - Consumation to
Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 171, 171-73, 185
(1951). In contrast, the 1871 Act was prompted by President Grant's request for
federal legislation to deal with the organization of the Ku Klux Klan and subsequent
rise in murders and assaults of blacks and Union sympathizers in the South. See
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1972).
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action, as evidenced by the statute's clear, sweeping language and - to the
extent relevant 9l - its history. It is submitted that the court's approach was
warranted not only by general notions of statutory interpretation,92 but was
also consistent with the original and continuing goal of civil rights
legislation. 93
The issue of the existence of municipal immunity, flowing from the
projected intent of the forty-second Congress in 1871, 94 was also correctly
decided by the Mahone court. The Third Circuit's refusal to apply the intent
of the forty-second Congress to the 1866 Act was arguably mandated by the
Supreme Court's comments and reasoning in a number of civil rights
cases.95 Most illustrative is the Court's opinion in District of Columbia v.
91. See note 92 infra.
92. While there are no "black letter" laws of statutory construction, certain basic
concepts have been recognized as useful tools for judicial interpretation and
application. See DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
1-6 (1975). Among the most frequently noted concepts is that "when language is clear
and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it plainly expresses, and no room is
left for construction." Swarts v. Siegel, 117 F. 13, 18-19 (8th Cir. 1902), citing, Railway
Co. v. Phelps, 137 U.S. 528 (1890); United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 399
(1805); St. Paul, M & M Ry. v. Sage, 71 F. 40, 47 (8th Cir. 1895); Knox v. Morton, 68 F.
787, 789 (8th Cir. 1895).
The Mahone opinion exemplifies the use of the plain meaning rule since the
holding was based upon explicit examination of the words in § 1981 and their
"comnmonsense" significance. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
, Exclusive reliance upon the plain meaning rule, however, is not without
criticisin, since isolated words are devoid of intrinsic meaning. See 2A C. SANDS,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 51, 182 (1973). Judicial consideration of
certain extrinsic aids, has thus been traditionally accepted by the courts as a vehicle
of legislative interpretation. Id. at 181. Legislative history has been especially
significant for that purpose. Id. at 181-82, Therefore, although it may have been
justified in ignoring the legislative history of the 1866 Act and confining the basis of
its holding to literal interpretation, the Mahone court's exploration of congressional
intent was certainly not controversial. See, e.g., FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899, 910
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
The danger of courts' extensive use of legislative history, especially when that
history is ambiguous or inconclusive is that "judicial legislation in the course of
judging as to the pertinence and probative force of the historical evidence" will result.
C. SANDS, supra, at 186. That risk seems possible in the instant case due to the
voluminous and disparate nature of the Reconstruction era civil rights legislative
history. See note 87 and accompanying text supra. Hence, the Mahone court's
avoidance of a very detailed dissection of the congressional debates and other
available materials, in order to determine a hypothesized understanding of the
members of the 39th Congress, seems appropriate. See C. SANDS, supra, at 216-17,
221-24.
93. See, e.g., HR. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, reprinted in [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2415. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970)) was premised on the notion
that "Congress can and should take action within its constitutional powers and
sphere of authority to carry out our national policy against discrimination by reason
of race or color .... " H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1964).
94. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
95. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968).
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Carter,96 in which the Court noted that the context of the language and the
constitutional origin of the 1871 and 1866 Civil Rights Acts were so
distinguishable as to require separate consideration of the modern versions
of the two bills. 97 It is therefore submitted that the Mahone opinion was
correct in viewing section 1981 as an independent statutory entity, the
language and purpose of which supported the award of damages against a
municipal corporation. 98
While the Third Circuit's literal interpretation of section 1981 resulted in
affirmative relief for the plaintiffs in Mahone, it is unlikely that all
problematic aspects of section 1981 claims against municipalities have been
removed. Notably, the Mahone court's failure to examine the relationship
between substantive and procedural jurisdictional requirements 99 or to
discuss alternate jurisdictional bases will not remedy the apparent
confusion of lower federal courts.1°° In the instant case, section 1331101
jurisdiction was available because the plaintiffs alleged the requisite
amount-in-controversy and the claim arose under a law of the United
States.10 2 Since the Supreme Court has suggested 0 3 and several circuit and
district courts have held10 4 that no substantive bar such as immunity exists
96. 409 U.S. 418 (1972). See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
97. 409 U.S. at 423. In Carter, the Court compared the 1866 and 1871 Acts for the
purpose of determining if the District of Columbia was a "state" under § 1983. Id. at
420. Since the Court had previously decided the same question under § 1982 and
concluded that the District was a state for the purpose of that statute, it was argued
that a similar result was compelled in Carter. Id. at 420-21, citing Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U.S. 24, 31 (1948). The Carter Court, however, maintained that the same word -
"state" - used in different statutes and different contexts should not necessarily be
given identical meanings. 409 U.S. at 423. With the objective of determining if "state"
was to be given the same definition in § 1982 and § 1983, the Court conducted a
thorough comparison of the 1866 and 1871 Acts and concluded that the purpose and
scope of the Acts were so distinct as to prevent one from being applied to the other. Id.
at 423-24.
98. See 564 F.2d at 1028-30.
99. The Supreme Court has emphasized the bifurcated nature of meeting
jurisdictional requirements in federal courts, distinguishing between a claim for
which relief could be granted and a statutory grant of federal court power to hear the
claim, and has required that both be demonstrated. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682
(1946). Section 1981, according to the Mahone court, provided the former requirement
in actions against municipalities. 564 F.2d at 1029-30. Satisfaction of the second
requirement presumably flowed from that finding, under either § 1331 federal question
jurisdiction, if the requisite amount-in-controversy existed, or under § 1343, since the
claim arose under federal statute and from federal legislation designed to protect civil
rights. See Bodensteiner, supra note 38, at 223-34.
100. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
101. For the pertinent text of § 1331, see note 36 supra.
102. 564 F.2d at 1021.
103. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
104. See, e.g., Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 1976); Cox v.
Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975); Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist. No. 515,
523 F.2d 569, 576-77 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Gray v. Union
County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1975); Hanna v. Drobnick,
514 F.2d 393, 398 (9th Cir. 1975); Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1305 (D.C.C.
1976); Waltenberg v. New York City Dep't of Correction, 376 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
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to prevent the use of section 1331 against municipalities, the Mahone court
could have structured its opinion so that it merely acknowledged that an
action pursuant to section 1981 provided the necessary "arising under"
jurisdiction. 10 5 The court, however, concluded its analysis by finding that
section 1343(3)106 jurisdiction was available to support the section 1981 claim
against the municipality. 10 The difficulty with that conclusion was
enunciated by dissenting Judge Garth who noted that, unlike sections 1981,
1983 and 1331, which derived from three distinct statutory sources, 08 section
1343(3) and section 1983 both were originally enacted in section one of the
1871 Civil Rights Act.10 9 Thus, even under the majority's reasoning, it is
submitted that the legislative history of the 1871 Act creates the same
substantive limitation with respect to municipal liability in section 1343(3)
as has been applied to section 1983.110 If use of section 1343(3) were limited
by excluding municipal liability, it would not necessarily follow that only
claims against cities in which damages of more than $10,000 were alleged -
thus satisfying the requirements of section 1331 - could be brought under
section 1981. Rather, section 1343(4) of the federal judicial code,"' under
which no minimum amount in controversy is required, could be used as a
jurisdictional basis for section 1981 claims.1 2
105. For the text of § 1331, see note 36 supra. Section 1331 creates general federal
question jurisdiction whenever at least $10,000 is in controversy and when the
plaintiff's cause of action "arises under" federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). The
thrust of the Mahone court's holding was to interpret the "equal benefits-like
punishment" language of § 1981 as creating a cause of action against a municipality.
See notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra. Since § 1981 is a federal statute, the
court's finding leads to the conclusion that plaintiffs' claims "arise under" federal
law. See The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (patent law);
Aycock, Introduction to Certain Members of the Federal Question Family, 49 N.C.L.
REV. 1, 5-7 (1970); Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Cause of
Action Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 905-06 (1967).
106. For the text of § 1343(3), see note 72 supra.
107 564 F.2d at 1033-34.
108. For the derivation of § 1983 and § 1981 see notes 16 & 41 supra. Section 1331
originally appeared in the Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. See generally
Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEG.
HIST. 333 (1969).
109. 564 F.2d at 1048 (Garth, J., dissenting), citing Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,
405 U.S. 538, 543 n.7 (1972); Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 162-63 (1970);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, 183-85 (1960).
110. See 564 F.2d at 1033. The Mahone majority erroneously noted that § 1343(3)
and § 1981 derived from the same source and then concluded that § 1343(3) provided
federal jurisdiction for § 1981 claims. Id. See note 73 supra. Had the court determined
that § 1343(3) actually originated in the 1871 Act, presumably it would have found
that congressional intent to exclude municipalities from § 1983 liability precluded the
use of § 1343(3) to circumvent that congressional determination. See id. at 1021.
111. Section 1343(4) states: "[The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:] To recover
damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for
the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote." 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
112. See, e.g., Munoz v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 563
F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1977); Allen v. Veterans Admin., 542 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1976); Hackett
v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971); Philadelphia Council of
Neighborhood Orgs. v. Coleman, 437 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1977); NAACP v. Levi,
418 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1976).
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A more unsettling deficiency of the Mahone opinion is its failure to
discuss the merits of the municipal immunity-liability question. It has been
noted frequently that serious weaknesses exist in the use of damage actions
against individual officers which prevent these actions from being an
effective remedy for injured plaintiffs. 113 Accordingly, it has been claimed
that the availability of damage actions against municipal corporations not
only provides financially responsible defendants' but also serves as a
prophylactic measure against unconstitutional behavior of municipal
employees. 115 These policy considerations favoring imposition of municipal
liability have been countered with the argument that the result of
dispensing with municipal immunity would be the disruption of governmen-
tal efficiency, destruction of employee morale, and flooding federal court
dockets. 11 Although 'the Mahone decision, which confined itself to the
language and history of section 1981 as a separate civil rights statute, may
not have logically required discussion of municipal liability," 7 it is likely
that the adherence to pervasive municipal immunity notions displayed by
many lower federal courts stems more from a positive belief in the value of
such immunity than from a desire to comply with the legislative history of
the provision." 8 Thus, a discussion of the value of municipal liability might
have added persuasiveness to the Third Circuit's opinion and preempted
possible arguments that the decision stemmed solely from a mechanical
statutory construction. 19 Furthermore, it is submitted that the Third
Circuit's failure to respond to the diverse positions on municipal liability-
immunity may perpetuate the debate and reduce the matter to a pleadings
game - if the right combination of substantive and jurisdictional
requirements are satisfied, the city's coffers will be accessible to the injured
plaintiff.
113. See, e.g., Note, supra note 19 at 926; Comment, Section 1983, The Eleventh
Amendment, and General Principles of Tort Immunities and Defenses: Who Is Left to
Sue?, 45 U. Mo. K. C. L. REV. 29, 30-32 (1976).
114. See, e.g., Hundt, supra note 29 at 779; Kates & Kouba, supra note 13, at
142-46.
115. See, e.g., Note, supra note 19, at 927.
116. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 13, at 142. Specifically, the argument suggests
that subjection of municipalities to vicarious liability for their employees' wrong-
doings would reduce the employees' sense of responsibility and result in vexatious
litigation as well as burden the financial stability of the governmental unit. Id.
Moreover, it is argued that substituting personal liability with municipal liability
under § 1983 would be contrary to the congressional policy that the exclusive remedy
for injured plaintiffs be the existence of § 1983 actions against the individuals directly
responsible, and could make municipal employees less hesitant to commit "constitu-
tional torts." See Hundt, supra note 29, at 783-84. Those arguments are countered,
however, by the allowance of simultaneous municipal and individual liability and by
the natural check of employee performance inherent in most firing policies. See id. at
783-85.
117. See note 92 supra.
118. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 13, at 132-45, in which the authors define the
traditional arguments supporting municipal immunity.
119. Cf. id. at 132-36. (Criticism of Monroe Court's failure to reach the policy
considerations involved in the municipal liability-immunity debate by opting to
decide the issue on narrow, definitional grounds). See also Note, supra note 20, at
803-05.
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Far more significant than any shortcomings of the Mahone opinion is
the effect that the holding will have upon future race-discrimination cases
against municipalities. A Bivens-type cause of action under the fourteenth
amendment for the recovery of damages from municipal corporations' 20 is
controversial and lacks clarification by the Supreme Court. 12 1 On the other
hand, use of section 1981 to sue cities directly is arguably warranted by its
express language,122 statutory history,123 and interpretation in other
contexts by the Supreme Court.124 Moreover, the section 1981 approach is
necessarily confined to claims of race related discrimination,'125 whereas the
fourteenth amendment reaches other forms of discrimination. 126 Thus, it is
submitted that Mahone appears to mark the more desirable method, as
between section 1981 and Bivens, for redressing the problem of unconstitu-
tional police action and creating a viable solution to a previously insoluble
problem.
Joni J. Berner
CIVIL RIGHTS - EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION - PUNITIVE DAMAGES
ARE NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
ACT OF 1972.
Richerson v. Jones (1977)
Dionysius Richerson, a black engineer employed by the Philadelphia
Naval Shipyard, instituted an employment discrimination action pursuant
to section 717 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA)'
120. See cases cited in note 25 supra.
121. See generally Lehmann, supra note 30; see note 24-38 and accompanying text
supra.
122. See notes 44, 59 & 65 and accompanying text supra.
123. See notes 41-42 & 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
124. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
125. Cf. League of Academic Women v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 343 F. Supp. 636(N.D. Cal. 1972) (sex discrimination claims not actionable under § 1981); accord,
Fitzgerald v. United Methodist Community Center, 335 F. Supp. 965 (D. Neb. 1972).
126. See, e.g,, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
(illegitimacy).
1. Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1977). Section 717 provides in part:
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment...
in military departments .... in executive agencies, . . . in the United States
Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, in those units of the
Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the competitive
service, and in those units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal
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against the United States Department of the Navy,2 alleging that he had
been denied promotions solely on the basis of his race.3 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that Richerson
had been the victim of discrimination and awarded him retroactive pro-
motions with corresponding backpay, 4 interest, attorney's fees and expenses
but denied the plaintiffs request for punitive damages.5 On appeal,6
government having positions in the competitive service, and in the Library of
Congress shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. V 1975).
2. 551 F.2d at 920. Plaintiff Richerson named the commanding officer at the
shipyard, Captain Gerald R. Jones, as nominal defendant as required by § 717 of the
EEOA which provides that the aggrieved "may file a civil action as provided in
section 2000e-5 of this title, in which civil action the head of the department, agency,
or unit as appropriate, shall be defendant." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975).
Since the United States is the real defendant, references hereinafter made to the
defendant will be in terms either of the Government or the United States. The lower
court opinion was not reported.
3. 551 F.2d at 921.
4. Id. The district court awarded Richerson three retroactive promotions with
backpay. Id. at 923. Specifically, the district court directed that Richerson be promoted
to GS-9 effective November 15, 1970, to GS-11 effective November 15, 1972, and to
GS-12 effective November 15, 1974. Id.
5. Id. at 921.
6. Id. The district court made three orders which form the bases of the appeal. Id.
On December 18, 1975, the district court entered judgment for plaintiff Richerson and
against the United States. Id. On March 12, 1976, the district court awarded
Richerson retroactive promotions, backpay, and interest but did not include any
reference to attorney's fees. Id. On April 29, 1976, the court ordered an award of
attorney's fees to Richerson. Id.
Richerson appealed from the order of April 29, 1976, because the district court
denied his request for punitive damages. Id. The United States appealed from the first
two orders contending that Richerson's retroactive promotion from GS-11 to GS-12
was not supported by the evidence and that the lower court erred in assessing interest
against the United States. Id.
Before the Third Circuit could resolve the substantive issues raised on appeal
the court first had to establish the requisite jurisdiction. Id. at 921-23. Ordinarily the
courts of appeals have jurisdiction only on appeals from final orders of the district
courts under § 1291 of the Judicial Code which states: "The courts of appeals shall
have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District
Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands .. " 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1970).
Richerson's appeal was from the final order of April 29 and therefore
presented no jurisdictional issue to be resolved by the Third Circuit. 551 F.2d at 922.
The United States, however, maintained appeals from the first two orders only, and
the Third Circuit determined that neither of these appeals was from a final order as
defined by the Supreme Court. Id. See, e.g., Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233
(1945) (test of appealability is whether the order of the court terminates the litigation
on the merits). Although the Government had not appealed from a final order, the
Third Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the Government's appeal, explaining
that "a premature appeal taken from an order which is not final but which is followed
by an order that is final may be regarded as an appeal from a final order in the
absence of a showing of prejudice to the other party." 551 F.2d at 922. (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted). Since Richerson never claimed that his rights would be
prejudiced, the Third Circuit assumed jurisdiction over the Government's appeal. Id.
at 923.
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 7 affirmed the
district court's order denying punitive damages,8 holding that the EEOA pre-
cluded the award of punitive damages. Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3d
Cir. 1977).
In order to establish a comprehensive program to combat employment
discrimination,9 Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII),10 which created "statutory rights against invidious discrimina-
tion in employment and establish[ed] a comprehensive scheme for the
vindication of those rights."'1 In response to criticism that the objectives of
7. The case was heard by Judges Rosenn, Kalodner, and Garth. Judge Garth
wrote the opinion.
8. In addition to affirming the district court on the issue of punitive damages,
the Third Circuit vacated Richerson's retroactive promotion to GS-12 and remanded
for additional fact finding concerning that promotion and the award of attorney's
fees. 551 F.2d at 921. The court also reversed the district court's order granting
Richerson interest against the United States. Id.
In order for the district court to award retroactive promotions with backpay,
the Third Circuit explained that it must be established that, but for the discriminatory
practice, the aggrieved party would have received the position. Id. at 923. See Day v.
Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In addition, the court noted that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires that the district court "find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon . . . ." 551 F.2d at 924,
quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). In Richerson, Judge Garth observed that the findings of
the district court would justify only a retroactive promotion to GS-9 level. 551 F.2d at
924. The Third Circuit therefore remanded to the district court with instructions to
make the requisite findings of fact. Id. at 921.
Finally, the Third Circuit held that the district court erred in ordering the
United States to pay prejudgment and post-judgment interest on the award of
backpay. Id. at 925. The basis for this holding was a Supreme Court ruling which
provided that interest on claims against the United States cannot be recovered absent
an express provision within the applicable statute. See United States v. Tillamooks,
341 U.S. 48, 49 (1951). The Third Circuit observed that, although Jones was the
nominal defendant in the action brought by Richerson, "in reality Richerson's claim
was against the United States." 551 F.2d at 925; see note 2 and accompanying text
supra. In addition, the court noted that the EEOA contains no provisions expressly
allowing interest on claims against the United States. 551 F.2d at 925. Therefore, the
Third Circuit ruled that the district court had erred in awarding interest to Richerson
and against the United States. Id. at 921.
9. See generally Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REV. 431 (1966).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-1 to 15 (1970).
11. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1975). The
principal enforcement organ provided for by Title VII is the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Supp. V 1975). When an
individual files a complaint with the EEOC alleging that he has been the victim of an
unlawful employment practice, the EEOC must investigate the charge and, if it
determines that the charge is true, must "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion." Id. §2000e-5(b).
If the EEOC fails to obtain voluntary compliance with its findings, the
aggrieved claimant may bring a civil action against the employer. Id. § 2000e-5(e). If
the district court finds that the claimant has been the victim of some unlawful
employment practice, "the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate ...." Id. § 2000e-5(g).
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Title VII were not being realized, 12 Congress attempted to strengthen the
remedial machinery of Title VII by adding the EEOA in 1972.13 Under the
provisions of the EEOA, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) was granted greater authority to halt discriminatory practices and
to achieve conciliation between the aggrieved and the wrongdoer, 4 the
coverage of Title VII was expanded to include a wider class of persons
adversely affected by unlawful practices, 15 and the federal district courts
were provided with additional discretion to fashion remedies consistent with
the intention of Congress. 16
Specifically, section 706(g) of the EEOA17 establishes the parameters of
the district court's authority to redress past discrimination, providing in
pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in
or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice
charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from
engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay . . .or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.'8
12. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, in which the House Committee on Education and
Labor stated:
The time has come to bring an end to job discrimination once and for all, and
to insure every citizen the opportunity for the decent self-respect that
accompanies a job commensurate with one's abilities. The hopeful prospects that
Title VII offered millions of Americans in 1964 must be revived.
Id. at 5, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS at 2141.
13. Id. at 3, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS at 2139. The EEOA
amended Title VII which is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e- 1 to 15 (Supp. V 1975) and
added 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975) to Title VII. For pertinent portions of this
addition, see notes 1 & 2 supra.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)-(f) (Supp. V 1975). The amendments to Title VII
were designed to improve the operations of the EEOC. Id. Through the amendments
the EEOC was given authority to bring a civil action in the federal district court,
investigatory powers similar to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and the
power to intervene with the court's permission in a suit filed by an aggrieved person if
the action is of general public importance. Id. § 2000e-5(b), (f). See also H.R. REP. No.
899, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1972).
15. The amendments to Title VII expand the coverage of Title VII from employers
with 25 or more employees to those with 15 or more employees, from labor unions with
25 or more members to those with 15 or more members, to state and local employees
subject to civil service laws, and to nonreligious schools with respect to teachers and
other school personnel. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. V 1975). In addition, the EEOA
proscribes discriminatory practices by the federal government. Id. § 2000e-16(a). See
note 1 supra.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). The remedial provisions of Title VII
are applicable in a civil action brought by a federal employee under § 717 of the EEOA
which provides: 'The provisions of section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title, as
applicable, shall govern civil actions hereunder." Id. § 2000e-16(d) (Supp. V 1975). For
the text of the pertinent remedial section, see text accompanying note 18 infra.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
18. Id. (emphasis added).
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In determining the scope of their remedial powers in suits instituted
under Title VII, federal courts have been confronted with the issue of
whether the provision in section 706(g) concerning "any other equitable
relief' empowered a district court to award punitive damages to an
aggrieved employee. 19 Since the legislative intent is uncertain, 2° courts have
struggled to determine whether their remedial powers are limited to the
equitable remedies provided by the statute, or whether they have authority
to provide legal remedies for unlawful employment practices. 21
19. The district courts have split on the issue of whether the remedial provisions
permit the awarding of punitive damages. The majority of the courts have held that
punitive damages are not available. See, e.g., Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 71
F.R.D. 34, 45-46 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1370-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp.
1338, 1341-42 (D. Haw. 1974); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 838
(N.D. Cal. 1973).
Punitive damages were awarded in Claiborne v. Illinois Central R.R., 401 F.
Supp. 1022, 1023 (E.D. La. 1975). For a discussion of this decision, see text
accompanying notes 32-36 infra. In addition, pretrial motions to strike prayers for
punitive damages were denied in Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co., 6 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159, 161 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Tooles v. Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp.
14, 18 (D. Neb. 1972).
20. In Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973) the
district court observed:
In one breath the Senators note that the equitable powers given to the courts
are extremely broad; in the next they speak rather imprecisely of making a
person "whole". What is intended by that second goal? The problem mirrored
lhere has been a source of confusion among the district courts.
Id. at 837.
The confusion as to the congressional intent behind Title VII was foreseen by
Senator Wayne Morse. In attempting to have this legislation referred to committee,
Senator Morse stated: "If I ever saw a bill that needed to be clarified for the courts by
way of a committee report, the argument which has taken place on the floor of the
Senate in the past 14 days has shown that bill to be the one before the Senate." 110
CONG. REc. 6419 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Morse).
21. E.g., Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 836 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
Included within the parameters of legal remedies are compensatory and punitive
damages. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.1 at 135 (1973). Compensatory damages are
awarded to the injured plaintiff to make up for some loss caused by the defendant. Id.
Punitive damages are separate from compensation; they are awarded to punish or
deter the aggravated misconduct of the defendant. Id. at 204.
Section 706(g) of EEOA does provide that a district court may award backpay
to compensate a victim of discriminatory employment practices. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). Once an unlawful employment practice has been
established, the district court may award backpay to the aggrieved unless the
defendant can demonstrate some justification for the particular practice. See Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Although backpay provides monetary relief to the aggrieved, many courts
consider such a remedy to be a form of restitution. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308-09 (6th Cir.
1975); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1367 (5th Cir. 1974);
Robinson v. Lorilland Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971). In Rosen v. Public
Service & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973), the Third Circuit affirmed the award of
compensation for wrongfully withheld pension funds based on a Title VII suit. Id. at
95-96. The Richerson court reasoned that the award in Rosen was a form of
restitution recoverable in an action based on Title VII rather than a type of
compensatory damages. 551 F.2d at 926-27 n.13.
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The majority of courts have held that punitive damages are not
available under section 706(g). 22 For example, in Van Hoomissen v. Xerox
Corp.,23 an employee sued to redress the effect of his employer's unlawful
employment practices. 24 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of California refused to award punitive damages concluding that
such relief was excluded by the specific language of section 706(g)25 and by
the section's legislative history which restricted the court's remedial
authority to equitable relief. 26
Prior to the instant case, only one federal court of appeals had ruled on
this specific issue. In EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 27 the Sixth Circuit
reversed an award of punitive damages, holding that such an award was
beyond the scope of the relief provisions of Title VII.28 The court determined
that the phrase, "other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate," is
limited "to relief of the same kind as that specifically enumerated" in section
22. See note 19 supra.
23. 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
24. Id. at 831. Plaintiff Van Hoomissen alleged various acts of employer
retaliation, such as denial of job advancement opportunities, demotions, and
termination, in response to his attempts to change the hiring practices of Xerox Corp.
Id. These practices allegedly discriminated against Mexican Americans. Id. With
respect to the issue of punitive damages, plaintiff argued that such an award,
although not authorized by the pertinent statute, should be permitted where it would
effectuate the purpose of the statute. Id. at 838.
25. Id. In refusing to award punitive damages, the district court stated: "In the
present case ... we have a statute which is quite specific in the remedies it provides.
This Court believes it would be beyond the scope of its power to find other remedies
contained in that statute where none seemingly exists." Id.
26. Id. at 836. The Van Hoomissen court recognized that, although the discussion
in Congress regarding § 2000e-5(g) is "not terribly illuminating," there was a basis
upon which to exclude punitive damages as an appropriate remedy under Title VII.
Id. Therefore, the court found that Congress intended to establish equality of
employment opportunities through "a wide panorama of equitable tools" rather than
the imposition of punitive damages. Id.
In addition to this legislative history, the district court found other legislative
factors to support its conclusion. Specifically, the court utilized the analogous
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which do not provide for
punitive damages, as indicating that a similar scope applies to the remedial
provisions of Title VII. Id. at 837. Furthermore, the court noted:
Perhaps even more illuminating on the question of the scope of damages in
Title VII is the fact that Title VIII, which deals with fair housing and is part of
the 1968 Civil Rights Act, specifically provides for punitive damages .... When
the 1972 amendment was made to Title VII, Title VIII was already law, yet no
such parallel provision for punitive damages was included, even though other
amendments to the remedies section were made.
Id. at 837-38 (emphasis in original).
27. 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
28. 515 F.2d at 308-09. After analyzing the language of section 706(g), the Sixth
Circuit stated: "We find no authority in the quoted language for the award of punitive
damages. We know of no authority which holds that the awarding of punitive
damages is equitable relief." Id.
The district court had based its award of punitive damages on a finding of
malice against the defendants. Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 124
(E.D. Mich. 1973). The court noted that the defendants had repeatedly disregarded
plaintiffs' requests that Edison alter its hiring practices and that the union afford
blacks fair representation. Id.
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706(g). 29 The Edison court explained that "[w]hile affirmative action may
not be limited to the reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without
back pay, we believe that it is limited to relief of the same general kind, that
is, equitable relief in the form of restitution." 3°
Several district courts, however, have suggested that punitive damage
awards may be appropriate under Title VII,3 1 and one court has awarded
punitive damages in a Title VII suit. In Claiborne v. Illinois Central
Railroad,32 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana engaged in an extensive historical analysis of Title VII and the
pertinent amendments embodied in the EEOA 33 and sustained an award of
punitive damages. 34 The court noted that "[t]here is no indication that
punitive damages are unavailable. Indeed, punitive damages can play a
useful role in making the victim 'whole' by providing compensation for
intangibles, e.g., mental suffering.... Punitive damages can provide
additional relief from such uncompensated losses. ' ' 35 Additionally, the
Claiborne court suggested that the availability of punitive damages would
further the objectives of Title VII by creating an effective deterrent to
violations and by providing an incentive for plaintiffs to initiate suits.36
The Third Circuit began its analysis of whether punitive damages are
an available remedy in EEOA suits by focusing on the applicable remedial
provisions of Title VII.37 The Richerson court concluded that the phrase,
"any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate," precluded
29. 515 F.2d at 309. The Sixth Circuit applied the ejusdem generis rule of
construction to determining the type of relief available under section 706(g). Id. See
note 39 and accompanying text infra.
30. 515 F.2d at 309.
31. See note 19 supra. The Third Circuit distinguished the holdings of Tooles v.
Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp. 14 (D. Neb. 1972), and Dessenberg v. American Metal
Forming Co., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159 (N.D. Ohio 1973) with respect to the
issue of punitive damages on the ground that these decisions were based, in part, on
the reluctance of the district courts to strike claims for punitive damages at a
preliminary stage of the proceedings. 551 F.2d at 926 n.13.
32. 401 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. La. 1975).
33. Id. at 1023-24. The Claiborne court recognized initially that the legislative
history of Title VII was not conclusive and therefore offered little support for a denial
of punitive damages. Id. at 1024. The district court rejected the analogy between the
NLRA and Title VII utilized by other courts to support the restriction of relief to
equitable remedies. Id. at 1024-25. Concluding that it must follow the statute's
general purpose of "creating broad and effective remedies," the court awarded
punitive damages. Id. at 1026, quoting Sape & Hart, Title VII Revisited: The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 824, 880 (1972).
34. 401 F. Supp. at 1027.
35. Id. at 1024.
36. Id. at 1026. Some commentators have suggested that punitive damages may
be an appropriate remedy under Title VII. See Richards, Compensatory and Punitive
Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 27 ARK. L. REV. 603, 616-20 (1973);
Sape & Hart, supra note 33, at'880 (1972); Developments in the Law: Employment
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109,
1259-64 (1971); Comment, Employment Discrimination Litigation: The Availability of
Damages, 44 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 497, 508-11 (1976).
37. 551 F.2d at 926. For the pertinent provisions of this statute, see text
accompanying note 18 supra.
[VOL. 23
60
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss4/11
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
district courts from awarding punitive damages on the grounds that
punitive damages "are a 'traditional form of relief offered in the courts of
law', not in the courts of equity. '38 In addition, the Third Circuit examined
the phrase, "such affirmative action as may be appropriate," and, by
applying the ejusdem generis39 doctrine of construction determined that it
referred to the use of equitable remedies such as injunctions rather than to
the application of any legal remedy.40
To support its interpretation of the remedial provisions of Title VII, the
Third Circuit scrutinized the legislative history of section 706(g) and
compared the section to similar provisions of analogous legislation. 41 The
Richerson court stated that the Supreme Court had noted that'section 706(g)
is modeled, in part, on the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).42 Furthermore, the court emphasized that several of the proponents
of Title VII stated that its relief provisions would function similarly to the
corresponding provisions of the NLRA.43 Since the remedial provisions of
the NLRA did not provide for punitive damages,44 the Richerson court
concluded that this was "additional evidence that Congress did not intend to
authorize the award of punitive damages under Title VII.
' '45
Seeking to further substantiate its construction of section 706(g), the
Richerson court examined the remedial provisions of Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 (Title VIII)46 which was enacted to prohibit discrimina-
tion in housing and to provide adequate relief to those injured by such
discrimination. 47 Remarking that "'where a statute with respect to one
subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a
similar statute is significant to show a different intention existed'" 48 the
38. 551 F.2d at 927, quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974).
39. The principle of ejusdem generis suggests that "[w]here general terms in astatute follow an enumeration of terms with specific meaning, the general terms can
be expected to apply to matters similar to those specified." diLeo v. Greenfield, 541
F.2d 949, 954 (2d Cir. 1976).
40. 551 F.2d at 927. The court first examined the type of relief expressly provided
for in § 706(g) such as injunctions and reinstatement with or without backpay. Id.
From this examination, the court concluded that these were examples of the kind of
equitable relief that Congress "had in mind." Id.
41. Id. at 927-28.
42. Id. at 927, citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 & n.11
(1975). Section 10(c) of the NLRA provides that, if the NLRB finds that an employer
has engaged in unfair labor practices, the NLRB may issue cease and desist orders,
and may "take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
43. 551 F.2d at 927, citing 110 CONG. REC. 6549, 7214 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey, memorandum of Senators Clark and Case).
44. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938); note 42
supra.
45. 551 F.2d at 927. The Richerson court noted the maxim that "when Congress
adopts the wording of a previously enacted statute, that adoption will usually carry
with it the previous judicial interpretations of the wording." Id. at 927 n.17, citing
Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970).
47. Id. § 3612.
48. 551 F.2d at 928, citing General Elec. Co. v. Southern Constr. Co., 383 F.2d 135,
138 n.4 (5th Cir. 1967).
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Third Circuit observed that Title VIII expressly provided injured plaintiffs
with an opportunity to recover punitive damages. 49 Reasoning that the
absence of such a remedial provision in the 1972 amendment to Title VII50
was "strong evidence that Congress did not intend to provide for punitive
damages" in employment discrimination suits, 51 the Third Circuit sustained
the district court's refusal to award punitive damages.5 2
By determining that section 706(g) prohibits awards of punitive
damages for employment discrimination, the Third Circuit joined the
majority of the federal courts that have confronted this issue.5 3 The
Richerson court's interpretation of the phrase, "any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate," as limiting the court's remedial discretion
closely paralleled that of the Sixth Circuit in Edison.54 Both circuits
supported the conclusion that section 706(g) precluded awards of punitive
damages by applying the ejusdem generis rule of construction to limit the
type of "affirmative action" authorized by the statute to equitable reme-
dies.55
It is submitted that the Richerson court's analogy to the relief provisions
of the NLRA to corroborate its interpretation of section 706(g) should be
tempered in its application. Although the language of section 706(g) closely
resembles the remedial provisions of the NLRA,56 the two statutes have
dissimilar objectives5 7 and enforcement schemes.5 8 Thus, although section
49. 551 F.2d at 928. Section 812(c) of Title VIII provides:
The court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or
temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order, and may
award to the plaintiff actual damages, and not more than $1000 punitive
damages, together with court costs and reasonable attorney fees in the case of a
prevailing plaintiff: Provided, That the said plaintiff in the opinion of the court
is not financially able to assume said attorney's fees.
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). For the text of this statute see text
accompanying note 18 supra.
51. 551 F.2d at 928.
52. Id.
53. See note 19 supra.
54. Compare notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra with notes 38-40 and
accompanying text supra.
55. See notes 29-30 & 40 and accompanying text supra.
56. See note 42 supra.
57. See 401 F. Supp. at 1025. The Claiborne court explained that the objectives of
the NLRA and Title VII differed greatly and therefore reduced the reliability of any
analogy developed. Id. at 1024-25. The district court noted that the NLRA was
designed to achieve conciliation and cooperation in settling disputes between
matiagement and labor whereas Title VII was enacted to eliminate discrimination
from employment practices. Id. at 1025.
58. See id. at 1024. Through the NLRA, the NLRB was granted cease and desist
powers to enforce its determination where conciliation and negotiation failed. Id. The
EEOC was limited to mediation and conciliation and, through the 1972 amendments,
was granted authority to bring "pattern and practices" suits, yet was denied cease
and desist powers. Id. Noting this distinction, the Claiborne court concluded:
Congress, in denying cease and desist powers to the EEOC, rejected rather than
adopted the NLRB scheme originally proposed. It is illogical to conclude from
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706(g) was modeled after the remedial provisions of the NLRA, 59 it is not
apparent that Congress intended to deny the award of punitive damages in
Title VII suits simply because it made punitive damages unavailable under
the NLRA.60
The Richerson court's decision to deny the availability of punitive
damages under Title VII may lessen the statute's effectiveness in achieving
Congress' two-fold purpose of eradicating discriminatory employment
practices and creating remedies for injured plaintiffs. 1 Some commentators
have argued that awards of punitive damages would be appropriate and
consistent with this legislative purpose.62 It has also been suggested that
without the opportunity to obtain punitive damages, claimants, believing
that adequate monetary compensation is unavailable, may be reluctant to
institute suits.6 3 This would make the statute a less potent tool against
discrimination in employment since "the effectiveness of Title VII is
dependent on the initiative of the complainant. '6 4
Despite the unavailability of punitive damages under Title VII, it is
submitted that the statute provides courts with authority sufficient to
compensate injured employees and effectuate the two-fold congressional
purpose. The Supreme Court has recognized that section 706(g) vests "broad
equitable discretion in the federal courts" to eliminate discrimination from
employment practices. 65 District courts are empowered to enjoin violations
of Title VII and to order rehiring, promotion, and backpay.6 6 Additionally,
Chief Justice Burger has suggested that it may be proper for a district court
to award "front pay" as an alternative to seniority relief.67
such Congressional action that Congress intended to.limit Title VII remedies to
those allowed under the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), when it rejected the
N.L.R.A. as a model for Title VII enforcement procedures.
Id.
59. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975).
60. See 401 F. Supp. at 1025.
61. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sees. 1, 9-10, reprinted in [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2401, 2405.
62. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 36, at 508-11. One commentator has stated:
"[T]he awarding of punitive damages would further the purpose underlying Title VII
- ending certain types of employment discrimination." Richards, supra note 36, at
619. See also Comment, 5 CAL. W. L. REv. 252, 256-57 (1969), in which the author
argued that if the legislative purpose is to be effectuated, some damages must be
obtainable by successful litigants.
63. See, e.g., Claiborne v. Illinois Central R.R., 401 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. La. 1975).
In Claiborne, the district court recognized that punitive damages can provide
additional relief for uncompensated losses. Id. at 1024. The court reasoned that
punitive damages would encourage plaintiffs to litigate and that this litigation would
serve as a deterrent to future discriminatory practices. Id.
64. Comment, supra note 62, at 259.
65. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 762 (1976).
66. See text accompanying notes 17 & 18 supra.
67. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 781 (1976). Chief Justice
Burger, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that competitive-type
seniority relief, in which the aggrieved employee is given certain seniority
promotions, is not an equitable solution where it is done at the expense of other
innocent employees. Id. at 780-81. Front pay would be monetary relief to the injured
employee which provides him with compensation at the expense of the discriminating
employer and not an employee. Id. at 781. The Chief Justice stated: "[S]uch monetary
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Notwithstanding the ambiguous legislative history of Title VII and the
EEOA68 and the potential problems arising from the comparison between
the remedial provisions of the NLRA and Title VII,69 it is submitted that the
Third Circuit's determination that punitive damages are not recoverable in
actions brought pursuant to the remedial provision which allows "equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate" is consistent with the purpose of the
legislation. 0 Although some district courts and commentators indicate that
punitive damages are essential to eliminate discriminatory practices from
employment opportunities,7 it would seem that effective use of the equitable
powers available to the district courts will encourage aggrieved persons to
litigate, thereby advancing the fundamental purpose of Title VII and the
EEOA.
Daniel J. Callaghan
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, IN NOT SECURING
RIGHTS To INDIVIDUALS, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CONSTITUTIONAL
BASIS FOR A FEDERAL CLAIM UNDER SECTIONS 1983 AND 1343(3). AND
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, IN NOT PROVIDING FOR EQUAL RIGHTS OR
THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A
STATUTORY BASIS FOR A FEDERAL CLAIM UNDER SECTIONS 1983 AND
1343.
Gonzalez v. Young (1977)
Julia Gonzalez, a recipient under the federal Social Security Act's Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC),' was denied emergency
relief would serve the dual purpose of deterring wrongdoing by the employer or union
- or both - as well as protecting the rights of innocent employees." Id.
68. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
69. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
70. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text supra.
71. See notes 62 & 63 and accompanying text supra.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 601-610 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The AFDC is one of four categories
of assistance established by the Social Security Act. See id. §§ 301-306, 601-610,
1201-1206, 1351-1355 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See also Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over
Challenges to State Welfare Programs, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 & n.4 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Welfare Challenges]. Categorical assistance is the predominant
source of public welfare in most states, with the programs providing for the receipt by
states of matching funds from the federal government. Id. at 1404. The federal
government pays a substantial part of AFDC grants under a federal matching
program, which states qualify for by complying with requirements of the Social
Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See Note, The Outlook For
Welfare Litigation in the Federal Courts: Hagans v. Lavine & Edelman v. Jordan, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 897 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Outlook for Welfare Litigation]. For
a general analysis of the AFDC program, see Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of
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assistance2 by a local New Jersey welfare board, because she did not satisfy
the state's eligibility conditions. 3 Alleging that the New Jersey welfare
regulations conflicted with the applicable federal AFDC rules 4 and deprived
her of the right to receive federally mandated benefits,' Gonzalez brought an
action against state welfare officials in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey.6 Federal jurisdiction for the complaint was
predicated upon the substantive section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States
the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (1974); Note, 1974
Developments in Welfare Law - Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1975).
2. Gonzalez v. Young, 418 F. Supp. 566, 568 (D.N.J. 1976), vacated and
remanded, 560 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977). Plaintiff, Julia Gonzalez, who resided with her
two children in Jersey City, New Jersey, received a monthly check from the Hudson
County Welfare Board in the amount of $235.00, issued pursuant to the AFDC
program. On February 2, 1976, after cashing her AFDC check, her pocketbook was
stolen, and the following day Gonzalez requested $163.00 in emergency assistance
funds to cover rent and utility bills. Id. at 567-68. Based upon a determination made
by a caseworker who had received verbal assurances from the plaintiffs utility
company and landlord that no steps would be taken against the Gonzalez family, the
request for emergency assistance was denied. Id.
3. Id. at 568. See 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) (1970) and its accompanying regulation, 45
C.F.R. § 233.120 (1976). Section 606(e)(1) provides that emergency assistance to needy
families with children embraces cases
where [an eligible] child is without available resources, the payments, care, or
services involved are necessary to avoid destitution of such child or to provide
living arrangements in a home for such child, and such destitution or need for
living arrangements did not arise because such child or relative refused without
good cause to accept employment or training for employment.
42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) (1970). In order to receive the funding, however, a state must
devise a state plan specifying the eligibility conditions to be imposed for receipt of
emergency assistance. 45 C.F.R. § 233.120(a)(1) (1976). With respect to emergency
assistance payments, New Jersey has promulgated the following regulations:
[W]hen because of an emergent situation over which they have had no control or
opportunity to plan in advance the eligible unit is in a state of homelessness, and
the county welfare board determines that the providing of shelter and/or food
and/or emergency clothing and/or minimum essential house furnishings are
necessary for health and safety, such needs may be recognized in accordance
with the regulations and limitations in the following sections.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE 10:82-5.12(c) (1969). Failure of a state to comply with the federal
government's requirements under the AFDC program can result in the loss of federal
matching funds. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)(2) (1970). Because of the assurances given to
plaintiffs caseworker by her utility company and landlord that they would not take
action against the plaintiff for failure to pay her bills, it was determined that she was
not "'in a state of homelessness'", as required by the state regulation. Gonzalez v.
Young, 560 F.2d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1977); see note 2 supra.
4. 418 F. Supp. at 569. In her complaint to the district court, Gonzalez contended
that the state welfare officials had violated 42 U.S.C. §606(e)(1) (1970) and its
accompanying regulation by refusing her request for emergency assistance, when she
allegedly was entitled to benefits under federal law. 418 F. Supp. at 568 (D.N.J. 1976);
see note 3 supra.
5. See 418 F. Supp. at 568 (D.N.J. 1976). For the pertinent text of the federal
legislation, see note 3 supra.
6. Gonzalez v. Young, 418 F. Supp. 566 (D.N.J. 1976). The named defendants
were the Director of the Hudson County, New Jersey Welfare Board, and the Director
of the New Jersey Division of Public Welfare. Id. at 566.
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Code 7 and the jurisdictional sections 1331 and 1343 of Title 28.8 The district
court found that the court's exercise, under section 1343, of jurisdiction over
Gonzalez' section 1983 claim was appropriate under the rationale that all
section 1983 claims, whether wholly or partially statutory, automatically fall
within the reach of section 1343. 9 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit 10 vacated the lower court's decision and
remanded for a dismissal of the complaint, holding that a section 1983
allegation that state law conflicts with a federal statute does not give rise to
a sufficient constitutional or statutory claim to establish federal jurisdiction
under section 1343. Gonzalez v. Young, 560 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. (emphasis added). For a further discussion of this issue, see Note, Federal Judicial
Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 84, 96 (1967).
8. 418 F. Supp. at 569. Since § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), requires a minimum
jurisdictional amount of $10,000, the district court rejected a claim of jurisdiction
under this section because Gonzalez sought only $163.00 in damages. 418 F. Supp. at
569-70.
Section 1343, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, or any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States;(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under an Act of
Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
Id. (emphasis added).
9. 418 F. Supp. at 570-71. In reaching this conclusion the district court relied
wholly upon the rationale of Vazquez v. Ferre, 404 F. Supp. 815 (D.N.J. 1975). Vazquez
had maintained that:
An analysis of the legislative history, . . .leads to the conclusion that this
language [of § 1343(3)] was not intended to reduce the jurisdiction of federal
district courts over § 1983 actions. Rather, the term "equal rights," which first
appeared in the 1875 revision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, had a broader
meaning than it does today. The purpose of the 1875 revision was not to effect
substantive changes in the 1871 Act, but instead merely sought to divide it into
separate jurisdictional and substantive statutes.
404 F. Supp. at 824, citing Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 838-39 (4th Cir. 1974). For a
discussion of the statutory aspects of § 1983 and § 1343, see notes 15-25 and
accompanying text infra.
By regarding the question as resolved by Vazquez, the district court in
Gonzalez found it unnecessary to decide whether the "'secured by the Constitution'
language of § 1343(3) should be construed to include supremacy clause issues." 418 F.
Supp. at 571 (D.N.J. 1976), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)(1970). For further discussion of
the supremacy clause issue, see notes 30-37, 39-40 & 46-55 and accompanying text
infra.
10. The instant case was decided by Judges Aldisert, Rosenn, and Hunter. Judge
Aldisert wrote the opinion.
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Selecting the proper federal jurisdictional basis for welfare claims has
been a subject of controversy among the circuits. 1 A common technique
used by welfare claimants has been to assert a cause of action under section
1983, and federal jurisdiction under sections 1331 and 1343(3) and (4).12
Because welfare claims seldom involve an amount in controversy exceeding
$10,000, section 1331 frequently is inapplicable.13 Thus, the major questions
have arisen in determining whether the use of sections 1983 and 1343(3) and
(4) are appropriate. 14
With respect to a welfare claimant's position that a valid statutory
section 1983 claim is sufficient to invoke the jurisdictional protection of
sections 1343(3) or (4), a reconciliation of the differing language in sections
1983 and 1343 is necessary. 15 While section 1983 furnishes a remedy for "the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and [federal] laws,"'16 section 1343 extends its application only
to rights secured by the Constitution and those federal laws "providing for
equal rights of citizens"'17 or "providing for the protection of civil rights."'18
The more restrictive language of section 1343, therefore, sometimes has been
characterized as a limitation, 19 leading some courts, including the Second
11. See text accompanying notes 34-42 infra.
12. See Outlook for Welfare Litigation, supra note 1, at 898-99. For the pertinent
text of §§ 1983, 1331, and 1343, see notes 7-8 supra.
13. See Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6
HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1970); Welfare Challenges, supra note 1, at 1405-06;
Note, supra note 7, at 111.
14. See generally Herzer, supra note 13.
15. The contemporary jurisdictional dilemma facing courts basically evolves from
a discrepancy between the language of § 1983 and § 1343(3), § 1343(3) appearing to be
narrower than its remedial counterpart. See Herzer, supra note 13, at 11; Welfare
Challenges, supra note 1, at 1406-26. See also text accompanying notes 16-18 infra.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (emphasis added). For the pertinent text of § 1983, see
note 7 supra.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) (emphasis added). For the pertinent text of § 1343(3),
see note 8 supra.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970) (emphasis added). For the pertinent text of § 1343(4),
see note 8 supra.
19. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 544 n.7 (1972) ("equal rights"
language of § 1343(3) is a limitation). It should be noted, however, that in Lynch the
Supreme Court referred to § 1983 and § 1343(3) as jurisdictional counterparts. Id. at
540, 543.
Both § 1343 and § 1983 are the progeny of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. The Civil Rights Act became positive law in 1874 as part of the
Revised Statutes Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 333, § 2, 18 Stat. 113 (1875) (current versions
at 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)). It has been noted that the
Revised Statutes, as positive law, repeal and supersede all previous statutes at large.
Welfare Challenges, supra note 1, at 1418. Thus the authoritative Civil Rights Act
language is that of the Revised Statutes - now codified into § 1983 - and not that of
the original 1871 enactment. Id. Section 1983 provides individual civil liability for the
deprivation of constitutional rights. Id. at 1407. See note 7 supra. Section 1343(3)
grants federal courts the power to hear "any civil action authorized by law" to remedy
such deprivation. See note 8 supra. It must be noted that § 1983 does not in itself
confer federal jurisdiction, but merely creates a cause of action; it is the 'functional
prerequisite' to establishing jurisdiction under § 1343(3). Welfare Challenges, supra
note 1, at 1407. See text accompanying note 43 infra.
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Circuit in Andrews v. Maher,2' to the conclusion that Congress created a
federal cause of action without granting federal jurisdiction in all
instances. 21 Other courts, including the Fourth Circuit in Blue v. Craig,22
have maintained that, although the language is different, the statutory
predecessors of sections 1983 and 1343(3) were considered to be coexten-
sive,23 thus attributing the discrepancy in language to inadvertence. 24
Courts supporting the more restrictive approach have held that a statutory
claim based upon a violation of a right secured by the Social Security Act
cannot satisfy section 1343 requirements, since the welfare statute was not
designed to provide for the equal rights of citizens. 25
SeveralUnited States Supreme Court decisions, including Hagans v.
Lavine,26 have established the broad rule that statutory welfare claims that
are joined with substantial constitutional questions may obtain section 1343
jurisdiction over the statutory claims through the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine.27 However, although subsection 1343(3) has been held to grant
federal jurisdiction over challenges to state welfare programs under the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, 2 welfare recip-
20. 525 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1975); see notes 39-42 and accompanying text infra.
21. See, e.g., 525 F.2d at 118.
22. 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974); see notes 34-38 and accompanying text infra.
23. See, e.g., 505 F.2d at 837. See also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S.
538, 543-44 n.7 (1972); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 961 (2d ed. 1973);
Herzer, supra note 13, at- 11 n_.46 Welfare Challenges, supra note 1, at 1426.
24. See 505 F.2d at 837; for a discussion of Blue, see notes 34-38 and
accompanying text infra.
It has been noted by one author that there is no explanation in the Revised
Statutes for the difference in language between § 1983 and § 1343(3), and that there
was no indication in the legislative history that the difference was intentional.
Welfare Challenges, supra note 1, at 1421. See also text accompanying notes 15-18
supra. In an exhaustive examination of the purpose and intent underlying the
predecessors of § 1983 and § 1343(3), that commentator attributes the difference in
language to possibly careless drafting. Welfare Challenges, supra note 1, at 1423.
Accord, Cover, Establishing Federal Jurisdiction in Actions Brought to Vindicate
Statutory (Federal) Rights When No Violations of Constitutional Rights Are Alleged,
2 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 5, 7 (1969).
25. E.g., Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 1975). For an analysis of
Andrews, see notes 39-42 and accompanying text infra.
26. 415 U.S. 528 (1974). See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
27. See, e.g., 415 U.S. 528, 543-50 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403-04
(1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.4 (1968); UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966). In Hagans, recipients of public assistance funds under the federal-state AFDC
program brought an action in federal court challenging a state regulation that
governed the administrative recoupment of certain payments. 415 U.S. at 530-31. The
action was based on the contentions that the regulation violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution and was in conflict with the
Social Security Act and its regulations. Id. at 531. The majority of the Supreme Court
held, inter alia, that the fourteenth amendment claim was sufficiently substantial to
confer jurisdiction under § 1343(3), and that, under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine,
the district court could also hear the claim involving the inconsistency between the
regulation and the Social Security Act. Id. at 543-50.
28. See, e.g., 415 P.S. at 543-50 (1974); To date, the Supreme Court has allowed
jurisdiction under §1343 only in cases that involved a substantial fourteenth
amendment claim. See id. at 536-43 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 402-05
(1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-34 (1968). See also White v. Beal, 413 F. Supp.
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ients often have no nonfrivolous fourteenth amendment claim upon which to
append their statutorily based grievances.29 Thus, the welfare litigant who is
unable to fashion a more substantial fourteenth amendment issue is left
solely with the allegation that there is a conflict between the state and the
federal law, which is governed by the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tionA0 In a widely cited footnote passage,3 1 the Hagans Court suggested that
where the Court has determined state AFDC laws to be inconsistent with
their federal counterparts, the state laws have been invalidated under the
supremacy clause.3 2 Two other Supreme Court cases have also declined to
address directly the question whether a conflict between federal and state
law is of sufficient constitutional substance to confer jurisdiction under
section 1343(3). 33
The circuit courts are not in agreement over the sufficiency of the
supremacy clause to provide a constitutional base, for federal jurisdiction. In
Blue v. Craig,3 4 the Fourth Circuit held that the "secured by the
Constitution" language of section 1343 should not be construed to exclude
supremacy clause issues, concluding that an allegation that a state
regulation is inconsistent with federal law does present a constitutional
issue for section 1343 purposes. 35 Therefore, the Blue court recognized
1141 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Almenares v. Wyman, 334 F. Supp. 512 (S.D.N.Y.),'modified on
other grounds, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972).
29. See Herzer, supra note 13, at 2; Welfare Challenges, supra note 1, at 1406.
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Outlook for Welfare Litigation, supra note 1, at
899-903.
31. See, e.g., Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 843 (4th Cir. 1974). See also notes 34-38
& 53-55 and accompanying text infra.
32. 415 U.S. at 533-34 n.5. The Hagans passage stated in pertinent part:
In view of our disposition of this case, we do not reach the question whether,
wholly aside from the pendent jurisdiction rationale ..... other valid grounds
existed for sustaining its jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claim of conflict
between federal and state law. It has been suggested, for example, that the
conflict question is itself a constitutional matter within the meaning of § 1343(3)
.... [The Court] itself [has] recognized that a suit to have a state statute
declared void and to secure the benefits of the federal statute with which the
state law is allegedly in conflict cannot succeed without ultimate resort to the
Federal Constitution - "to be sure, any determination that a state statute is void
for obstructing a federal statute does rest on the Supremacy Clause of the
Federal Constitution." . . . Moreover, when we have previously determined that
state AFDC laws do not conform to the Social Security Act or HEW regulations,
they have been invalidated under the Supremacy Clause.
Id. quoting Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 125 (1971) (citations omitted). Thus,
petitioners in Hagans urged that the "secured by the Constitution" language of
§ 1343(3) should be construed to include supremacy clause issues. Id. The Court left
this question "for another day." Id. See also notes 34-38, 53-55 & 64-69 and
accompanying text infra.
33. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
34. 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974).
35. Id. at 844. In Blue, the Fourth Circuit was faced with a claim that a state plan
for medical assistance deprived recipients of civil rights secured to them by the Social
Security Act. Id. at 832. The plaintiffs predicated their federal right of action
primarily upon § 1983 and § 1343(3). Id. The court maintained that the separation of§ 1983 and § 1343 into distinct substantive and jurisdictional sections was not
intended to alter the interrelation of the two as they had previously existed in the
original 1871 Act. Id. at 837-38. See note 19 supra.
1977-19781 905
69
Editors: Federal Statutes and Regulation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction over a constitutionally based section 1983 claim involving
purely statutory rights under subsection 1343(3). 36 The Blue court acknowl-
edged the supremacy clause as a basis for jurisdiction by a logical extension
of recent Supreme Court decisions that maintained that a determination
that a state statute is void for obstructing a federal statute "rests on" the
supremacy clause. 37
The Fourth Circuit also allowed the statutory claim as a jurisdictional
basis. After an exhaustive analysis of the legislative history the Blue court
concluded that section 1343(3)'s grant of jurisdiction to redress deprivations
of rights secured by federal laws that provided for "equal rights" is
coextensive with section 1983's creation of a cause of action for deprivations
of any right secured by federal laws. 38
The Second Circuit, when faced with the same issues in Andrews v.
Maher,39 refused the supremacy clause as a basis for jurisdiction since that
clause does not itself secure rights to individuals. 40 The Andrews court also
rejected the statutory issue as providing a basis for jurisdiction, concluding
that subsection 1343(3) was not coextensive with section 1983 in actions
36. 505 F.2d at 837-38.
37. Id. at 843-44 citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974); Carleson v.
Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971), and Swift
& Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965). The Blue court concluded that "a claim that
a state statute or regulation is inconsistent with Federal law poses a constitutional
issue under the supremacy clause, jurisdictionally cognizable under § 1343(3)." 505
F.2d at 844 (emphasis added). See also Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (N.D.
Ohio 1973) (Ohio policy of denying AFDC benefits, since inconsistent with Social
Security Act, was violative of supremacy clause, which gave court federal jurisdiction
under § 1343(3)). See generally Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 125 (1965). But
see Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1974). The Second Circuit in Andrews
held that the supremacy clause does not secure rights to individuals but rather states
a fundamental structural principle of federalism. Id. at 118. See also notes 39-40 &
62-69 and accompanying text infra.
38. 505 F.2d at 836-42. With respect to the "equal rights" language of § 1343(3),
the Fourth Circuit maintained that it should be construed not so much as a term of
limitation, "but rather as a term intended to spread the jurisdictional umbrella of the
federal courts over any actions authorized under statutes enacted to give effect to the
Fourteenth Amendment, including specifically § 1983." Id. at 838.
39. 525 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1975).
40. Id. at 119. In Andrews, the court was presented with a claim that a
Connecticut regulation violated various provisions of the Social Security Act, as well
as regulations of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare that required
that AFDC aid be furnished uniformly to all those who were eligible within the state.
Id. at 115-16. The plaintiffs contended that, since the claim required ultimate resort to
the supremacy clause, it was cognizable under § 1343(3) as a deprivation of rights
"secured by the Constitution." Id. at 118. The court rejected this contention, stating
that such. A theory "transforms statutory claims into constitutional claims by verbal
legerdemain." Id. at 118-19. Although the supremacy clause invalidates state laws
that conflict with federal statutes, Andrews maintained that it was the federal statute,
and not the supremacy clause, that conferred the individual's rights. Id. Furthermore,
the court stated that the language of § 1343(3) clearly pointed to a "distinction
between rights secured by the Constitution and rights secured by 'any Act of
Congress."' Id. citing 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). The court reasoned: "If the latter were
just one variety of the former, it would be unnecessary to mention it as a separate
situation." 525 F.2d at 119.
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based upon purely statutory rights.41 The court posited that, since it was the
federal statute that conferred the individual's rights, and the Social Security
Act was not an act "providing for equal rights" within the meaning of
section 1343(3), there was no jurisdiction over claims that a state had
violated the Social Security provisions. 42
Faced with these difficult jurisdictional contentions, the Third Circuit
began its analysis in Gonzalez by positing that, since section 1983 is a
remedial and not a jurisdictional statute, the plaintiff had to assert a further
jurisdictional basis upon which the case was appropriately in federal court.43
After summarily disposing of plaintiff's claim of jurisdiction under section
1331 for lack of a sufficient amount in controversy,4 4 the court then focused
upon the constitutional claim that Gonzalez had asserted under subsection
1343(3).45
In addressing this question, the court first determined that the sole
constitutional claim presented was "'that the alleged conflict between the
state and federal statutes and regulations violates rights secured ... by the
supremacy clause."' 46 Using the Supreme Court's approach in Hagans, 7 the
court questioned whether the alleged constitutional claim was of "sufficient
substance,' 48 to meet the section 1343(3) requirements.49 The Third Circuit
41. 525 F.2d at 118. See notesl5 & 19 supra. See also McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d
246 (2d Cir. 1969). The Second Circuit there explicitly rejected plaintiff's argument
that § 1983 and § 1343 should be coextensive in order to provide a comprehensive
federal remedy. Id. at 250. McCall was an action challenging the state welfare
commissioner's decision to deduct from plaintiff's AFDC payments reimbursement for
amounts paid to a child also receiving Old Age Survival and Disability Insurance. Id.
at 247-48. Noting the difference in language between the two sections, the court
concluded that there is no indication of congressional intent to provide § 1343
jurisdiction for all suits under § 1983. Id. at 250.
42. 525 F.2d at 118.
43. 560 F.2d at 164.
44. Id. The district court had taken the same approach with respect to the § 1331
claim. See note 8 supra.
45. 560 F.2d at 164.
46. Id. at 165, quoting Gonzalez v. Young, 418 F. Supp. 566, 569 (D.N.J. 1976).
47. 560 F.2d at 164. For a discussion of the Hagans "substantiality" approach, see
notes 26-27 & 32 and accompanying text supra.
48. 560 F.2d at 164-66. The Gonzalez court set forth at length the issues that had
not been reached by the Supreme Court. Id. at 164-65, citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528, 533-34 n.5 (1974), and King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.3 (1968). After
evaluating and rejecting the various alleged bases for jurisdiction, the court ended its
analysis by harmonizing the Hagans standard with Third Circuit precedent,
maintaining that courts could still afford a litigant an opportunity to press statutory
§ 1983 claims in the same action, if there was a substantial constitutional claim. 560
F.2d at 168. For example, in Williams v. Wohlgemuth, 540 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1976),
state provisions of the AFDC emergency assistance program were challenged as
violative of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 166. Based upon Hagans, the Third
Circuit allowed district court jurisdiction over the case. Id. See 560 F.2d at 168-69. In
Gonzalez, the court noted that the complaint in the instant case contained vague
constitutional overtones relating to the supremacy clause, whereas the complaint filed
in Williams had alleged violations of the equal protection and due process clauses. 560
F.2d at 168-69. See also Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972) (jurisdiction over claim that state procedures for
terminating AFDC benefits were contrary to federal regulations permitted where
complaint also stated a substantial due process claim).
49. 560 F.2d at 165-66.
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expressed its complete agreement with the Second Circuit's position in
Andrews,5° that the supremacy clause does not "'secure rights to individu-
als' "15 and, therefore, that the plaintiffs claim was statutory and not
constitutional in nature.5 2 Acknowledging that its decision conflicted with
the Fourth Circuit's holding in Blue,53 the Third Circuit criticized Blue for
placing its reliance upon the Hagans passage5 4 when the Supreme Court
there had specifically left the question open. 55
Having rejected the supremacy clause as a constitutional basis for
jurisdiction, and thus reducing the plaintiffs claim to a statutory question,
the Gonzalez court next considered whether the denial of welfare benefits
resulting from the discrepancy between state and federal laws could provide
an independent basis for jurisdiction under section 1343.56 Maintaining that
Gonzalez claimed deprivation of a right under the Social Security Act which
contains the AFDC provisions, the court adopted the more restrictive
Andrews approach - that the Social Security Act simply was not designed
to provide for the "equal rights of citizens" for purposes of section 1343(3).- 7
In doing so, the Third Circuit again was rejecting the approach advocated in
50. Id. at 165. For a discussion of the Andrews court's resolution of the question
whether an allegation that a state law conflicts with federal law establishes a
sufficient constitutional claim under the supremacy clause to establish § 1343(3)
jurisdiction, see notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
51. 560 F.2d at 166, quoting Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113, 118-19 (2d Cir.
1975).
52. 560 F.2d at 166.
53. Id. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's holding in Blue that a claim that a
state statue is void as contrary to a federal statute rests in the supremacy clause, see
notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
54. 560 F.2d at 166. For the pertinent text of the Hagans passage, see note 32
supra.
55. 560 F.2d at 166. The Third Circuit asserted that "[a] statement which
specifically does not meet a question cannot be cited as authority for answering it."
Id. See note 32 supra.
56. 560 F.2d at 166.
57. Id., quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). The court rejected plaintiffs contention
that the qualifying language of § 1343(3) was superfluous, noting the discrepancy in
language between § 1983 and § 1343. Id. For a discussion of this discrepancy, see notes
15-25 and accompanying text supra. For discussion of AFDC as a category of
assistance adminstered under the Social Security Act, see note 1 supra.
The Gonzalez court stated: "[A]bsent convincing evidence to the contrary,.
we must believe that Congress intended to separate the jurisdictional section from the
section fashioning a remedy, which it did, and that 'equal rights' does have a
meaning of its own." 560 F.2d at 167, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). The Gonzalez
court also rejected the contention that the Social Security Act is one "providing for the
protection of civil rights," so as to bring this action under § 1343(4). 560 F.2d at 167,
quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
Plaintiff made an ancillary argument that "section 1983 itself provides ajurisdictional basis under section 1343(4) by virtue of its very existence as a statute
protecting "'rights, privileges and immunities."' 560 F.2d at 167-68, quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 580
n.39 (5th Cir. 1969). The court rejected this approach, stating that § 1983 does not in
and of itself create or secure any substantive rights, but merely authorizes a cause of
action when rights secured by another source have been infringed. 560 F.2d at 168.
See note 19 supra.
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Blue, where the Fourth Circuit had interpreted all wholly statutory 1983
claims as within the jurisdictional protection of section 1343. 58
Finally, with regard to the policy considerations that a federal forum is
best suited for adjudicating a claim of this type, 59 the Third Circuit
maintained that it had no choice but to act within its jurisdictional limits.6°
The court also suggested that, until Congress mandated otherwise, claims
such as that pressed by Gonzalez could be adjudicated in federal court only
when pendent to a sufficient constitutional claim in the same action. 61
With respect to plaintiff's claim that the alleged conflict between state
and federal law violated her rights under the supremacy clause,62 the
Gonzalez court conceded that the Blue court had been correct in finding that
such a conflict does rest within the supremacy clause.6 3 However, the Third
Circuit rejected the Blue court's recognition of jurisdiction from this finding
because of Blue's reliance upon the Hagans passage, which specifically
stated that it was not directly addressing the issue. 64 It is submitted
however, that although the Hagans passage did not directly address the
issue of section 1343 jurisdiction over supremacy clause claims, it may be
inferred from that passage that the Court's ultimate disposition of this issue
will be in the affirmative.6 5
The Hagans passage had noted that a suit to invalidate a state policy
that conflicts with a federal statute cannot succeed without resort to the
Constitution. 66 The aspect of Blue that is subject to criticism lies in the
Fourth Circuit's leap from the recognition that such a claim is an issue
under the supremacy clause to the assumption that the issue is a right
58. 560 F.2d at 167, citing Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974).
59. 560 F.2d at 169.
60. Id. The court stated:
We are not unmindful of the merits of the argument that a federal forum is
best suited for adjudicating a claim that federal monies are not being allocated
according to a mandatory federal scheme.... It may well be that a federal
forum has the necessary sensitivities to handle these claims, but it is for
Congress to so determine.
Id.
The court noted that Congress had not provided for enforcement of the AFDC
program without regard to jurisdictional amount. Id. The Third Circuit substantiated
its position with reference to various authorities, including the American Law
Institute, which had, in 1969, recommended amending § 1331 to provide original
jurisdiction without regard to jurisdictional amount. Id. See ALI STUDY ON THE
DIvISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969) [hereinafter
cited as ALI STUDY]. The court also noted a statement by Senator Quentin Burdick in
support of the recommendation to the effect that "'[the need for a federal forum is no
less in small cases than in large cases."' 560 F.2d at 169, quoting 119 CONG. REC.
16,679 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Burdick). Nevertheless, the Third Circuit concluded that
"until Congress acts we are not in a position to adjudicate claims" such as that
pressed by Gonzalez. See text accompanying notes 91-92 infra.
61. 560 F.2d at 169.
62. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
63. 560 F.2d at 166; see notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
64. See notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text supra.
65. See Outlook for Welfare Litigation, supra note 1, at 902-03.
66. See note 32 supra.
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"jurisdictionally cognizable under section 1343(3)".67. This leap, however,
may be warranted by the Hagans passage itself, since all of the decisions
cited therein albeit in slightly different contexts, found the supremacy clause
to be an appropriate basis for jurisdiction.68 Moreover, at least one
commentator has interpreted Hagans as suggesting that a supremacy clause
question "is itself a constitutional matter over which the federal courts have
jurisdiction under section 1343(3). . .. -69 Blue's reliance upon Hagans, it is
therefore submitted, was not as farfetched as the Third Circuit apparently
supposes.
The Third Circuit's analysis of the statutory aspect of the plaintiffs
claim is also subject to criticism. Federal jurisdiction of nonconstitutional
challenges to welfare regulations requires a separate analysis and depends
upon the construction of the scope of sections 1983 and 1343.70 Although
some courts and commentators have concluded that, "when analyzed in
light of [the] legislative history and statutory purpose [section 1343] should
67. 505 F.2d at 844 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's
conclusion, see notes 34-37 & 53-55 and accompanying text supra.
68. See note 32 supra; Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971) (previous
determination by Court that state AFDC laws do not conform to Social Security Act
invalidated state laws under supremacy clause); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S.
111, 125 (1965) (determination that state statute is void as contrary to federal statute
is governed by supremacy clause); Connecticut Union Welfare Employees v. White, 55
F.R.D. 481, 486 (D. Conn. 1972); ("If the state policy is in conflict with the federal
statute,. . . this would deny plaintiffs a right secured by the Constitution - namely,
the right to secure the benefit of the Supremacy Clause"). It is clear, therefore, that the
Blue court's reliance upon Hagans rested indirectly upon other Supreme Court cases
as well. See also Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
It is also interesting to note that one court, while feeling compelled to follow
Andrews, hinted that that Second Circuit decision might not be permanent law. See
Aitchison v. Berger, 404 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Aitchison court stated:
"Although the Supreme Court has left open the issues of whether all Supremacy
Clause and § 1983 claims are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and/or (4), the
Second Circuit [in Andrews] has, at least temporarily, resolved those same issues
against jurisdiction". Id. at 1143 n.16 (emphasis added). See also Hundt, Suing
Municipalities Directly-.nder The Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 770, 772
n.12 (1975), citing Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974) ("Any federal statutory
right may be enforced under section 1983, in addition to any constitutional right")(emphasis added).
69. See Outlook for Welfare Litigation, supra note 1, at 903. The author's full
reasoning is as follows:
Although in recent years the Supreme Court has consistently refused to decide
whether this conflict question is itself a constitutional matter over which the
federal courts have jurisdiction under section 1343(3), the Hagans court
suggested that the question may ultimately be answered in the affirmative. The
court noted that a suit to invalidate a state policy which conflicts with a federal
statute cannot succeed without resort to the federal Constitution. It further
acknowledged that such a claim, "although denominated 'statutory,' [was] in
reality a constitutional claim arising under the supremacy clause."
One can present a compelling argument that section 1343(3) provides a
proper jurisdictional basis for a federal court to entertain an independent
supremacy clause claim. Accordingly, whenever a welfare litigant is unable to
fashion an alternative colorable constitutional issue, the allegation that there is
a conflict between state and federal law should be presented in this manner.
Id. (Footnotes omitted).
70. See text accompanying notes 15-25 supra.
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provide the welfare litigant a path into the courthouse," 71 the Gonzalez
decision indicates that this viewpoint is not being universally recognized. 72
Part of the disagreement on this point is attributable to the fact that it is
difficult to draw firm conclusions specifically regarding welfare litigation
from the legislative history of the statutes.73 But a respectable number of
authorities, including the Fourth Circuit in Blue, have agreed that there is
no congressional intent that section 1343(3) should be interpreted more
narrowly than section 1983.7 4 It is submitted, therefore, that the Third
Circuit's decision regarding the statutory issue may be criticized for
rejecting plaintiff's statutory claim under the rationale that the Social
Security Act is not a statute providing for the protection of equal rights or
civil rights within the meaning of section 1343. 7 5 Unlike the Blue court, the
Third Circuit did not take into account the legislative history and scope of
the general statutes at issue. 76 In fact, the Gonzalez court summarily
disposed of Blue's in-depth discussion of the congressional intent and
legislative history of sections 1983 and 1343,77 as well as the numerous
authorities that also have maintained that the "equal rights" language of
section 1343(3) was not meant as a limitation on section 1983, but that the
substantive and jurisdictional statutes were clearly intended to complement
one another. 78 As stated by one commentator, 79 there is no indication that
Congress intended that there be section 1983 actions that could not be
reached jurisdictionally by section 1343, and, rather than resorting to
technical language in section 1343(3) to thwart a federal remedy, courts
should give the statutes a coextensive construction to afford the litigant a
federal remedy, as Congress had contemplated.80 Even the Second Circuit in
Andrews acknowledged both the propriety of a federal forum in that case
and the hypertechnicality of permitting "subtle analysis of jurisdictional
71. Herzer, supra note 13, at 1. See also 505 F.2d at 837.
72. See Herzer, supra note 13, at 1. But see Aitchison v. Berger, 404 F. Supp. 1137
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court in Aitchison stated: "Jurisdiction in welfare cases is a re-
current issue, regularly resolved for plaintiffs." Id. at 1142 (footnote omitted).
73. For an analysis of the conflicting interpretations drawn from the legislative
history of § 1983 and § 1343, see notes 15-25 and accompanying text supra. See also
Herzer, supra note 13 at 7.
74. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra; note 82 and accompanying
text infra.,
75. See 560 F.2d at 166.
76. See id. at 166-67.
77. Id.
78. Id. For a discussion of the authorities supporting this theory, see notes 22-24
and accompanying text supra; note 82 and accompanying text infra. The Gonzalez
court rejected the lengthy discussion of the scope of § 1983 and § 1343 as examined in
Blue and in commentaries cited therein by stating: "[A]bsent convincing evidence to
the contrary, . .. we must believe that Congress intended to separate the
jurisdictional section from the section fashioning a remedy". 560 F.2d at 166-67
(emphasis added). In light of this issue, which has invoked much scholarly comment,
it is difficult to comprehend how the Third Circuit could so lightly reject the
construction given to the statutes by such authorities by merely stating "absent
convincing evidence to the contrary . Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
79. See Cover, supra note 24.
80. Id. at 24-25.
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statutes to accomplish a result which, on policy grounds, [it] found
uncongenial." 8' Thus, where the specific legislative intent regarding
jurisdiction over the underlying statute is unclear, it is a disturbing result to
permit the frustration of individuals' rights on mere jurisdictional technical-
ities that are premised upon statutory construction.82
Finally, and most significantly, there are multifaceted policy considera-
tions in favor of federal courts entertaining jurisdiction over statutory
welfare claims.83 First, a federal forum is most appropriate for claims such
as that in Gonzalez because federal concepts are at issue. Most of the legal
questions presented by welfare cases are federal in nature, the central focus
being upon whether the state statute violates the United States Constitution
or is contrary to the Social Security Act, a federal statute.84 Moreover,
categorical assistance programs such as the one in Gonzalez are federally
funded, making a federal forum necessary to protect federal fiscal interests
against massive expenditures by possibly invalid state programs.85
Furthermore, proper adherence to uniform standards is an important
consideration in determining the validity of state categorical assistance
programs.8 6 Since the determination of their validity depends frequently
upon federal law, the federal courts are more likely than the state courts to
interpret the programs in a uniform, effective manner.87
81. 525 F.2d at 120. For a discussion of the many policy considerations favoring
federal jurisdiction, see notes 83-90 and accompanying text infra.
82. See Cover, supra note 24, at 25. The author there expressed the same idea in
very strong language: "It would be idiotic to permit subtle distinctions in language
where there is no evidence of any intent to make distinctions in meaning accomplish
a result which would be deplorable in any event." Id. See also H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 123 (1973).
83. See generally Herzer, supra note 13, at 9.
84. See Note, supra note 7, at 95; 59 MINN. L. REV. 761, 772 (1975), For the
Gonzalez court's recognition of this point, see 560 F.2d at 169. See also Welfare
Challenges, supra note, at 1413.
85. See note 1 supra. See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). In Rosado,
the Supreme Court examined the policy considerations in favor of federal jurisdiction
over welfare claims. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, concluded:
[W]e find not the slightest indication that Congress meant to deprive federal
courts of their traditional jurisdiction to hear and decide federal questions in this
field. It is . . . peculiarly part of the duty of this tribunal, no less in the welfare
field than in other areas of the law, to resolve disputes as to whether federal
funds allocated to the States are being expended in consonance with the
conditions that Congress has attached to their use. As Mr. Justice Cardozo
stated, .... "[Wlhen [federal] money is spent to promote the general welfare, the
concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not the states."
Id. at 422-23, quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937). See generally
Welfare Challenges, supra note 1, at 1405; 59 MINN. L. REV. 761, 772 (1975).
86. See 59 MINN. L. REV. 761, 772 (1975).
87. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 550 (1973); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966). See also Welfare Challenges, supra note 1, at 95; 59 MINN. L.
REV. 761, 772 (1975). One author further noted that a state court's holding that a state
statute is invalid has a less forceful impact on a state agency to effectuate changes
than does a similar federal decision. Note supra note 7, at 96. Accord, Herzer, supra
note 13, at 10.
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Lastly, from a practical standpoint, a federal court is simply a better
forum for the needy welfare recipient. The federal judiciary generally is
regarded as more impartial than the state courts, and thus may have more
regard for constitutional liberties. 88 In keeping with this point is also the
consideration that a narrow construction of the jurisdictional statute under
which section 1983 claims are brought 9 would defeat the congressional
purpose of section 1983 to create a federal cause of action with its
accompanying federal remedies, regardless of the existence of state judicial
remedies.90
Not unmindful of the suitability of a federal forum,91 the Third Circuit
simply would not extend jurisdiction beyond what it considered to be its
jurisdictional limits.92 If the Third Circuit is to be criticized, there is no doubt
that much of the blame for the results in Gonzalez must be placed on
Congress, which has not provided for the enforcement of AFDC benefits
without regard to jurisdictional amount,9 3 and on the Supreme Court, for
88. See Herzer, supra note 13, at 10; 59 MINN. L. REV. 761, 772 (1975).
89. For an explanation of the narrow construction imposed on § 1343, see text
accompanying notes 20-21, 25 & 39-42 supra.
90. See Note, supra note 7, at 114. According to its author, the purpose of § 1983 is
to provide a federal judicial remedy for deprivations of rights under color of state law,
regardless of whether or not the state courts provide a remedy. Id.
91. 554 F.2d at 169. See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra. See also
Herzer, supra note 13, at 19. Professor Herzer commented: "Federal courts, concerned
with federal rather than state development of the congressional vision of the general
welfare, should interpret their powers to extend to the claims of the welfare plaintiff".
Id.
See also H. FRIENDLY, supra note 82, at 123. In discussing the present "patch-
work structure" of federal question cases, Judge Friendly maintained that Congress
should move in one direction or another to alleviate judicial inconvenience, stating:
The distinction whereby no jurisdictional amount is required for actions
challenging acts of state officers as violating the Constitution but is required
when they are claimed only to have violated a statute has proved particularly
troublesome in the growing field of welfare litigation. In one opinion of mine, the
discussion of jurisdictional problems required six printed pages which must be as
tiresome to read as they were to write; when we finally reached the merits, only
half a page was needed to sustain the plaintiffs' claim that New York's practices
with respect to terminating benefits under federally assisted programs, although
not unconstitutional, violated valid federal regulations. Clearly the case was
appropriate for a federal court, and we should have been able to reach the
substantive issue without delay.
Id. citing Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944
(1972).
92. 560 F.2d at 169. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
93. 560 F.2d at 169. In 1958, amendments to § 1331 were enacted which merely
changed the amount in controversy requirement and prohibited removal of workmen's
compensation cases. See Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1, 72 Stat. 415
(codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)). See 59 MINN. L. REV. 761, 778-79 & n.118 (1975).
The author there criticizes the lack of congressional action in his discussion of
Hagans, stating that Congress had not reviewed federal court jurisdiction in any
depth in almost twenty years. Id. The author suggests that if Congress had acted
upon the proposals for legislative reform in this area made by the ALI in 1969, the
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failing to provide adequate guidance in this complex jurisdictional field.9 4
The Hagans footnote passage has not provided a clear precedent. But in
view of the fact that recent cases and commentaries have given that passage
a positive inference,95 it is possible that other courts will follow. 96
Nevertheless, until the Third Circuit determines to do so, future welfare
litigants with Gonzalez claims will encounter a "significant roadblock" 97 to
federal courts and will have to remain satisfied with a state forum. 98
Vanessa Dienna Anthony
need for the rulings in Hagans would have been obviated. Id. at 779. See ALI STUDY,
supra note 60 at 489-491. Since the writing of that Note, Congress passed an
amendment to § 1331 that eliminated the amount in controversy requirement in suits
against "the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in
his official capacity." Act of October 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)). Although this indicates a step in the right
direction, it should be apparent that Congress should aid the courts in solving thejurisdictional complexity with respect to § 1343, or further amend § 1331.
94. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra. See also Andrews v. Wyman,
525 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1974). The court there stated: "We prefer to await guidance on
these jurisdictional issues, on which there is now a clear conflict among the circuits,
either from higher authority or from Congress." Id. at 120.
95. See notes 68-69 & accompanying text supra.
96. There has been a marked reluctance of federal courts to address this issue.
See, e,g., Gurley v. Wohlegemuth, 421 F. Supp. 1337, 1340 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("we need
not reach these additional and difficult jurisdictional contentions"); Mathes v.
Nugent, 411 F. Supp. 968, 970-71 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1976) ("Although we are impressed by
[Blue's] reasoning, we need 'not decide this question here").
97. Herzer, supra note 13, at 11.
98. Wherever the blame for this confusing situation is placed, the fact remains, as
one writer has observed, that future welfare litigants who "merely seek compensation
for desperately needed benefits that have been . . .withheld are left to either the
beneficence of the less-than-friendly state courts or the make-shift measures currently
being initiated by the federal courts." Outlook for Welfare Litigation, supra note 1, at
917.
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FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION - SECTION 2042(2) - POWER TO ELECT A
SETTLEMENT OPTION IN A GROUP TERM LIFE INSURANCE POLICY Is NOT
AN INCIDENT OF OWNERSHIP WITHIN MEANING OF SECTION 2042(2).
Estate of Connelly v. United States (1977)
Prior to his death, John J. Connelly, Sr., a retired employee,' had been
covered by a noncontributory group term life insurance policy.2 The only
power which the decedent possessed with respect to this policy was the
power to elect an alternate mode of payment to the beneficiary 3 by
arranging to have the monthly payments reduced by a selected percentage,
thereby extending the time period over which these payments were to be
made.4 The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (Commissioner)
claimed that the possession of this power was an incident of ownership and
included the proceeds of the life insurance policy in the gross estate of the
1. Estate of Connelly v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 815, 816 (D.N.J. 1975), aff'd,
551 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 19,77). The district court mentioned that since Connelly was
retired, he could not quit his employment and terminate his coverage. 398 F. Supp. at
816.
2. 398 F. Supp. at 816. For a reproduction of the policy, see Estate of Lumpkin v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 815, 817-21 (1971), ren'd, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973). The
policy, which had been paid for solely by the employer as part of a survivor benefit
plan, provided for a lump-sum payment at the death of the employee plus an annuity
for the next 50 months. 398 F. Supp. 816, 818. Because it was a group term policy,
Connelly could not obtain a loan against the policy or redeem it for a cash surrender
value. Id. at 817. Moreover, Connelly could not convert the policy to individual
insurance. Id. In addition, according to the law of the jurisdiction at that time, the
policy could not be assigned. Id. The beneficiaries of the policy had been irrevocably
fixed and, according to its terms, the surviving spouse was to receive the benefit
payments. Id. at 816. If there were no surviving spouse or if she died before receiving
all the payments, the next of three classes would receive the balance. Id. Specifically,
the payments would be made to the "preference relatives" of the insured. Id. First, the
proceeds would go to the minor children of the insured and then to his parents. Id. If
no preference relatives existed, then the payments would be made to other "dependent
relatives" of the insured. Id. If no eligible beneficiaries lived to receive the payments,
Connelly's estate would not be entitled to receive any payments from the insurer. Id.
Since Connelly died a widower, his son Robert became entitled to the proceeds of the
policy. Id.
3. 398 F. Supp. at 816. The election of the option plan required the mutual
agreement of Connelly, his employer, and the insurance company. Id. at 818. If
Connelly had a surviving spouse, however, he alone could have selected a different
mode of payment to his wife without the consent of the employer or the insurance
company. Estate of Connelly v. United States, 551 F.2d 545, 547 n.5 (3d Cir. 1977).
Similarly, if his spouse had survived him, she could have elected the settlement option
after his death with the consent of the employer and the insurance company. Id. at
547 n.5. Connelly's exclusive right to change the settlement option thus terminated on
his wife's death. Id.
4. 398 F. Supp. at 816. If this plan had been adopted and the beneficiary had
died before completion of the payments, the estate of the beneficiary would have
received the balance of the payments as if the option had not been elected. Id. at
816-17. Thus, the amount that any beneficiary would receive remained constant and
could not be changed by the insured. Id.
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decedent 5 under section 2042(2) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code).6 After a
claim for a refund was filed and denied,7 the executrix instituted this action
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking a
refund of the federal estate tax which had been paid under protest.8 The
district court granted the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment, 9
concluding that the decedent did not possess at the time of his death any
incidents of ownership in the policy.10 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit 1 affirmed, holding that since the decedent's
power gave him no rights to the economic benefits of the policy, he did not
possess any incidents of ownership, and therefore the proceeds should not
have been included in his gross estate. Estate of Connelly v. United States,
551 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1977).
The Revenue Act of 191812 was the first estate tax law specifically
requiring inclusion in the gross estate of proceeds from insurance policies 13
which had been "taken out" by a decedent and payable to beneficiaries other
than his estate. 14 In an attempt to clarify the precise meaning of "taken
out," the Internal Revenue Service (Service) formulated the payment of
5. Id. at 815.
6. I.R.C. § 2042(2). Section 2042 provides in pertinent part:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries. - To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the
decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the
incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other
person.
Id.
7. 398 F. Supp. at 816.
8. Id. Jurisdiction was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1970). 398 F. Supp. at
816.
9. 398 F. Supp. at 828.
10. Id. at 827.
11. The appeal was heard by Circuit Judges Rosenn, Forman, and Garth. Judge
Forman wrote the opinion.
12. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1098 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 2042).
13. Id. If a beneficiary to a policy had been designated prior to the passage of this
provision, the proceeds of the policy were not includible in the decedent's gross estate
for estate tax purposes. See Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U.S. 238 (1925). The act's legislative
history reveals congressional awareness that "[a]gents of insurance companies" had
"openly urged persons of wealth to take out additional insurance payable to specific
beneficiaries for the reason that such insurance would not be included in the gross
estate." H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918).
14. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1098 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 2042). The statute stated that the insurance proceeds were taxable
[t]o the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under
policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the extent of the
excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as
insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life.
Id.
Since 1918, the only change with respect to insurance payable to the executor
has been the deletion of the requirement that the insurance be "taken out" by the
decedent. See I.R.C. § 2042(1).
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premiums test which equated the insured's taking out a policy with his
paying the premiums. 15 As a result of a decision of the United States
Supreme Court in 1929,16 the applicable standard was changed and
insurance proceeds were taxable if, in addition to paying the premiums on
the policy, the insured possessed certain incidents of ownership in the
policy. 17 Under the subsequent Revenue Act of 1942,18 however, the proceeds
15. See Treas. Reg. 37, art. 32 (1919). Thus, insurance was "taken out" by the
decedent whether or not he had made the technical application so long as he had paid
the premiums. Id. Where the policy was payable to beneficiaries other than the gross
estate of the insured, the proceeds were taxable only where the insured had paid the
premiums and the proceeds payable to these beneficiaries exceeded $40,000. Id.
16. Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929). In Chase, the insured
had named his wife as the beneficiary on several insurance policies. Id. at 332.
Although the executor of the estate argued that the termination at death of the power
of the insured to change beneficiaries and the resultant passing to the designated
beneficiaries of all rights under the policies was not a legitimate subject of a transfer
tax, the Court stated:
A power in the decedent to surrender and cancel the policies, to pledge them
as security for loans and the power to dispose of them and their proceeds for his
own benefit during his life which subjects them to the control of a bankruptcy
court for the benefit of his creditors, . . . and which may, under local law
applicable to the parties here, subject them in part to the payment of his debts,
• . . is by no means the least substantial of the legal incidents of ownership, and
its termination at his death so as to free the beneficiaries of the policy from the
possibility of its exercise would seem to be no less a transfer within the reach of
the taxing power than a transfer effected in other ways through death.
Id. at 335 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
17. See Treas. Reg. 70, arts. 25, 27 (1929). By 1934, however, the Treasury issued
another regulation which made payment of premiums and incidents of ownership
alternative tests rather than conjunctive ones. Treas. Reg. 80, arts. 25, 27 (1934). See
also Treas. Reg. 80, arts. 25, 27 (1937).
In Eisenstein, Estate Taxes and The Higher Learning Of The Supreme Court,
3 TAx L. REv. 395 (1948), the author stated:
The words "taken out" had three independent meanings, yet only one of
these meanings was really significant. Insurance receivable by specific
beneficiaries was not taxable unless "the decedent possessed at the time of his
death any of the legal incidents of ownership." But under the regulations a
decedent who possessed any of these incidents had necessarily "taken out" the
insurance. It was therefore immaterial whether he or someone else had paid the
premiums.
Id. at 518-19 (footnote omitted), quoting Treas. Reg. 80, art. 27 (1934).
During this period, the courts struggled to determine the meaning of the
ambiguous term "taken out" in a variety of complex situations. For example, one
court looked to statutory construction and decided that "where life insurance proceeds
are involved, the initial inquiry is as to what, if anything, has passed from the
decedent because of his death." Walker v. United States, 83 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir.
1936) (emphasis in original). For cases dealing with insurance which had been paid
out of community property, see, e.g., Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938); Bank
of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1937);
Newman v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 449 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 600 (1935). See
also Helvering v. Reybine, 83 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1936) (part of premiums paid by both
beneficiary and insured); Wilson v. Crooks, 52 F.2d 692 (W.D. Mo. 1931) (policy
premiums paid by corporation).
Recognizing this confused situation, in 1941 the Treasury restored the
premium payment test and insurance proceeds once again became taxable whether or
not the insured possessed any incidents of ownership at his death. See T.D. 5032,
1941-1 C.B. 427.
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1942, ch. 619, § 404, 56 Stat. 944 (current version at
I.R.C. § 2042).
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were included in the gross estate if the insured either paid the premiums or
possessed incidents of ownership in the policy. 19 Ultimately, the Revenue
Act of 1954 adopted the incidents of ownership test as the sole criteria for
taxability.2
Absent a statutory definition, 2' the courts have determined that
incidents of ownership include22 the power to change the beneficiary of the
19. Id. The $40,000 exemption and the terminology "taken out" were removed. Id.
See note 14 supra. In addition, insurance policies were now taxable
[t]o the extent of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance
under policies upon the life of the decedent (A) purchased with premiums, or
other consideration, paid directly or indirectly by the decedent, in proportion that
the amount so paid by the decedent bears to the total premiums paid for the
insurance, or (B) with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of
the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any
other person.
Int. Rev. Code of 1942, ch. 619, § 404, 56 Stat. 944 (current version at I.R.C. § 2042).
20. I.R.C. § 2042(2). See note 6 supra.
21. Although the Code does not define "incidents of ownership," the Treasury
Regulations state:
[T]he term "incidents of ownership" is not limited in its meaning to ownership of
the policy in the technical legal sense. Generally speaking, the term has
reference to the right of the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the
policy. Thus, it includes the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or
cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the
policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value
of the policy, etc.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2), T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277. This language apparently
originated from Congress's attempt to enumerate those incidents of ownership that
will render a policy taxable:
Examples of such incidents are the right of the insured or his estate to the
economic benefits of the insurance, the power to change the beneficiary, the
power to surrender or cancel the policy, the power to assign it, the power to
revoke an assignment, the power to pledge the policy for a loan, or the power to
obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy.
Incidents of ownership are not confined to those possessed by the decedent in a
technical legal sense.
H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 491 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 677 (1942). Thus, while the regulations state that the term involves the right "to
the economic benefits of the policy," the congressional reports merely list the right to
economic benefits an an example of an incident of ownership. Id. This difference in
language was interpreted in one case to signify that the insured himself must have
the power to benefit economically from the policy. Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner,
468 F.2d 699, 701-02 (2d Cir. 1972). One commentator has noted that "such a
conclusion is difficult to reach from what may have been an unintentional change in
language." Note, Estate Taxation of Life Insurance Policies Held by the Insured as
Trustee, 32 MD. L. REv. 305, 310-11 n.23 (1972).
22. The courts have also held that certain rights are not to be considered
incidents of ownership. For example, the power to cancel a group term life insurance
policy simply by terminating employment is not an incident of ownership. See
Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Rev. Rul. 72-307, 1972-1 C.B.
307. In Landorf, the court stated:
[W]e do not believe that Congress intended to include the power to terminate
employment, a right which everyone can exercise at any time, to be an "incident
of ownership" in property simply because the property involved is somehow
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policy,23 to surrender or cancel the policy,24 to pledge the policy as collateral
for a loan,2 5 to obtain a loan against the surrender value of the policy, 26 to
assign or revoke an assignment of the policy, 27 and to regain a reversionary
related to the employment. The exercise of the right to terminate employment in
no way derogates the rights in the property assigned.
408 F.2d at 469.
In addition, the right to receive dividends on a policy has been deemed to be
only a reduction in premiums and therefore not an incident of ownership. See, e.g.,
Estate of Chester H. Bowers, 23 T.C. 911, 917 (1955), acq. 1955-2 C.B. 4; Estate of
Louis J. Dorson, 4 T.C. 463, 469 (1944), acq. 1945 C.B. 3. See also Cowles v. United
States, 152 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1945) (insured's ability to allow the policy to lapse for
failure to pay premiums not considered an incident of ownership); Estate of Jordahl v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 92, 96-97 (1975), acq. 1977-1 C.B. 1 (decedent's privilege to
substitute policies of equal value into trust agreement does not require inclusion of
policy's proceeds in gross estate).
23. See Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1929); Hall v.
Wheeler, 174 F. Supp. 418, 421 (D. Me. 1959). This right alone is enough to require the
inclusion of the policy's entire proceeds in the gross estate. See Singer v.
Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 1952).
Furthermore, where the insurance policies are held in an irrevocable trust and
the insured retains the right to change the beneficiaries, such power will be considered
an incident of ownership. See Farwell v. United States, 243 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1957).
One court has held, however, that where the beneficiaries had been irrevocably
designated and had themselves paid all the premiums, the insured did not possess an
incident of ownership. See Morton v. United States, 457 F.2d 750, 753-55 (4th Cir.
1972).
Where an insured merely retains a veto power over an attempted beneficiary
change on a policy owned by his employer, he still possesses an incident of ownership.
See Schwager v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 781, 792 (1975). The Schwager court noted:
"The fact that his power was one of a negative cast makes it no less an incident of
ownership .... " Id. at 791. See also Rev. Rul. 75-70, 1975-1 C.B. 301.
Moreover, where the right to change the beneficiary is reserved by a
corporation in which the insured is the sole stockholder, the policy proceeds may be
included in the gross estate of the insured. See Cockrill v. O'Hara, 302 F. Supp. 1365
(M.D. Tenn. 1969); Estate of Huntsman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 861 (1976), acq.
1977-1 C.B. 1. See also T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277.
24. See Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247, 249 (1st Cir. 1945). In addition, courts
have ruled that where the insured created an irrevocable trust and retained the right
to either surrender or cancel the insurance policies, the retention of this power was an
incident of ownership. See, e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 262 F.
Supp. 27, 29 (E.D. Mo. 1966); Estate of Myron Selznick, 15 T.C. 716, 729 (1950), aff'd
per curiam, 195 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1952).
The power of a New York Stock Exchange member to sell his seat and obtain
the surrender value, thereby divesting his wife's potential death benefits of $20,000,
has been adjudicated to be an incident of ownership. See Commissioner v.
Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288, 292-93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950).
25. See, e.g., Prichard v. United States, 397 F.2d 60, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1968); Ballard
v. Helburn, 9 F. Supp. 812, 814 (W.D. Ky. 1933), aff'd per curiam, 85 F.2d 613 (6th Cir.
1936); Estate of Krischer v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 821, 825 (1973).
26. See Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564, 566-68 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd per
curiam, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953).
27. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 682-84 (1965);
Caldwell v. Jordan, 119 F. Supp. 66, 68 (N.D. Ala. 1953); Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp.
564, 566-68 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953). It should be
noted that an effective assignment of a group term life insurance policy may remove
the proceeds of the policy from the gross estate for estate tax purposes. See Landorf v.
United States, 408 F.2d 461, 465-68 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Estate of Max J. Gorby, 53 T.C. 80,
91 (1969), acq. 1970-1 C.B. xvi; Rev. Rul. 69-54, 1969-1 C.B. 221.
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interest in the policy.28 If any of these incidents are possessed by the
insured29 and are "exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other
person," 3 the proceeds of the policy will be included in his gross estate.31 In
28. See Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969). See also I.R.C.
§2042(2); Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(3) (1958).
29. Actual physical possession of the policy is not a determinative factor since
some rights of the insured may be exercisable without physical control of the policy.
See United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1966) (son's
policy was included in his gross estate even though father, as beneficiary, applied for
policy, paid premiums, and kept the policy); Estate of Piggott v. Commissioner, 340
F.2d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 1965) (company's possession of policy was not conclusive on
issue whether proceeds were included in decedent's gross estate); Fried v. Granger, 105
F. Supp. 564, 566-68 (W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953)
(although decedent did not retain possession or pay the premiums, policy was
included in his gross estate).
As the Rhode Island Hospital court explained: "Power can be and is exercised
by one possessed of less than complete legal and equitable title. The very phrase
'incidents of ownerships' connotes something partial, minor, or even fractional in its
scope. It speaks more of possibility than of probability." 355 F.2d at 10.
Similarly, the physical impossibility of exercising authority over the policy is
not controlling. In Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965), a flight
insurance policy on the husband's life was in the physical possession of the wife who
was the beneficiary. Id. at 679-80. The Supreme Court stated: "[E]state tax liability
for policies 'with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the
incidents of ownership' depends on a general, legal power to exercise ownership,
without regard to the owner's ability to exercise it at a particular moment." Id. at 684,
quoting I.R.C. § 2042(2). Cf. Estate of Dawson v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 837 (1972),
aff'd mem., 480 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1973) (where wife died leaving will naming husband
as residuary legatee and husband died one hour later, court held that husband had no
powers of disposition and therefore no incidents of ownership).30. I.R.C. § 2042(2). See note 6 supra. As to the meaning of this requirement, one
court has stated:
It makes no difference whether under the trust instrument the decedent may
initiate charges or whether he must merely consent to them. In either case only
the three parties acting together can modify the trust. If the decedent acting with
others can effectively change the beneficiary of the policy, he possesses an
incident of ownership.
Commissioner v. Estate of Karagheusian, 233 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1956) (citations
omitted). In Karagheusian, the wife placed a policy on her husband's life in a trust,
and retained the power to modify the trust only upon the consent of her husband and
their daughter or the survivor of them. Id, at 198-99. Therefore, the court included the
proceeds of the policy in the husband's gross estate. Id. at 200. See, e.g., Nance v.
United States, 430 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1970) (insured could change beneficiary of
policies only with beneficiary's consent); Altshuler v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 456
(S.D. Mo. 1958) (consent of pension committee and trustee required for insured to
designate or change beneficiary); Goldstein's Estate v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 677
(Ct. Cl. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955) (consent of insured and beneficiary was
essential to make any change in policy). But see Morton v. United States, 457 F.2d
750, 753-55 (4th Cir. 1972) (under West Virginia law, insured did not possess any
incidents of ownership since irrevocably designated beneficiary who paid all
premiums could act without the consent of the insured).
For an application of this principle to a partnership agreement, see Estate of
Infante v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 903 (1970); Estate of Fuchs, 47 T.C. 199
(1966), acq. 1967-1 C.B. 2. See generally Flannery, The Case of Est. of Howard Infante
Denied Validity by IRS Internal Ruling, 55 TAXES 146 (1977).
For an overall discussion of when an insured has possession, either alone or
in conjunction with another person, see generally Eliasberg, IRC Section 2042 - The
Estate Taxation of Life Insurance: What Is an Incident of Ownership?, 51 TAXES 90,
94-106 (1973).
31. I.R.C. § 2042(2).
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determining whether the insured retained any of these powers, most courts
will not look at the intent of the parties involved, but rather will confine
their inquiry to the actual terms of the policy.32
In May Billings,33 a case decided in 1937, the Board of Tax Appeals was
confronted with another possible incident of ownership - the power to elect
a settlement option.A4 The Board determined that the insured did not have
control of the proceeds and excluded the insurance policies from his gross
estate. 35 The Board concluded that "[t]he mere right to say when the
proceeds of the insurance policies should be paid to the beneficiary does not
amount to a control of the proceeds. '36
32. Most courts have held "'policy facts' (reservation of rights in the policy)
impregnable to attack from 'intent facts.'" United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Co., 355 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1966) (citations omitted) (although the son treated the
policy as his father's property, the terms of the policy provided that the son retained
control and the policy was included in the son's gross estate). See Nance v. United
States, 430 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1970) (extrinsic evidence as to custom and practice of
insurer was neither relevant nor admissible to rebut "policy facts"). This situation
often arises where a corporation retains physical custody over the policy, records it as
a corporate asset, and borrows on the policy. See, e.g., Cockrill v. O'Hara, 302 F. Supp.
1365, 1367-69 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Kearns v. United States, 399 F.2d 226, 228-30 (Ct. Cl.
1968).
In Rhode Island Hospital, however, the court commented:
To the principle of heavy predominance of the "policy facts" over the "intent
facts" there must be added the caveat that, where the insurance contract itself
does not reflect the instructions of the parties, as where an agent, on his own
initiative, inserts a reservation of right to change a beneficiary contrary to the
intentions which had been expressed to him, no incidents of ownership are
thereby created.
United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d at 13 (citations omitted). See
also Schongalla v. Hickey, 149 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 736 (1945);
National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 773 (Ct. Cl. 1950); Estate of
Bert L. Fuchs, 47 T.C. 199 (1966), acq. 1967-1 C.B. 1.
Additionally, some courts have decided that while the policy itself is a
relevant factor in determining ownership, extrinsic evidence and the parties' actual
intent must also be examined. See, e.g., Prichard v. United States, 397 F.2d 60 (5th
Cir. 1968); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 358 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1966).
For an informative discussion of this issue, see generally Eliasberg, supra
note 30, at 116-24.
33. 35 B.T.A. 1147 (1937), acq. 1937-2 C.B. 3, nonacq. 1972-1 C.B. 3. Billings was
decided in accordance with the "taken out" requirement of the Revenue Act of 1926,
ch. 27, § 302(g), 44 Stat. 71 (current version at I.R.C. § 2042). 35 B.T.A. 1151-52.
34. 35 B.T.A. at 1149. In three of the 32 life insurance policies possessed by the
insured in Billings, he had retained the right to select among several settlement plans
without the consent of the beneficiary. Id. In two of these policies, the insured could
direct that the proceeds be retained until the death of the beneficiary, at which time
the proceeds would be paid to the executor or the administrator of the beneficiary. Id.
In all three of these policies, the insured could direct payment either in fixed annual
installments or in installments calculated upon the life expectancy of the beneficiary.
Id.
35. Id. at 1152.
36. Id. Although these three policies were taken out prior to the Revenue Act of
1918, ch. 18, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1098 (current version at I.R.C. § 2042), the court noted
that it would have included the proceeds in the gross estate had the decedent
possessed control over the policies at the date of his death. 35 B.T.A. at 1150-52.
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In recent decisions, some courts have formulated an economic benefit
test to determine whether the insured possessed any of these incidents of
ownership.37 In Fruehauf v. Commissioner,3 8 the insured was co-executor
and co-trustee of a trust created as a result of his wife's death which
contained life insurance policies.3 9 The Sixth Circuit included the policies in
his gross estate,40 holding that since the insured could surrender the policies
for their cash value, he could exercise this power for his own economic
benefit.4 This economic benefit rationale was followed by the Second Circuit
in Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner,42 which involved an insured who had
been granted broad fiduciary powers as a trustee.4 3 In holding that these
powers were not incidents of ownership, 44 the court focused upon the fact
that the insured could not exercise his powers to derive any economic benefit
for himself.45
37. See notes 38-45 and accompanying text infra.
38. 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970).
39. Id. at 82. According to the provisions of the will, the husband was also named
income beneficiary of the trust. Id. The insured possessed, in a fiduciary capacity as
co-trustee and co-executor, the powers to surrender any of these policies for their cash
value and to exercise privileges of conversion. Id.
40. Id. at 84-85. The Tax Court had also included the proceeds in his estate,
reasoning that the possession of powers constituting incidents of ownership,
regardless of the capacity in which they are held, always requires inclusion in the
gross estate. Estate of Harry R. Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915, 924-26 (1968). The Sixth
Circuit rejected this "per se" rule, however, noting that the Tax Court had ignored the
fundamental nature of the fiduciary relationship recognized in earlier Tax Court
cases. 427 .F.2d at 85. See, e.g., Estate of Bert L. Fuchs, 47 T.C. 199 (1966); Estate of
NeWcomb Carlton, 34 T.C. 988 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.
1962).
41. 427 F.2d at 86. Although the decedent, at the time of his death, had not yet
been formally appointed trustee by the probate court, the Sixth Circuit did not find
this significant. Id. at 85-86.
42. 468 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1972).
43. Id. at 701. The insured had assigned his interest in nine life insurance policies
on his life to his spouse. Id. She predeceased him, however, and by her will appointed
her husband as trustee of her residuary estate which included these policies. Id. In his
capacity as trustee, the insured could distribute the principal of the trust at any time
to the current income beneficiary, thereby eliminating the share of the remaindermen
in the trust corpus. Id. Also, the insured had broad powers of manugement and control
over the corpus of the trust, including the powers to sell or mortgage the trust property
and to invest or reinvest the proceeds. Id.
44. Id. at 705.
45. Id. at 702-03. The Second Circuit, in its analysis, noted the difference in
language between the Treasury Regulation and the congressional committee reports.
Id. See note 21 supra. The Second Circuit stated:
It seems significant to us that the reference point in the regulation for "incidents
of ownership" is "the right . . . to the economic benefits of the policy," since
there was no way in which Skifter could have exercised his powers to derive for
himself any' economic benefits from these insurance policies.
Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir. 1972), quoting Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2042- 1(c)(2) (1958).
In concluding that the insured could not derive any economic benefit, the
court noted:
[I]t was the intent of Congress that § 2042 should operate to give insurance
policies estate tax treatment that roughly parallels the treatment that is given to
other types of property by § 2036 (transfers with retained life estate), § 2037
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Despite these decisions, in Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner,46 the
Fifth Circuit inferred that Congress intended life insurance proceeds to be
taxed when "the insured at death still possessed a substantial degree of
control" over the policy.4 7 The power which the insured possessed in
Lumpkin was the right to alter the time and manner of enjoyment of the
proceeds of a group life insurance policy.48 The court, relying on two trust
cases, reasoned that this power constituted a substantial degree of control
and therefore held that it was an incident of ownership. 49
(transfers taking effect at death), § 2038 (revocable transfers), and § 2041 (powers
of appointment).
468 F.2d at 702. The court reached this result from an examination of the legislative
history of the 1954 Code which rejected the premium payment test for determining
whether insurance policies are includible in the gross estate of the decedent for estate
tax purposes. Id. (citation omitted). At that time, Congress had declared that: "No
other property is subject to estate tax where the decedent initially purchased it and
then long before his death gave away all rights to the property and to discriminate
against life insurance in this regard is not justified." S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 124, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4757. In addition,
the Second Circuit relied upon the inclusion of a reversionary interest rule by
Congress:
The House and your committee's bill retains the present rule including life-
insurance proceeds in the decedent's estate if the policy is owned by him or
payable to his executor, but the premium test has been removed. To place life-
insurance policies in an analogous position to other property, however, it is
necessary to make the 5-percent reversionary interest rule, applicable to other
property, also applicable to life insurance.
468 F.2d at 702, quoting S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 124, reprinted in [1954]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4757.
Applying this reasoning to the factual situation involved in Skifter, the
Second Circuit concluded that since the insured had not retained powers over the
trust, but merely was the transferee of such powers, "it is difficult to construe this
arrangement as a substitute for a testamentary disposition by the decedent." 468 F.2d
at 704. Therefore, since the powers would not be taxable under the court's
interpretation of § 2038 of the Code relating to revocable transfers, (see I.R.C. § 2038),
the powers could not be considered an incident of ownership. 468 F.2d at 703-04. The
court concluded that Treas. Reg. § 20.2042- 1(c)(4) (1958), dealing with incidents of
ownership and trusts, must apply only to powers reserved by the transferor as trustee.
Id. at 705. See generally Note, supra note 21.
46. 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973).
47. Id. at 1095 (footnote omitted). The Fifth Circuit acknowledged, as did the
Skifter court, that Congress intended to tax life insurance policies in a manner
equivalent to other types of property. Id. at 1095 n.9; Estate of Skifter v.
Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir. 1972). However, the Lumpkin court also
declared that, with respect to other types of property in a decedent's gross estate,
substantial control was often the determining factor. 474 F.2d at 1095-96.
48. 474 F.2d at 1095. The terms of this policy were identical to the insurance
policy involved in Connelly. See notes 2-4 and accompanying text supra. However in
contrast to Connelly, the insured in Lumpkin was still employed at the time of his
death. 474 F.2d at 1092. In addition, the Fifth Circuit noted that although the insured
in Lumpkin had no right to designate the beneficiaries under the optional settlement
provision, he could have assigned all the rights which he had been granted under the
policy. Id. at 1094. See note 85 and accompanying text infra.
49. 474 F.2d at 1096-97. The Tax Court, in holding that this power was not an
incident of ownership, had relied in part upon the Billings decision. Estate of
Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 815, 824 (1971), citing May Billings, 35 B.T.A. 1147
(1937), acq. 1937-2 C.B. 3, nonacq. 1972-1 C.B. 3. For a discussion of Billings, see
notes 33-36 and accompanying text supra. To offset the impact of Billings, the Fifth
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Against this conflicting background, the Connelly court began its
analysis by rejecting the Commissioner's contentions that the decedent's
power to elect a settlement option and the right to assign this power
constituted incidents of ownership. 5° Following its discussion of the Billings,
Fruehauf, and Skifter decisions,51 the Third Circuit sought to distinguish
the factual situation in Connelly from that in Lumpkin.52 The court noted
that since Connelly was retired, unlike the insured in Lumpkin, he could not
quit his job and thereby cancel the policy.53 Also, since Connelly was not
Circuit analyzed a case in which the trustee of an irrevocable trust retained the right
to determine when the trust corpus would be enjoyed. 474 F.2d at 1096-97, citing
Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953). In Lober, the United States Supreme Court
stated: "'A donor who keeps so strong a hold over the actual immediate enjoyment of
what he puts beyond his own power to retake has not divested himself of that degree
of control which § 811(d)(2) [now I.R.C. § 2038] requires in order to avoid the tax."'
Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. at 337, quoting Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes,
326 U.S. 480, 487 (1946). See I.R.C. § 2038 (relating to the power to alter, amend,
revoke, or terminate a trust).
The Lumpkin court also discussed another Supreme Court trust case, United
States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966), in determining whether a substantial degree of
control constituted an incident of ownership. 474 F.2d at 1096-97. The trustee in
O'Malley had the power to determine when the income from the trust would be
enjoyed by the beneficiaries. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. at 629. As in Lober,
the Court in O'Malley determined that the proceeds of the policy were includible in the
gross estate of the deceased. Id. at 633.
In view of the congressional intention to treat insurance like other types of
property, the Lumpkin court reasoned that it would be anomalous to conclude that
such a power over an insurance policy was not an incident of ownership. 474 F.2d at
1097. See note 45 supra. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit, contrary to the reasoning of
the Second Circuit in Skifter, stated that "it is enough if at death the decedent merely
possessed an incident of ownership, the means by which he came into possession
being irrelevant." 474 F.2d at 1097 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). See note
45 supra. For a criticism of Lumpkin, see generally 52 N.C.L. REv. 671, 681-84 (1974).
In two recent decisions, the Fifth Circuit has extended the rationale of
Lumpkin to trust situations. See Terriberry v. United States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976) (although trust provision prohibited insured as
trustee from exercising any incidents of ownership, since insured could elect
settlement options, court held he possessed incidents of ownership); Rose v. United
States, 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975) (since insured, by exercising his rights as trustee,
could alter the time and manner of enjoyment of the p~olicy proceeds, court found a
substantial degree of control and included the proceeds in his gross estate).
The Service has recently announced that it would not follow the Skifter
court's holding that the regulations apply to reservations of powers by the transferor
as trustee, but rather would adopt the holdings in Lumpkin, Rose, and Terriberry.
Rev. Rul. 76-261, 1976-2 C.B. 276. See generally Munch, Incidents of Ownership in
Life Insurance: Courts Disagree, 115 Trusts & Est. 720 (1976).
50. 551 F.2d at 548.
51. Id. at 548-49. See notes 33-45 and accompanying text supra. The Third
Circuit disregarded the Commissioner's assertion that Billings did not control the
situation in Connelly. 551 F.2d at 548 n.9. The court noted that several of the policies
in Billings were taken out before 1918 and that the statutory incident of ownership
test had not yet been enacted. Id. However, both the Supreme Court, in Chase Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929) and the Treasury in its regulations had
applied this test prior to the Billings decision. 551 F.2d at 548 n.9. See notes 16 & 17
and accompanying text supra.
52. 551 F.2d at 549-52. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
Additionally, the Connelly court recognized that Lumpkin involved the same
insurance policy as the case sub judice. 551 F.2d at 549.
53. 551 F.2d at 549.
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survived by his spouse, he could not unilaterally exercise a settlement
option.54 Finally, the court recognized that Connelly did not have the legal
right, as did the insured in Lumpkin, to assign his power.55 Although the
Commissioner argued that Lumpkin controlled the instant case, the Third
Circuit rejected this contention.5 6 The court stated that Lumpkin did "not
accurately reflect the applicable law" and that Lumpkin's powers "were
greater than those possessed by" Connelly.5 7
The Third Circuit further reasoned that since Connelly had not
purchased the insurance, the power to select a settlement option was not a
substitute for a testamentary disposition which would avoid the estate tax.58
The court explained that if the Fifth Circuit in Lumpkin was correct in
determining that Congress intended to tax all types of property equally,
then "it would certainly seem more logical that Congress intended to equate
incidents of ownership with the right to economic benefits of the policy."5 9
Noting that the language of the applicable Treasury Regulation expressly
states that "incidents of ownership" refers "to the right of the insured or his
estate to the economic benefits of the policy,"0 the court concluded that
Connelly "had no rights whatsoever to the economic benefits of the
policy."
6 1
The Third Circuit also contended that the Fifth Circuit in Lumpkin
had misinterpreted Skifter, stating that "Skifter properly required that the
54. Id.
55. Id. In so concluding, the Third Circuit relied upon the applicable state law
which, at the time of Connelly's death, did not allow assignments of any of his rights
under the insurance policy involved in the instant case. Id. at 549 & n.15.
56. Id. at 550.
57. Id. The court remarked that even if Lumpkin was the controlling law, its
impact could be easily avoided by drafting provisions which required "employees to
make an irrevocable election at the inception of their coverage." Id. at 550 n.19, citing
10 Hous. L. REv. 984, 986 (1973).
58. 551 F.2d at 551. The court stated: "The federal estate tax is imposed on the
privilege of transferring property at death coupled with 'taxes upon other types of
transfers that have some of the aspects of a testamentary transfer and would
otherwise be resorted to in order to escape a tax limited to strictly testamentary
transfers.'" Id., quoting Lowndes, An Introduction to the Federal Estate and Gift
Taxes, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1, 4 (1965).
59. 551 F.2d at 551. The court noted that "a long line of cases" have made this
equation. Id. See, eg., Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929);
Prichard v. United States, 397 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1960). In reaching this result, the
Connelly court stated:
Lumpkin's construction of § 2042 would make it the only section in the Code that
could reach property in which the decedent had no beneficial interest and over
which he had no power exercisable for his own benefit. It is clear that Congress
does not consider life insurance to be inherently testamentary.
551 F.2d at 551 (footnotes omitted). It is interesting to note that a minority of the
House Ways and Means Committee had unsuccessfully argued that "life insurance is
not like other property. It is inherently testamentary in nature. It is designed, in
effect, to serve as a will, regardless of its investment features." H. R. REP. No. 1337,
83rd Cong., 2d Sess. B14, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4608.
60. 551 F.2d at 551, quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2), T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B.
277. See note 21 supra.
61. 551 F.2d at 551.
1977-1978]
89
Editors: Federal Statutes and Regulation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
nature and source of the power, the way in which it is held, and whether the
retention of power is a substitute for testamentary disposition of the
property, be examined. '62 In addition, the Connelly court expressed its
disapproval of the Fifth Circuit's reliance on two trust cases.6 3 The court, in
distinguishing these two cases, recognized that Connelly could only alter the
time at which the proceeds would be received. 64 Connelly could not change
the beneficiaries themselves or the amount any beneficiary would receive.65
Although Connelly could attempt to ensure that a beneficiary's estate,
rather than the beneficiary himself, would receive a portion of the insurance
proceeds, the Connelly court considered this "speculative power" insignifi-
cant as compared with the power to change beneficiaries possessed by the
decedents in the trust cases.66
Ultimately, the court concluded that "Connelly's sole power to select a
settlement option with the mutual agreement of his employer and the
insurer did not give him a substantial degree of control sufficient to
constitute an incident of ownership. '67 Therefore, relying on Billings, the
Third Circuit determined that the proceeds should have been excluded from
the decedent's gross estate.68
It is submitted that the Third Circuit's analysis in Connelly was
internally inconsistent. 69 In adopting the economic benefit test, the Third
Circuit reasoned that if Congress intended that the treatment given life
insurance conform to the treatment given other types of property, it must
have intended to equate incidents of ownership with the right to economic
benefits. 70 This reasoning, however, ignores the fact that the congressional
62. Id. According to the Third Circuit, the Lumpkin court had entirely ignored the
distinctions between the different types of property which would be taxed under other
sections of the Code. Id. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
63. Id. at 551-52. See note 49 and accompanying text supra. The Connelly court
commented that both these decisions were controlled by explicit regulations not
involved in the case sub judice. 551 F.2d at 551-52.
64. 551 F.2d at 552.
65. Id. See notes 2 & 4 supra.
66. 551 F.2d at 552. See note 49 supra. See also note 4 and accompanying text
supra.
67. 551 F.2d at 552 (citations omitted).
68. Id. The Third Circuit stated: "Notwithstanding withdrawal of acquiescence by
the Commissioner, Billings remains viable and controls the instant case as held by
the District Court." Id. (footnote omitted). For a discussion of Billings, see notes 33-36
and accompanying text supra.
69. It is interesting to note that the court's analysis was strikingly similar to that
suggested in 52 N.C.L. REV. 671 (1974).
70. 551 F.2d at 551. In its analysis, the Connelly court stated that "Congress does
not consider life insurance to be inherently testamentary." Id. (footnote omitted).
Arguably, however, life insurance is testamentary since
[t]he purchase of life insurance on one's own life is made for the avowed purpose
of providing for a fund of money to pass at death to the object of one's bounty.
Life insurance was devised and perpetuated in popularity as an effective
mechanism for creating this fund of money. The basic concept of life insurance is
the accomplishment of this goal, and all other attributes of a life insurance
contract are secondary in importance.
Groll, Some Federal Tax Aspects of Life Insurance, 15 DE PAUL L. REv. 48, 55 (1965)(footnote omitted). See note 59 supra.
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reports list the right to economic benefits as merely an example of an
incident of ownership. 71 In accepting the approach taken by the Treasury
Regulation which, unlike the congressional reports, provides that all
incidents of ownership have reference to the right to economic benefits, 72 the
court failed adequately to explain this discrepancy. 73 While it is true that a
regulation must be sustained unless it is clearly inconsistent with the
statute,74 the Third Circuit, in adopting the economic benefit test, seemingly
ignored the intent of Congress. Moreover, in light of a recent Revenue
Ruling which seems to require the inclusion of life insurance proceeds in the
gross estate even if the decedent does not have rights to any economic
benefits,7 5 the court did not provide any new analysis to dispute this
position.
7 6
In its criticism of Lumpkin, the Third Circuit properly noted the failure
of the Fifth Circuit to recognize the distinction under the Code between life
insurance and other types of property. 77 However, after recognizing that
71. See note 21 supra.
72. 551 F.2d at 551. For the text of this regulation, see note 21 supra.
73. See 551 F.2d at 547 n.7.
74. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969). In Bingler, the Supreme Court stated
that "it is fundamental, of course, that as 'contemporaneous constructions by those
charged with administration of' the Code, the Regulations 'must be sustained unless
unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes,' and 'should not be
overruled except for weighty reasons."' Id. at 749-50, quoting Commissioner v. South
Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
75. Rev. Rul. 76-261, 1976-C.B. 276, 277. Recognizing Congress' intent to parallel
the statutory scheme governing other types of property, this ruling states: "Under
these sections, it is the decedent's power at the time of death to affect the beneficial
interest or enjoyment of the property, or the income therefrom, that requires inclusion,
even though the decedent had no right to receive any of the economic benefits." Id.
For further support of this noneconomic benefit approach, see United States v. Rhode
Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966). Referring to those incidents of
ownership noted by Congress, the Rhode Island Hospital court stated: "All of these
are powers which may or may not enrich decedent's estate, but which can affect the
transfer of the policy proceeds." Id. at 11. For a further discussion of Rhode Island
Hospital, see notes 29 & 32 supra. Since this recent revenue ruling is inconsistent with
Treas. Reg. §20.2042-1(c)(2), T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, it is possible that this
regulation may be the subject of a forthcoming revision. For the text of this
regulation, see note 21 supra.
76. Several authors have suggested that, in determining whether the decedent
possessed any incidents of ownership, different standards should be used depending
on the origin of the life insurance. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD, & S. LIND,
FEDERAL ESTATE & Givr TAXATION 4-223 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as R.
STEPHENS]. For an extensive discussion of a similar "bifurcation theory," see Note,
Federal Estate Tax: Application of the Section 2042 Incidents of Ownership Concept
to the Insured's Fiduciary Estate, 60 IowA L. REV. 1319, 1352-64 (1975).
77. 551 F.2d at 552. For an analysis which considers these factual differences, see
generally R. STEPHENS, supra note 76, at 4-218.
Although Congress arguably intended to treat life insurance in a manner no
less favorable than other types of property, it is suggested that the Lumpkin court
extended this analogy beyond the meaning of Skifter by discriminating against life
insurance. In Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975), a case in which the
Lumpkin rationale was adopted, the court remarked: "Sections 2036, 2037, 2038, 2041,
and 2042 may be consanguineous, but each has an individual personality with genetic
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Lumpkin had erroneously relied upon two trust cases, 78 the Connelly court
developed an unnecessary comparison of the power possessed by the
decedents in those irrelevant cases and the power possessed by Connelly.79
Furthermore, despite the statement by the Third Circuit that Lumpkin was
not the applicable law,80 the court utilized the language of the test
formulated in Lumpkin in determining that Connelly's powers "did not give
him a substantial degree of control sufficient to constitute an incident of
ownership.""' It is suggested that this result is difficult to reconcile with the
Third Circuit's apparent acceptance of the economic benefit test.
In addition, the court's attempt to distinguish the Lumpkin case
factually was not particularly convincing. 82 Although the Third Circuit
emphasized that the decedent in Lumpkin was employed and could therefore
still quit and terminate his policy, 3 even the tax court in Lumpkin itself had
rejected this power as an incident of ownership.8 4 Furthermore, the fact that
the decedent in Lumpkin could assign his policy was mentioned by the Fifth
Circuit only after it had first concluded that the power to elect a settlement
option was an incident of ownership. 85 Finally, the Third Circuit's
awareness that Connelly, unlike the decedent in Lumpkin, had died a
widower and thus could not exercise a settlement option unilaterally was not
a valid distinction since Connelly still possessed the power to select the
settlement option "in conjunction with any other person."88
It is submitted that the decision in Connelly will widen the gulf between
the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits, which support the economic benefit
variations .... Life insurance is a specie of its own, it occupies a special place in the
tax field, and we cannot simply graft terms from one provision onto another." Id. at
265. Nonetheless, it is submitted that the Lumpkin court did precisely that by stating
that "somewhat of an anomaly would be created if power over the time and manner of
enjoyment was said to impart enough control to activate §§ 2036 and 2038 yet not
enough to make it an 'incident of ownership' within the context of § 2042." Estate of
Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092, 1097 (5th Cir. 1973). The district court in
Connelly had criticized Rose, stating that 'i]f Rose were to stand, no individual could
safely serve as trustee of a trust." Estate of Connelly v. United States, 398 F. Supp.
815, 828 (D.N.J. 1975). The Third Circuit, however, neglected to discuss this case in its
analysis.
78. 551 F.2d at 551.
79. Id. See notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
80. 551 F.2d at 550.
81. Id. at 552 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 47
supra.
82. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
83. 551 F.2d at 549. See note 22 supra.
84. See Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 815, 825 (1971).
85. Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1973).
The Lumpkin court stated at the end of its opinion that "Lumpkin could easily have
assigned the right to elect optional settlements, thereby completely divesting himself
of control over the insurance proceeds and avoiding inclusion of their value within his
gross estate. Since he did not, his estate must suffer the consequences." Id.
86. I.R.C. § 2042(2). See note 6 supra.
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test,8 7 and the Fifth Circuit which supports the substantial control test.88
This polarity will undoubtedly continue until the Supreme Court expresses
its opinion as to what constitutes an incident of ownership sufficient to
require the inclusion of insurance policy proceeds in a decedent's gross
estate.8
9
Catherine N. Jasons
87. See notes 37-45 & 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
88. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
89. See G. MAxFiELD & B. COMERFORD, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFr TAXATION 4448
(3d ed. Supp. 1977). These authors stated: "It seems that the controversy over the
concept of an incident of ownership is sufficiently mature for determination by the
Supreme Court. . . ." Id.
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